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ABSTRACT 
Saudi Arabia has embarked on the restructuring and the full privatisation of its electricity 
industry with the aim of transforming the industry from a single-buyer structure into a 
pool-based structure. The objective is to break up the industry into its main segments: 
generation, transmission, and distribution. In such a decentralised structure, the role of the 
transmission network extends well beyond mere transportation of electricity to facilitating 
the emergence of competitive markets by providing a level playing-field for the users. 
This interdisciplinary thesis is an application to the optimisation problem facing a multi- 
plant finn. with transportation costs. In the case of electricity, the optimal price at each 
point (node) on a transmission network equals the marginal cost of producing and 
transporting electricity to that point. However, the efficiency advantage of marginal pricing 
is weakened by its volatile charges and implementation difficulties in a deregulated 
market. Postage stamp rates, which are a flat amount per MW of generation capacity (or 
maximum demand), are usually used to recover transmission costs. Nevertheless, the 
simplicity of these rates comes at the expense of spatial signalling. The literature on the 
subject has included the development of the new method of electricity tracing, which 
assumes that power flows are traceable. This property makes it possible to allocate 
transmission variable (i. e. losses) and fixed costs to the users based on their 'extent of use'. 
This research study contributes to this debate by comparing, for the first time, these three 
methods by using real data. The calculation of tracing charges required the construction of 
incidence and adjacency matrices for the transmission network of the electricity company, 
SCECO-central. Thus, it was proper to use NMTLAB, which is a mathematical software 
suitable for such numerical computations. The necessary data were gather from the Load 
Flow Program of the company. The marginal loss factors were obtained from the output of 
the Optimal Power Flow for the network. The tracing allocation of losses produced nodal 
and zonal charges for either generators or demand centres based on their usage of the grid. 
These charges are simple and transparent, but there is no guarantee that they are efficient. 
However, while postage stamp rates completely ignores locational differences, the tracing 
charges have a strong similarity to the marginal charges, especially for distant users. 
Computing nodal prices is useful in evaluating the impact of tracing and marginal charges 
on net social welfare. The tracing charges tend to reduce generators' surplus without any 
increase in consumers' surplus which result in lower total surplus. On the other hand, the 
volatility of marginal charges transfers part of the surplus from one group of users to 
another but keeps total surplus unchanged. The negative impact of tracing charges on 
economic efficiency is shown to be very small. This research has demonstrated that the 
tracing charges did not alter the economic dispatching outcomes. In fact even when these 
outcomes are altered, total production costs increased by only 0.47%. Arguably the 
practicability of the tracing could induce more trade in the market which could produce 
sufficient gains to offset efficiency losses. In sum, this thesis is able to: 1) exannine 
marginal cost pricing of transmission with an emphasis on the volatility of marginal prices; 
2) confirm the inability of the postage stamp rates to produce efficient prices; 3) show that 
the tracing charges have high correlation with marginal charges, especially for zonal 
prices; and 4) conclude that if marginal pricing is not adopted in the Saudi Arabian case, 
the tracing zonal pricing would be suitable alternative, especially as the country's 
geographical characteristics define zone boundaries in a simple way. 
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INTRODUCTION 
AIMS OF THE RESEARCH STUDY 
The electricity industry in Saudi Arabia started as a profitable private enterprise. Practical 
considerations rather than ideological dogmas led to government direct intervention in this 
industry, especially since 1975. This intervention was based on the justification that there 
was an urgent need for sufficient generation, transmission and distribution capacity in the 
industry to meet the needs of a country subject to sudden economic and social 
transformation. Also, there was a social aim of providing Saudi citizens, especially in rural 
and less developed regions, with electricity services at low and affordable prices. 
It seems that pursuing this well intended policy may have made the industry, producers as 
well as consumers, more dependent on this intervention, especially as it has taken the form 
of subsidisation. The lack of interest by private investors in the electricity industry has 
been directly linked to its poor financial performance. This was disregarded in the past 
when plentiful funding was available from the government. The growing constraints on its 
budgetary allocations, due mainly to declining oil revenues, and the massive future 
investment requirements of the industry, have led to calls for more participation by the 
private sector. 
From the point view of the private sector, these investment requirements should be looked 
at as promising opportunities rather than challenges. Studying the issues facing the 
electricity industry shows that there is no lack of interest or shortage in future funding for 
the industry. Also, an improvement in its financial performance is expected to arise from 
combining the new structural reforms and the revised tariffs, on the one hand, with cost 
reduction, especially in generation, on the other. These developments are in line with the 
Sixth Development Plan (1995-1999) which considers full privatisation of the electricity 
industry as a strategic objective for the medium and long term. This objective has to be 
complemented by promoting competition and choice in as many segments of the industry 
as possible. 
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The past restructuring programmes aimed at modernising the industry with the objective of 
creating adequate supplies for industrial and residential consumers without either group 
having to meet the full cost. The current restructuring programme has the objective of 
making it a profitable and market-based industry. Thus, the immediate objective is to 
remove this industry from direct government interference in its day-to-day operations. 
The new reforms also aim at unbundling the industry into its different functions of 
generation, transmission and distribution. The competitive segment of the industry, that of 
generation, is already opened for direct investment by private independent power 
producers. This would be followed by the natural monopoly segments of transmission and 
distribution. Under the restructuring plan, the newly created holding company will be the 
owner, but not necessarily the operator, of the national transmission grid. The regional 
distribution networks will be subject to franchise bidding with the opportunity for retailing 
activities by private suppliers and other electricity traders. The industry's independent 
regulator has the function of overseeing the conduct of these different aspects of the 
industry, which include pricing and trading arrangements. In addition, the restructuring 
plan gives the regulator responsibility of preparing the industry for the creation of power 
pool where electricity is to be traded in wholesale spot market. 
Opening generation and distribution activities for private companies will require 
clarification of major issues regarding the use of the transmission network, such as 
transmission pricing. Transmission pricing becomes an important issue as the industry 
moves toward competition. In particular, competition in generation makes it necessary to 
include the cost of transmission in the evaluation of bids. Also, the contracts for 
purchasing power should specify where the electricity is bought (at which node) on the 
network. For an electricity network with no transmission losses (costs), the prices at all its 
nodes are the same. In reality, however, the price of the electricity at any node differs from 
the price at any other node by the transmission cost between the two nodes. In an ideal 
competitive market, this difference should be equal to the marginal cost of transmission, 
which is the marginal transmission loss. 
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The importance of transmission pricing becomes even more obvious as the electricity 
industry is structured to include wholesale (and retail) competition. Also, the chosen 
market mechanisms of pooling or bilateral contracting, require clear consideration of these 
prices in the electricity trading process. Thus, the evolution of the industry into a 
decentralised structure has highlighted the pivotal role of transmission prices in the co- 
ordination between generation and transmission segments. The efficient use and 
development of the electricity system are directly linked to how good these prices in 
reflecting the appropriate costs of both segments. 
In first-best situation, deriving transmission costs should be based on the method of 
marginal pricing of transmission losses. The advantage of this method in guaranteeing 
economic efficiency is diminished by the volatility of its charges and the practical 
difficulties surrounding its implementation. Therefore, alternative traditional methods such 
as the 'Postage Stamp' method, which is based on flat rate per unit of power, are used in 
real practice. The practicality of this method comes at the expense of providing the 
necessary spatial signalling. A new method has been presented lately which is based on the 
notional assumption of tracing electricity on the transmission network. The electricity 
'Tracing' method considers the proportionality in sharing the electricity flow (and losses) 
among the system users, which comprise generatores as well as load (demand) centres in 
the network. 
The objective of this thesis is to examine these three methods for pricing transmission 
costs. It contributes to the above debate by presenting, for the first time, an empirical 
comparison of the methods based on actual data. The main results of the thesis are that the 
tracing method is a compromise solution between the other two methods. Secondly, its 
departure from the marginal method would result in a minimal loss in economic efficiency. 
Thirdly, it has the advantage over the postage stamp method in its ability to give spatial 
signalling similar to that of the marginal method. Fourthly, the tracing method is very 
transparent, fair and easy to implement. Thus, in addition to its academic contribution, the 
thesis is useful for future policy making for the Saudi Arabian electricity industry or that of 
any other country embarking on privatising the industry. It is also applicable to cross- 
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border trade in electricity between countries such as those in the Arabian Gulf region and 
beyond. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis consists of nine chapters. The first chapter provides a general overview of the 
Saudi Arabian economy, its potentials and challenges. Chapter Two focuses on the 
problems facing the electricity industry and the current restructuring effort. The third 
chapter provides a literature review of the issues related to privatisation and restructuring 
in general and the electricity industry in particular. This chapter highlights the contentious 
issue of transmission pricing which is at the heart of this process. Chapter Four reviews the 
different transrMssion pricing methods that are usually considered by theorists and 
practitioners. The focus here is on the ideal method of marginal cost pricing and also on 
the novel method of electricity tracing. 
The fifth chapter is the first in a series of four empirical chapters. Using real data, this 
chapter presents and explains the main features of the tracing method. Chapter Six presents 
the main features of the marginal method and evaluates both the tracing and the postage 
stamp methods with respect to it. Chapter Seven examines the impact of demand variations 
on transmission charges under these three methods. The eighth chapter is an illustration of 
two potential applications of the tracing method to today's electricity industry. The first 
application is concerned with cross-border trade in electricity while the second deals with 
the design of access charges that recover the network fixed costs. Chapter Nine provides 
the conclusions and the main findings of this research. Also, it presents several policy 
recommendations, and suggests some relevant topics for further research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Saudi Arabian Economy 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Saudi Arabia officially follows the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence, which is often 
described as liberal on economic and business issues. This factor may have made it easier 
for the government to consider the philosophy of the free market system as the cornerstone 
of its development strategy. Hence, the lack of sufficient and adequate physical and human 
capital in the country was interpreted as evidence of market failure and the government 
took the initiative in adopting economic planning. In contrast to central planning based on 
socialist ideology followed by some Arab countries in the 1960s, economic planning in 
Saudi Arabia was intended to redistribute oil revenues, which are the dominant source of 
national wealth. 
The launching of the five-year development plans began in 1970 with emphasis on 
industrialisation as a strategic move toward achieving economic development objectives. 
These objectives included reduction in the reliance on oil revenues, economic 
diversification, increasing private sector involvement in the economy and higher 
investment in the country's human capital. The role of oil in the economy is expected to 
remain predominant in the foreseeable future. This means that economic development 
policies should be concerned not only with the welfare of today's citizens, but also with 
that of future generations. 
The diversification of the econorruc base is a long-term objective; hence, the current task 
for the country is to allocate its available resources efficiently between its different 
priorities. The clarification of the boundaries of both the private and the public sectors 
would enhance the efficiency in the economy through more specialisation. There are 
opportunity costs for govenunent activities when the private sector can perform them more 
effectively. Arguably the objective of economic diversification could be attained more 
successfully with a greater contribution from the private sector. These issues will be 
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explored in this chapter with the aims of providing an overview of the Saudi Arabian 
economy and assesses its potential and future challenges. 
1.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ECONOMY 
1.2.1 DEPENDENCY ON OIL 
Saudi Arabia has nearly 262 billion barrels of crude oil, which is 25 per cent of the total 
proven world reserves. It is the largest single oil exporter, accounting for over 30 per cent 
of total production of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
Despite thirty years of economic development, the oil sector continues to play a dominant 
role in the economy. In 1999, the production of oil and gas amounted to about 36 per cent 
of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The share of crude oil exports in total 
exports was 88 per cent and the oil revenues represented 78 per cent of total government 
revenues. These figures are lower than they were during the 1970s and 1980s, especially in 
comparison with the period of the oil boom. Nevertheless, the Saudi economy is still 
characterised, rightly, as an oil-dependent economy. 
The dependency of Saudi Arabia on a single source, oil, for its national wealth puts the 
country in an uncertain position. Robert Solow highlighted the main challenge that Saudi 
Arabia has to face. He states that: 
The Saudi Arabian economy starts with one asset: a vast pool of oil. Its job is to 
manage the use and using-up of that asset in such a way as to provide the best 
available flow of consumption benefits over time. That stream of benefits may 
well have to go on after the pool of oil is more or less exhausted, or is at least 
much diminished in value. (Torward' in Askari (1990), p. xxxiii) 
The continuous discoveries of new quantities of crude oil, at the present time, make the 
physical depletion of oil a less important issue. What is of concern, however, is the present 
fluctuation in oil revenues and the potential for substitutes in the long run. In addition, the 
world energy market has witnessed structural changes where the oil share in the total 
demand for energy sources has substantially declined. The demand for oil from OPEC has 
fell to only 35 per cent due to the competition from other oil producing countries such as 
Norway and Mexico. This means the problem that the Saudi Arabian economy has to deal 
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with is the sustainability of demand for its oil exports and the maintenance of a sufficient 
level of revenues to meet its long term development needs. 
It is worth noting that this issue has an intertemporal dimension as there is a trade-off 
between current and future consumption and, thus, has implications for the national saving 
rates. The objectives of economic development should include the achievement of a 
sustainable high standard of living, not only for the current generation, but also for future 
generations. Therefore, it is paramount for the economy to be less dependent on oil 
revenues by developing its internal sources of economic growth. This requires more 
attention to economic and financial measures which could substantially increase saving 
and investment rates in the economy. 
1.2.2 ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
The growth of the Saudi economy remains closely linked to the growth in the oil sector. 
This link means that the fluctuations in world oil prices have an indirect impact on the 
growth of GDP through government expenditures. This was not the case in 1998 when the 
oil sector had a negative growth rate of 0.5 per cent, due to the large drop in oil prices, but 
the non-oil sector grew by 2.7 per cent. Within the non-oil sector, the private sector and 
government sector grew by 2.9 per cent and 2.1 per cent respectively. This may indicate 
the increasing ability of the different economic sectors to gradually adapt to the 
uncertainties associated with fluctuations in oil revenues, especially those that began in the 
1980s. Also it reflects the potential for the different economic activities to break away 
from the influence of the oil sector if the necessary economic policies are followed. The 
following table, Table 1.1, shows the structural changes for the economy during the last 
three decades. 
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Table 1.1: The Breakdown of GDP Components and their Growth (at 1989 Constant 
Prices) 
Economic 
Sectors 
1974 1985 1998 Annual Growth 
Rate (1969-1998) 
Oil and Gas 65.3 22.5 27.3 0.5 
Agriculture 2.3 5.2 7 7.9 
Manufacturing 1.6 5.5 9.7 8.7 
Construction 4.6 13.8 9.8 8.8 
Trade 2.8 10.2 7.7 8 
Transport and Comm. 4.4 8.7 6.9 5 
Other services 19 34.1 31.6 5.1 
, GDP 100 100 1 100 3.4 
Sources: Nfinistry of Planning, 'Facts and Figures (1970-1998)'; 
SAMA, Annual Report (1999) 
Includes government services 
Table 1.1 shows that the oil and gas sector's relative contribution to the GDP was clearly 
influenced by the fluctuations in world oil prices. The high share of the non-oil sectors in 
1985 and 1998 could have been a result of the decrease in the oil sector's share to 22.5 and 
27.3 per cent in these two years respectively. Three important points can be observed from 
the above table. 
Firstly, the low growth of the oil sector, which was due to the decline in oil revenues 
during the 1980s and 1990s, coincided with much higher growth for the non-oil sectors. 
This may indicate that these sectors have been more able to minimise their direct link to 
the oil sector which caused the GDP to grow at a higher rate than the oil sector. Secondly, 
the manufacturing sector was able to surpass the agricultural sector, which could be 
explained by the fact that large part of petrochemical industry has become operational in 
1985. In addition to the natural limitation on the growth of the agricultural sector, the 
reduction in its subsidisation during the 1990s may have caused its growth to slow down. 
Thirdly, the table shows that the construction sector may have already peaked and its share 
in GDP may fall below that of the manufacturing sector, as the industrialisation effort is 
intensified. 
1.2.3 INVESTMENT AND SAVINGS 
When savings are invested in more capital, it becomes possible to increase the rate of 
economic growth and produce a higher income level; otherwise there would be what is 
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called the paradox of thrift where more saving can lead to less investment, not more. 
Hence, the industrialisation of the economy ought to be combined with a similar effort to 
enhance the contributions of the financial services such as banking and insurance in the 
economy. These services could play a major role in increasing the saving rate and 
channelling savings toward more efficient investments. Figure 1.1, below, reveals how the 
Gross Domestic Product for Saudi Arabia, or its national output, has been used during the 
last three decades. As an open economy, the GDP consists of private consumption, 
goverm-nent consumption (purchases), gross fixed capital formation (investment) and the 
current account (net exports of goods and services). 
Figure 1.1: Expenditures on GDP in Current Prices (1969-1998) 
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This figure shows that the public spending remains the driving force in the Saudi Arabian 
economy. The fluctuation in the current account share in the GDP is almost entirely a 
reflection of changes in oil exports during the last three decades. The movement of 
government consumption, private consumption and investment followed similar trends 
especially during the 1970s. The substantial increase in oil revenues made government 
spending the main factor influencing the other components of the GDP. As the main 
employer in the economy, the government was able to influence private consumption 
through hiring a significant segment of the labour force and providing a substantial 
increase in salaries. In addition to this effect, private consumption was influenced by 
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government subsidies to housing, food and public utilities services such as electricity and 
water. 
The government spending on infrastructure projects, especially in the transportation sector, 
was the main contributor to investment in the capital stock. This was the case until the 
mid-1980s when most of these projects were completed. The private sector contribution to 
investment grew in absolute terms during the same period, causing its share in capital 
formation to increase from 42 per cent in 1984 to over 61 per cent in 1998. This change 
draws attention to the impact of government spending on private investment. 
The study of many developing economies by Blejer and Khan (1984) shows that only the 
non-infrastructural composites of government spending have a crowding-out effect on 
private sector investment. However, Looney (1992,1997) studied key macroeconomic 
variables in the Saudi Arabian economy and found that the non-infrastructural as well as 
infrastructural composites of government spending have a crowding-out effect on private 
sector investment. He attributes his findings to the possibility that the short run sensitivity 
of private investment to government spending is much greater than the long run advantages 
of the availability of infrastructure services. 
Such findings show that future policies should emphasise the withdrawal of government 
from direct investment even in infrastructure. The private sector is now more able than 
before to enter into such large-scale projects when the right framework is put in place. The 
government can use schemes such as Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) or Build-Own- 
Operate-Transfer (BOOT), by involving the private sector in the expansion of the 
country's physical infrastructure. The advantage of this approach is the opportunity of the 
government to build such projects at a lower cost than if it has to raise the funds itself. In 
addition, the government does not to have to relinquish its ownership of the assets of some 
of the projects which are considered to be 'strategic'. 
Figure 1.1, above, raises various issues relating to economic policies on investments and 
savings. In relation to the other components of GDP, the investment' share has been 
declining since the early 1980s and it fell to 20 per cent by the end of 1998. This level can 
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be considered too low as it includes spending on capital depreciation. The long-term 
objective of increasing capital formation may require a higher level of investment in the 
capital stock. This level of investment is related to the existing national saving rate. 
According to Mankiw (1997), there are no agreements on what is the optimal saving rate 
as that would depend on the level of economic growth of each country. For a developed 
economy such as that of the United States, a saving rate of 15 per cent is considered 
acceptable. 
The data for the Saudi Arabian economy indicate that the saving rate ranges between 27 to 
35 per cent of the GDP. Askari (1990) believes that Saudi Arabia, at this stage of economic 
development should aim to have a saving rate of 60 per cent. This high rate would be 
necessary for maintaining the cur-rent standard of living in the future. Hence, economic 
policies would have to pursue an array of measures to reduce the total consumption, 
especially that of the government through a greater role for the private sector and 
privatisation of many public enterprises. Also further development of banking services and 
financial deepening would enhance the incentives for more saving and investment. 
1.3 INDUSTRIALISATION 
Industrialisation has been a government aim since the early 1960s as reflected by the 
establishment of the Industrial Studies and Development Center in 1965. Since then, this 
governmental organisation (renamed Saudi Consulting House) has played a major role in 
the provision of technical and industrial consultation services to private and public 
enterprises. This organisational reform was followed by the launching of the five-year 
development plans in 1970 with emphasis on industrialisation as the cornerstone of the 
government's economic diversification policy. 
The industrialisation policy offers two strategic measures for accomplishing its objectives. 
The first measure is to support industries that could produce substitutes for imports by 
utilising domestic raw materials. The aim is to provide the domestic market with needed 
products such as cement and other construction materials. The second measure is to 
develop industries that are able to use the country's available natural resources such as oil 
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and natural gas. These industries include basic industries such as petrochemical, steel and 
aluminium. 
The availability of oil revenues has made it feasible for the government to pursue these 
objectives through various means including direct and indirect subsidies, provision of soft 
loans and creation of infrastructure facilities such as industrial estates. These measures 
have been justified on the ground that these are infant industries. The reduction, if not the 
removal, of subsidies to such industries, as part of the effort to join the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), may provide a challenge for policies of self-reliance and economic 
diversification. 
1.3.1 IMPORT SUBSTITUTE INDUSTRIES 
The last three decades witnessed a clear growth in manufacturing industries (excluding 
petrochemical and related industries). These industries are geared to supply the domestic 
market and provide substitutes of imports. The annual reports of SAMA reveal that the 
number of operating factories increased from 199 in 1970 with 14,000 workers to 3,148 
factories with 292,102 workers in 1998. This growth was associated with a considerable 
increase in the capital-intensity of these industries. On average, the amount of capital per 
worker rose from SR200,000 in 1970 to SR795,000 in 1998. Thus, the high capital 
intensity of these industries may limit their potential for generating employment 
opportunities for Saudis, at least in the short term. The lack of strong reliance on economic 
feasibility studies in the past by the private sector may have led to the establishment of too 
many factories for the same products. It seems that generous industrial subsidisation may 
have resulted in an over-capacity in some of these industries. Therefore, the distinction 
between constructive competition and mere duplication should be an essential part of 
future industrialisation policies. This could be helped by reforming the existing licensing 
regimes, as these need to consider the size of the domestic market as well as the export 
potential for such industries. 
1.3.2 HYDROCARBON AND PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 
The creation of the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) 
in 1976 was 
mainly to oversee the establishment of petrochemical and 
heavy industries for the purpose 
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of utilising cheap feedstock from oil and natural gas. The available official' figures show 
that by the end of 1996, SABIC had 16 operating plants, from which 60 per cent of the 
output was accounted for by petrochemicals, 18 per cent fertilisers, 10 per cent plastics and 
12 per cent metals. The value of petrochemical exports was over SR15bn, which accounted 
for about 66 per cent of the country's exports of industrial goods. These numbers are likely 
to become higher in the next a few years as the world demand for petrochemicals is 
expected to improve and more new plants become operational. 
The exports of Saudi Arabian petrochemicals account for about 5 per cent of the world 
petrochemical market. The main markets were those of the East Asian countries but the 
financial crises of the region have had a negative effect on SABIC profits for the last two 
years. However, the financial performance of the company since the second half of 1999 
improved as some of the Asian economies began to recover. For the expected new capacity 
to be absorbed, SABIC needs to have more aggressive marketing strategies. These 
strategies should include offering a wider range of products to the existing markets, 
especially in Europe, and expanding into new markets such those in Latin America. 
The rationale for hydrocarbon and petrochemical industries was founded on the 
comparative advantage argument. These industries are based on utilisation of associated 
natural gas, which used to be flared in large quantities until the beginning of the 1980s. 
They benefit from low-cost feed stocks but their high construction costs raised, at that 
time, many doubts about their long-term profitability. This depends mainly on the demand 
conditions in the world market and the share of Saudi Arabian exports in it. 
The environmental benefits from utilising otherwise flared gas need to be weighed against 
environmental costs created by petrochemical and other heavy industries. The support for 
such industries based on the low opportunity cost of natural gas is no longer strong. The 
move toward more production of non-associated gas and the expected increase in domestic 
demand for gas, especially for electricity generation and desalinisation plants, will reduce 
the relative share of such industries in gas consumption. So the viability of the 
'Ministry of Planning, 'Facts and Figures (1970-1996)' 
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petrochemical industries will be judged mainly on how far these industries are integrated 
into the Saudi Arabian economy through its linkage with other economic activities. 
The government is very involved in the petrochemical and other heavy industries. This is 
usually explained by two factors. Firstly, the financial requirements of these industries are 
too risky for the Saudi Arabian private sector. Secondly, the close linkages between these 
industries and both oil and gas policies categorise them as strategic industries. However, 
the government has encouraged joint ventures with foreign companies in the development 
of these industries. According to Johany et al, writing in 1986, the joint venture approach 
would ensure ongoing viability of the projects, as the foreign companies have an 
established international marketing network. In addition, these companies would provide 
the needed know-how and managerial skills to these new industries. 
Askari (1990) sheds some doubt on the widely accepted assumption that the foreign 
partner shares the same objective of the long-term viability of these ventures. According to 
him, the real capital commitment of the foreign company is usually under 10 per cent, with 
the difference accounted for by intangibles, such as the fees for technology transfer, and 
the sale of the right to use patents to the joint venture. Also, he sees a low linkage of these 
industries to the domestic private sector. However, he accepts the benefit of these 
industries in reducing the gap between the total dependency on the exports of crude oil and 
the exporting of value-added manufactured goods. 
1.4 URBANISATION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Although Saudi Arabia is a large country (covering an area of 2,250 million square km. ) 
with a relatively small population (20 million people in 1999), it is considered a very 
urbanised country. The World Bank (1999) data reveal that in 
1960 only 30 per cent of the 
population was considered urban, but this number reached 
66 per cent in 1980, and 
increased to more than 86 per cent in 1998. The following map illustrates the concentration 
of the urban population in Saudi Arabian into well-defined and 
distinct centres. 
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Figure 1.2: Map of Urban Population Centres in Saudi Arabia 
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In addition to direct economic factors, the relatively fast urbanisation of Saudi Arabia has 
been caused by two demographic factors. The first is the relatively high natural population 
growth, especially in the last two decades due mainly to the improvement in the country's 
health services. The second factor contributing to this urbanisation is that each region 
contains a number of modem and developed regional centres which became attractive for 
migrants from rural areas. 
These two demographic aspects of urbanisation development have long-term implications. 
In addition to increasing demand for employment opportunities, the next a few years are 
expected to witness very high pressure on the existing social and economic services, 
including those of education, health and infrastructure. The pattern of urbanisation in the 
country, which took the form of regional centres, has some positive advantages. This 
pattern makes the task of future provision to a large percentage of Saudi citizens of the 
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necessary services relatively easier than in the past. For example, it is easier for the 
electricity industry to supply its services to large segments of the population as they are 
concentrated in a limited number of cities and towns across the country. However, Figure 
1.3, below, indicates that there is more work to be done toward reducing the differences 
between the country's five main regions. 
Figure 1.3: The Relative Share of Each Region in the Kingdom's Total Population, 
Residential Electricity Consumption and Housing Units (in 1997) 
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John Presely, writing in 1984, observed that the eastern, central and western regions of 
Saudi Arabia had benefited more from economic development than their population would 
warrant. This observation is still valid at the present time despite the fact that the 
government's effort to correct such an imbalance began with the Third Development Plan 
(1980-1985). Figure 1.3, above, compares the five regions of Saudi Arabia in terms of their 
respective shares in the country's total population, residential electricity consumption and 
housing units. Although these are only some of the factors which needed to be considered 
in drawing a cross-regional comparison, the above figure shows that in the present time 
there still remain a considerable degree of regional imbalance. 
In comparison with the eastern, central and western regions, both the southern and northern 
regions have lower residential electricity consumption in relation to their respective shares 
in the country's population. The per capita of residential electricity consumption levels for 
the southern and northern regions are 1,372 kWh and 1,219 kWh respectively which are 
Eastern Central Southern Western Northern 
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substantially lower than the country's average per capita (residential) consumption of 
2,487 kWh. 
With the exception of the western region, the share of each of the other regions in housing 
units is lower than their share in the population, which indicates the potential for growth in 
demand for electricity in these regions. These examples confin-n the need for further effort 
toward achieving a balanced economic and social development. This objective has been 
considered a strategic principle in the Seventh Development Plan (2000-2005) which 
attempts to use a bottom-up approach by giving the provincial councils more role in this 
process. 
1.5 FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Xu (2000) reviewed the literature concerning the importance of financial systems to 
economic growth, and he categorised it according to three distinct points of view. The first 
sees financial systems as an important factor for economic growth and development. The 
second views financial development as a result of rather than a contributing factor to 
economic growth. The third considers financial systems to have a negative impact on 
economic growth as it has the potential to create a 'credit crunch' by reducing the available 
credit to domestic firms. In his empirical investigation of these hypotheses, Xu found that 
there is strong evidence to suggest that the development of financial systems is essential to 
economic development, which supports the first hypothesis. He explains that the impact of 
financial system on economic development is channelled through its short- and long-term 
impact on domestic investments. These findings are clearly very relevant to the case of the 
Saudi Arabian economy. 
In the light of the country's financial wealth, the development of its financial system has 
been below its potential. Abdeen and Shook (1984) contend that such a development 
requires three conditions: a high level of lending by the banks, an active stock market, and 
government borrowing and lending activities by the central bank. At the time they were 
writing, these conditions had not been met by the financial system. Since then, the 
economy has gone through changes and moved closer to meeting these conditions. For 
example, the persistent deficits in its budget have forced the government to stop relying on 
its foreign reserves and begin borrowing from the domestic banking system. These issues 
18 
will be discussed further in the following section which reviews the main components of 
the financial system in Saudi Arabia. These components consist of the central bank, 
commercial banks and the stock market. 
1.5.1 CENTRAL BANK 
Central banking functions are the responsibility of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA), which reports to the Ministry of Finance National Economy. As a result, SAMA 
does not have complete autonomy in determining monetary policy. Although MFNE has 
no explicit targets for inflation or money supply growth, it has the aim of exchange rate 
stability through maintaining a fixed parity of the Saudi riyal with the US dollar. 
The role of SAMA as a central bank is further restricted by the fact that it does not have at 
its disposal two of the main monetary policy instruments which are normally used by 
traditional central banks. These instruments are open-market operations and the discount 
rate. Hence, SAMA has to rely on the required reserve ratio to influence money supply 
through the commercial bank's ability to create money. Wilson (1999) points out other 
rules which have been used by SAMA to regulate commercial banking activities. The first 
of these rules is the use of the so-called Basle ratio of 8 per cent, which is the ratio of 
capital to risk-weighted assets. The second is that a bank's deposit may not exceed 15 
times its capital, reserves and retained earnings. The third is that 7 per cent of demand 
deposits and 2 per cent of all other account liabilities are to be maintained with SAMA. 
The fourth is that loans should not exceed 65 per cent of customers' deposits 
1.5.2 CONMERCIAL BANKS 
1.5.2.1 LOCAL COMMERCLAL BANKS 
There was a steady decline in the share of currency in the money supply (M3) from 49.3 
per cent in 1970 to 16 per cent in 1998, which clearly indicates the increasing demand for 
banking services. By the end of 1999, there were 10 banks with total assets of SR415bn. 
The country had 1,196 branches which means that there were approximately 16,700 people 
per branch. Although this ratio can be considered acceptable, especially by the standard of 
developing economies, it signals further opportunities for expanding retail banking. 
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The banking sector is greatly influenced by the oil revenues, but the continuous 
government budgetary deficits have increased the role of the commercial banks in the 
economy. Not only has the private sector had to rely less on public funding but also the 
goverm-nent itself has needed to finance its deficits through the commercial banks. In 1999, 
the commercial banks' claims on the private sector and the public sector reached SR162bn 
and SR1 17bn respectively. However, most of the credit provided for the private sector has 
a short-term maturity and most of these credits were for trade activities. Al-Dukheil (1995) 
believes that these banks have the potential to play a major role in future economic 
development. He suggests that they should formulate effective strategies to tap the 
country's considerable private savings. He also argues that they need to expand their 
lending to the industrial sectors, especially lending to small business. Such lending is a 
positive contribution to the economy but it has to be combined with a reform of the 
bankruptcy laws in the country. However, there is an effort under way to revise the 
existing system for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes which includes such laws. 
The approval by SAMA of recent banking consolidations may indicate its disregard for the 
likely emergence of market concentration in this sector. This policy may have been based 
on the premise that such mergers would strengthen the ability of the local banking system 
to operate efficiently in a competitive global environment. There is some easing in the 
reluctance of the monetary authority to allow foreign banks to open fully-owned 
subsidiaries in the country. The Gulf International Bank (GIB), which is based in Bahrain, 
is being allowed in 2000 to open branches in Saudi Arabia. The commercial nature of this 
bank is supplemented by its investment banking capabilities and its significant loan 
syndication activities. In addition, this bank has been offering an advisory services to the 
Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) for its electricity interconnection project. Although the 
banking services in Saudi Arabia are, in general, considered to be very good, the entry of 
foreign banks may bring with it real competition and better quality for many customers. 
Thus, the banking sector has to be well prepared to deal with such competition especially if 
the country is admitted into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
1.5.2.2 SAUDI INTERNATIONAL BANKS AND OFFSHORE UNITS 
O'hali (2000) believes that there are some limitations on the banking services and products 
which can be offered by the local banks, due to two factors. Firstly, the domestic demand 
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for such services remains small, though growing. Secondly, the relatively small size of 
most of these banks prevents them from offering such services efficiently. However, there 
have been growing off-balance-sheet activities in the last few years. The major income 
sources, so far, have been 114 mutual funds with assets totalling about SR24.4bn. Other 
increasing activities in recent years are the management of private client investment funds 
and positions in derivative financial instruments. 
The tie between some of the local banks and the Offshore Banking Units (OBUs) may 
have helped to provide exposure of these banks to the international banking system. OBUs 
perform an important function, especially those located in Bahrain, as they provide 
financial services for international companies operating in Saudi Arabia. Azzam. (1997) 
points out that the Saudi Arabian international banking operations provide a useful tool 
with which SAMA can influence the offshore riyal market. The recent merger of the Gulf 
International Bank with the London-based Saudi International Bank (SIB) may indicate a 
growing interest in enhancing their ability to operate in international capital markets. 
However, the advantages of OBUs have to be weighed against their disadvantages of 
transferring domestic savings to be invested in international rather domestic markets. It is 
worth noting that it is possible that there will be less need for OBUs when the Saudi 
Arabian market has opened up to foreign banks. 
1.5.3 SPECIALISM CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
The Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank (SAAB) was the first government-sponsored credit 
institution to be established, in 1963. The early and mid 1970s witnessed the establishment 
of other institutions. These included the Public Investment Fund (PIF), the Saudi Industry 
Development Fund (SIDF) and the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF). The objective 
of these institutions was to extend medium- to long-term credit to the private sector and 
some public enterprises operating in the relevant activities. In the middle of 
1999, their 
total assets were over SR229bn, which was very large considering that the commercial 
banks' assets were over SR404bn at that time. In 1997, the loans of these agencies to the 
private sector were higher than loans from the commercial 
banks by more than SR45bn. So 
the current activities of these agencies reflect the fact that there 
is a considerable demand 
for longer-term credit which needs to be met by the banking sector. 
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The specialised agencies' accumulated total disbursement reached over SR 281bn in 1999. 
However, the ratio of their credit to the gross domestic fixed capital formation declined 
from 15.4 per cent in 1990 to 9.8 per cent in 1996. Most of the time during the 1990s, the 
net lending of these agencies was negative, as their repayments exceeded their 
disbursement. The importance of these agencies has been diminishing as the country's 
infrastructure is almost completed; also, the government's ability to fund these institutions 
has become more limited than before. The privatisation of some of these institutions, such 
as REDF and SIDF, may revitalise their role in the economy. At present these agencies 
provide funding at below commercial rates, but when privatised they will no longer be able 
to do so. However, this restructuring would increase competition in the banking sector. 
This is more likely, as currently the only private source of medium- and long-term 
financing is the Saudi Investment Bank (SAIB). 
1.5.4 FINANCIAL MARKET 
1.5.4.1 GOVERNMENT SECURITIES 
The financial market in Saudi Arabia is considered to be an underdeveloped market. 
Wilson (1999) explains this situation by the fact that the economy as a whole was financed 
by the available cash flow rather than by borrowing. Even at the time of declining oil 
revenues, especially prior to the mid 1980s, the government as well as the commercial 
banks were able to draw on their foreign reserves. This situation began to change as the 
continuous budget deficit compelled the government to rely on bonds for financincing. 
In 1988, the Saudi government started to issue, through SAMA, Government Development 
Bonds (GDB) to cover its budget deficits. In addition, it started to issue Treasury Bills in 
1991 and Floating Rate Notes in 1997 for the same purpose. This policy is similar to those 
followed by other Arab countries. According to Azzam (1997), these governments found it 
useful to finance their deficit from local funds instead of international loans as this reduced 
foreign exchange risk. These developments are useful for commercial banks as they can 
add these financial instruments to the range of assets they can hold. Also, the replacement 
of direct government borrowing with these instruments is preferable for the banks, since 
loans are replaced with short-term tradable assets. In addition, the benefits from financing 
this deficit locally would reduce foreign exchange risk, but the lack of an effective 
secondary market in Saudi Arabia may lessen such benefits. 
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1.5.4.2 STOCKMARKET 
Soufi and Mayer (1991) emphasise the role that the financial system of Saudi Arabia could 
play in the expansion of its industrial investment which can materialise through a more 
effective stock market. The Saudi stock market has been steadily developing: in 1986 the 
number of joint stock companies listed in the market was only 48 which increased to 72 
companies by the end of 1999. This stock market is the largest in the Arab world in terms 
of market capitalisation. The Joint Arab Economic Report (1998) shows that for the Saudi 
Arabian stock market the ratio of market capitalisation to GDP was 40 per cent in 1997 
which was below the average for the stock market of the other Arab countries. This could 
be explained partially by the relatively large size of the GDP of Saudi Arabia in 
comparison with those of the other Arab countries. 
The Saudi Arabian stock market used to be closed for direct investment by non-Saudi 
investors with the exception of nationals from the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) 
countries. This restriction was eased in 1997 by giving permission to the Saudi American 
Bank (SAMBA) to manage closed-end mutual funds where foreign nationals can buy 
shares through the fund. These restrictions have been further relaxed in 2000 to allow non- 
Saudis to invest directly in open-ended local equity funds. The process which is under way 
to finalise a new stock market law, is a realisation of the stock market's importance in the 
economy. In addition to its impact on domestic savings, the easing of foreign ownership 
restrictions means that the savings of a large number of expatriates working in the country 
can potentially be mobilised. These actions may have been long overdue considering that 
the annual remittances by these expatriates reach over SR50bn and have had an adverse 
effect on the country's balance of payment. 
The stock market remains low in liquidity because of the relatively small number of issuers 
and the limited base of investors. The performance of the market, especially in 1998, has 
been influenced by the changing conditions in the oil markets as well as the weak 
performance of some emerging markets. However, this performance improved in 1999 as 
traders found comfort in rising oil prices and anticipated positive measures for improving 
investment climate in the country. Table 1.2, below, shows the activity of the market 
during 1999 by economic sector. 
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Table 1.2: Share Trading hv Rprtnr-(z dimin cr 1000 
Economic 
Sectors 
Number of Traded 
Shares 
_ 
(%) 
Value of Shares 
(in SR) 
Number of 
Transactions 
Banks 156,121,541 29.6 34,870,321,567 61.6 166,422 38 
Industry 82,509,623 15.6 10,236,345,009 18.1 105,729 24.1 
Cement 33,862,362 6.4 3,789,893,269 6.7 44,495 10.2 
Services 226,967,729 43 6,085,512,505 10.8 96,247 22 
_Electricity 
19,643,425 3.7 11,372,636,049 2.4 17,099 3.9 
Agriculture 8,401,026 1.6 224,014,628 0.4 8,234 1.9 
Total 
n- 
-- --- - 
C1 A 
527,505,706 
A=. - 
100 
.. - 
66,578,723,027 100 438,226 100 
Orl-LvJLrl, 1%, F-budlUll dIlU OUILISUCS vepartment 
This table reveals that the banking and industrial sectors are the most active sectors 
especially in terms of the value of traded shares and the number of executed transactions. 
At the bottom of the ranking are the electricity and agriculture sectors. The decline in the 
growth of the agricultural sector and the cut in government subsidies may explain the weak 
demand for agricultural companies' shares. The considerable assets and capital invested in 
the electricity industry, especially by the government, did not translate into good 
performance in the stock market by the listed companies. 
The financial losses of the electricity companies , due to low prices, had made the industry 
rather unattractive to investors. However, the implementation, at the beginning of 2000, of 
the new tariff structure has led to an increase of over 50 per cent in the prices of electricity 
shares. As a result, the new tariffs would not only make the electricity companies improve 
their internal financing through cash flows, but would also enable them to raise more debt 
finance as their market values rise. 
1.6 PRIVATISATION 
The official policy for privatisation is stated in the Sixth Development Plan (1995-1999) 
which introduced privatisation in the context of enhancing private sector participation in 
the economic development of the country. The plan states that one of its main priorities is 
to " rationalise government expenditure and make the national economy more dependent 
on private sector activities through (among other things) considering the feasibility of 
privatising some government business-oriented activities" (P. 6). The plan indicates that the 
gradual divestiture of public sector industries could be done through different means, 
including the flotation of shares on the stock market. 
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This policy emphasises that privatisation could be implemented by private sector 
participation in ownership, management, financing, operations and maintenance. The plan 
favours selling the entire government share in state-owned companies to privately owned 
venture capital companies listed on the stock market. The plan names the electricity 
industry as the main candidate for full privatisation in the middle and the long term. This 
shows that the current restructuring of the industry is intended to improve the profitability 
of the industry prior to its complete transfer to the private sector 
There were three aspects to Saudi Arabia's past experience of privatisation. The first was 
the partial privatisation of public services through private provision of these services, 
which is in parallel with the government. This took the form of private schools and private 
hospitals, which continue to be regulated and supervised by the government. The second 
was the privatisation of existing public services through operation and management 
contracts to provide the service on behalf of the public sector. The third aspect was direct 
privatisation through the sale of part or the whole project to the private sector. 
Full privatisation of a company has not occurred as yet, but the initial partial sale of 35 per 
cent of SABIC in 1976 was supposed to be followed by another 45 per cent. The inability 
of the domestic stock market to absorb an additional stock flotation was the official reason 
for this delay. It is possible, however, that the government found it very difficult to 
privatise a profitable and strategic company such as SABIC. The telecommunications 
company, Saudi Telecommunication Company (STC), which is a profitable company is at 
the top of the list for next privatisation. Thus, it is expected to have some writers such as 
Wilson (1995) who believe that the government's reluctance to privatise SABIC has been 
influenced by 'strategic' considerations rather than by its ability to generate revenues. 
The reduction of the financial burden of the government should not be underestimated and 
could be considered as the main motive for privatisation of public enterprises. The decline 
in oil revenues since the 1980s has made the public sector unable to provide sufficient 
funding for future financial obligations such as the financing of infrastructure projects. One 
of the main shortcomings of privatisation policies so far has been the lack of an explicit 
timetable for privatisation programmes, even for those sectors which are already 
considered and approved as candidates for privatisation. This would raise the concern that 
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the commitment to the reform may become subject to the availability of oil revenues. The 
establishment of such a timetable makes the implementation of the process less dependent 
on the conditions of the government finances. 
CONCLUSION 
The adoption of economic planing by the Saudi Arabian government is not in contradiction 
with its claim of being an adherent to the philosophy of free market. The rise in its oil 
revenues made it necessary to draw up coherent plans for using these revenues for the 
purpose of pursuing economic development and diversification. In addition, these plans 
were useful in making the government able to set priorities for its spending commitments. 
The objective of economic diversification has been centred on industrialisation through the 
two strategies of import substitution and export promotion. The pursuit of achieving these 
strategies has been backed in the past by direct and indirect involvement by the 
government. 
Although the Saudi Arabian economy is described as 'state-heavy', the declining oil 
revenues and changing world trade environment would make such policies less likely to 
persist in the coming decades. Notwithstanding the consequences of these changes to the 
economy, it is time for the private sector to begin serious reduction in its reliance on 
government support. On the other hand, the government has to do its part by introducing 
more consistency and continuity in its current reform programmes as this would reduce 
apprehension and uncertainty by domestic as well as foreign investors. The entry of the 
economy into this transitional stage is expected to be aided by the achievements of the 
past. These have not been limited to the physical capital represented mainly by the 
country's modem infrastructure. They also include the improvement in human capital in 
the form of the expansion in education and health services during the last three decades. 
However, for these accomplishments to remain available in the future it is necessary to 
have suitable measures for improving the saving and investment climate in the country. 
Economic liberalisation and the deepening of financial markets could helpful. In addition, 
privatisation of some state-owned enterprises would increase the efficiency of the economy 
and reduce the size of the public sector. This would reduce the burden on the government 
budget and redefine the scopes and boundaries of both the public and the private sector. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Electricity Industry of Saudi Arabia 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Saudi Arabia is still considered a developing country. Hence, achieving economic growth 
and, more broadly, economic and social development remain national strategic objectives. 
The investments in the country's infrastructure projects, including those of electricity, have 
depended on the availability of government revenues generated from exporting crude oil. 
The declining oil revenues since the early 1980s and budgetary constraints have limited the 
ability of the government and the public sector to continue financing such projects. 
In addition to being justified on the basis of achieving social and economic objectives, the 
government involvement in the electricity industry was beneficial during the oil boom 
period. It has become clear since then that with increasingly limited budgetary allocation, 
the growth of this industry ought not to come at the expense of other sectors in the 
economy and vice versa. Consequently, the existing difficulties facing the industry have 
raised important questions regarding its ability to deal with future challenges. The private 
sector has become once again the candidate for carrying some of these responsibilities 
through the encouragement of its direct investments in this industry. 
The sixth development plan (1995-1999) considers full privatisation. of the electricity 
industry as a strategic objective for the medium and the long term. So there is an 
expectation for the industry to return to its historical position when it was owned and 
operated completely by the private sector. In the mean time, the objective is to raise the 
needed funds to enhance the industry's ability to meet the growing demand. However, 
shifting the financial responsibility from the government to the private sector, including 
national and international sources, should result in lower costs for the industry. This has to 
be complemented by introducing competition and choice in as many aspects of the industry 
as possible. 
27 
2.2 GENERAL BACKGROUND 
2.2.1 REGULATORY AND ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The electricity industry in Saudi Arabia went through distinct stages of development in the 
last century. The following is a review of these stages based primarily on the regulatory 
and organisational transformation of the industry over the years. 
2.2.1.1 THE FIRST STAGE 
The electricity industry in Saudi Arabia started as a private enterprise. The 1920s and 
1930s witnessed the introduction of electricity by some businessmen who needed this 
service for their factories and businesses. They were also able to sell excess capacity to 
other customers (neighbouring houses and streets) for lighting during early evening hours. 
Until 1948, the only organised form of power generation was that owned by the Arab 
American Corporation (ARAMCO), which was utilised mainly for its oil extraction 
facilities in the eastern region. In 1949 some Saudi citizens and businessmen from the city 
of Dammam co-operated in establishing the first private electricity company. Other cities 
and towns followed suit till the early 1970s when the country had over a hundred small 
commercial companies and co-operative projects (MIE, 1999). During the period between 
1961 and 1974 the NEnistry of Commerce supervised the electricity industry, which may 
reflect how electricity was viewed as a commercial commodity rather than just a social 
service. 
2.2.1.2 THE SECOND STAGE 
The creation of the new NEnistry of Industry and Electricity (MIE) in 1975 meant that the 
supervision of electricity was transferred to the same ministry responsible for the pursuing 
the strategic goal of industrialisation. This development may have influenced government 
policy toward the electricity industry and the expected role of the private sector in this vital 
industry. The goal of industrialisation does not by itself justify government involvement in 
the electricity industry especially in a country which claims to be an adherent to the 
philosophy of free market economy. It seems, however, that practical considerations rather 
than ideological dogmas may led to government intervention in this industry. 
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The discussion of this issue may be illuminated by the views of Ghazi Al-Qusibi, who was 
the first official to head the Nfinistry of Industry and Electricity. He was known for his 
commitment to the private sector and was an early advocate of the privatisation of the 
Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) and the public enterprise, the 
Electricity Corporation. Al-Qusibi (1998) describes his personal experience in the ministry 
and states how much he was disappointed with many of the officials in the electricity 
companies. He discovered in a few weeks how these officials lacked any comprehension of 
the challenges that the electricity industry was facing. He found that some of these officials 
were not able to comprehend the situation in their franchised areas even as far ahead as two 
years, let alone five or fifteen years. 
It is possible that this attitude by the companies was based on rational justifications. The 
introduction of price regulation during the period between 1971 to 1975 may have 
adversely effected the profitability of these companies. This period witnessed the reduction 
of electricity prices by as much as 50 per cent from their level in previous years. Further 
reduction was introduced in 1974, as a nation-wide tariff structure became operative. The 
reduction in prices to a level below production costs may have contributed greatly to 
under-investment in the industry by the private sector. 
Even if the private companies were able to raise the needed investments for their 
generation capacity expansion, the existing transmission and distribution capacity was not 
sufficient to accommodate such expansion. Also the private sector may have been able to 
raise sufficient funds from the domestic or international markets, but it may have lacked 
the incentive to enter into such unprofitable infrastructure projects. In addition, the capital 
costs of such an infrastructure were immense, which made the private sector unable to 
invest in them, at least in a expeditious manner. 
It seems that the rush towards industrialisation and economic development made 
government technocrats, such as Al-Qusibi, impatient with these private companies who 
needed to consider what all the sudden changes would mean to them. The patience of these 
technocrats may have been very limited, especially as they had at their disposal at that time 
very substantial public funding. It is possible that such a pragmatic approach was based on 
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three factors. Firstly, there was an urgent need to have the infrastructure in place regardless 
of its cost. Secondly, the goverm-nent had the objective of the nation-wide electrificatIon 
and providing electricity at low prices, especially for consumers in rural areas. Thirdly, the 
policy-makers were sensitive to public opinion and the social reactions to the frequent and 
lengthy blackouts especially in large cities such as Riyadh. These factors may have 
enhanced the perception that the electricity industry was unwilling, or at least unable, to 
meet these new high expectations by relying on the private sector alone. 
2.2.1.3 THE THIRD STAGE 
Between 1976 and 1982, the government gradually subsumed individual operating 
companies under four vertically integrated companies in each region respectively. This led 
to the formation of the Saudi Consolidated Electric Companies (SCECOs) in the eastern, 
central, southern and western regions. The initial official intention was to consolidate the 
northern companies into one integrated company similar to the SCECOs, but the small size 
and the isolated nature of load (consumption) centres in this region made this objective 
economically unjustifiable. Also the Electricity Corporation (EQ was created as a public 
enterprise with two objectives. The first objective was to have the responsibility of 
financing and supervising the operation and expansion projects of the scattered companies 
in the northern region. The second objective was to represent the government's share in the 
industry as a whole including SCECOs. 
This stage, which lasted from 1976 to 1999, is the period which witnessed the largest 
expansion of generation capacity in the industry's history. This may have been helped with 
government funding especially during the period of the oil boom. However, this 
achievement came with some drawbacks, which resulted from an excessive government 
intervention. This industry still faces significant financial losses due to inefficient pricing. 
Obviously, such intervention did not make the operation of the industry transparent. 
2.2.1.4 THE FOURTH STAGE 
A new stage began when the holding company the Saudi Electricity Company 
(SEC) was 
created in 2000. This is to be followed by a regulatory office called 
Electric Services 
Regulatory Authority (ESRA) that has the responsibility to oversee the transformation of 
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the industry into an unbundled structure. This restructuring of the industry is being done, 
not on a region -by-region basis but rather, on an activity-by-activity basis. The objective at 
this stage is to end government intervention in the day-to-day matters of the industry. 
The current restructuring plan intends to make the industry a self-financing private 
enterprise with the introduction of a market mechanism into the different segments of the 
industry. According to this plan, the industry's new structure will include: 
the opening up of the generation segment to competing private companies 
a privately-owned transmission company 
regional private distribution and supply companies 
the transformation of the industry from a single-buyer structure to a pool structure 
where electricity is traded in the spot market, and 
9 the establishment of an 'independent' regulatory body. 
The gradual implementation of this restructuring plan could provide the necessary time for 
the institutional and legal reforms to take place. Healthy competition in generation requires 
the provision of well-thought out rules and a regulatory system which is fair and 
transparent. So the reform has to be credible in practice, by tackling directly some of the 
economic and legal issues that would arise under the new structure and, more importantly, 
this reform needs to be consistent. 
2.2.2 OVVIWRSIHP MIX 
The creation of the Electricity Corporation in 1976 to represent the government's 
ownership share in the electricity companies, including the SCECOs signified direct 
government involvement in the industry. Table 2.1 shows the government share in the total 
equity capital of the companies operating in this industry as of the end of 1998. 
Tý'kh- ?1- Cinvern-ment'g Shares in Electricitv COMDanies (in Nlillion SR) 
Central Western Eastern Southern Northern Total 
Paid-Up Capital 8000 7350 4151 3564.4 36.98 23102.38 
Government Share 5742.03 6281.84 3764.5 3513.24 21.17 19322.78 
% 71.87 85.47 91 98.6 57.25 1 83.6 
Source: Council of Saudi Chamber ot uommerce (iggg) 
* Includes ARAMCO share of 41 % 
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The electricity industry is, for all practical purposes, a government dominated industry and 
this is reflected in its high share in these joint-stock companies. Table 2.1 shows that the 
government is the major shareholder in the industry with about 84 per cent of total paid-up 
capital. The government's involvement in the industry was based on three justifications: 
firstly the intention to have the needed generation capacity to meet the growing demand of 
energy-intensive industrialisation; secondly, the aim of developing the necessary 
transmission and distribution infrastructure for the country's electrification; thirdly, the 
social aim of providing Saudi citizens especially in less developed regions with electricity 
at low and affordable prices. 
2.2.3 GROWTH OF DEMAND 
In addition to industrialisation, the urbanisation of the country was a major factor in the 
growth in electricity consumption during the last thirty years. Table 2.2 illustrates that the 
growth of the industry could be divided into two very distinct periods: the period from 
1970 to 1984 and the period from 1985 to 1999. The high growth rates during the first 
period reflect the time when the country went through the oil boom and economic 
transformation. The second period shows the time when the country infrastructure was 
mostly completed and the economy began to slow down. 
Table 2.2: Electricity Industry Growth Rates (1970-1999) 
Periods Generation Cap. Peak Load Generated Sold 
1970-1974 28.5 24.6 19.1 19.1 
1975-1979 34.5 32.6 33.7 31.7 
1980-1984 23.5 23.5 20.5 21.8 
1985-1989 6.8 6.4 9.1 8.9 
1990-1994 1.3 8.5 8.1 8.3 
1995-1999 3.3 3.1 4.7 5.1 
1970-1999 16.32 16.45 15.87 15.82 
* Includes Imported Energy from SWCC since 1975 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Electricity (1999) 
Table 2.2 shows that the 1990s were a difficult time for the industry as it tried to keep up 
with the growth in electricity consumption. The growth rate of electricity demand, either 
measured in peak demand or in energy consumption, was at most of the time during this 
decade higher than the growth rate of generation. In addition to the high natural population 
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growth of 3.5 per cent, the processes of modernisation and economic diversification were 
the main driving forces behind the high growth in electricity demand. Figure 2.1, below, 
illustrates the growth in electricity consumption over the past thirty years and the 
generation supply. 
Figure 2.1: Development of Electricity Generation and Consumption 
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The annual growth in generated electricity, in N4Wh, since 1975 has been 13.8 per cent 
which was insufficient to keep up with the 14.8 per cent growth in consumption. In 1999 
about 106 million MWh were sold, while the industry itself was incapable of generating 
more than 94 million NlWh. The electricity produced by the desalination plants, which are 
owned by the Slain Water Conversion Corporation (SWCC), covered the deficit of 18 per 
cent. This indicates the importance of SWCC plants for the electricity industry as the 
output of these plants have been crucial in closing this deficit since 1984. 
Also Figure 2.1 shows the total technical energy losses (i. e. the difference between total 
generation and total electricity sales) which include station losses as well as transintission 
and distribution losses. These losses in a percentage term declined from 13.4 per cent in 
1980 to only 7.9 per cent in 1999. This percentage is very low even in comparison with the 
electricity systems of many developed countries, which have an average loss of 9 per cent. 
The explanation for this increase in efficiency in transporting electricity is due to the 
establishment of modem and robust transmission and distribution networks. This 
became 
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possible with the availability of the allocated government funding for such infrastructure 
projects during the 1970s and early 1980s. 
2.3 OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
The operational and financial issues facing this industry are closely inter-linked. The 
following sections review the operational issues first. This is necessary to give the proper 
background for understanding the financial issues that are facing this industry. 
2.3.1 FUEL LOCATION 
The location of any industry is determined by a combination of many factors but the most 
important among them is the proximity to consumption location (markets) and the 
availability of production inputs such as raw material including fuel. This is also true in the 
case of the Saudi Arabian electricity industry where the fuel factor has a major influence 
on the generation location. About 35 per cent of the industry capacity is located in the 
eastern region, despite the fact that this region has only 15 per cent of the country 
population. The concentration of oil and gas fields in this region also attracted the 
petrochenucal industries, which are the main consumers of electricity in the region as well. 
Figure 2.2: Relative Usage of Fuel Types by each Region 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
-60,50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
98 85 
73 69 
62 
41 38 36 
31 
23 
1.51 
15 
0.5 
Eastern Central Southern Western Northern Sector 
E3 Diesel 
m Oil 
[I Gas 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Electricity (1999) 
34 
Fuel availability at a reasonable price is one of the major elements in the consideration of 
the location of generators. Figure 2.2 shows the power generation usage of the different 
types of fuels by electricity companies in different regions of the country. The availability 
of gas fields in the eastern region enables SCECO-Eastern to have 98 per cent of the fuel 
used in its plants coming from natural gas. Also the availability of these fuel sources have 
influenced the location of its major customers, the petrochemical manufacturers. 
Despite the high usage of gas by this company, the industry as whole is still dominated by 
the usage of crude oil and diesel. Most of the fuel usage by the companies in central and 
western regions is of crude oil, while most of the fuel usage by the southern and northern 
companies is of diesel. This variation between regions in fuel usage could be explained in 
part by the transportation costs of these different types of fuel and the lack of a nation-wide 
natural gas network. The exception is the single NGL line which runs from the eastern 
region to Yanbu (in the western region) to supply the petrochemical plants with the 
required feedstock. The opening up of the industry for independent power producers may 
increase the demand for gas for electricity generation purposes. The cost advantage of 
transmitting electricity relative to transporting gas may encourage future generation 
projects to locate in the eastern region. Consequently the transmission grid will play an 
essential role by linking consumption centres with generation sources. 
2.3.2 REGIONAL GENERATION LOCATION 
Figure 2.3 indicates the ranking of electricity companies in terms of their actual generation 
capacity. Also it shows the pattern of generation location in the different regions since 
1975. 
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Figure 2.3: Regional Generation Location 
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The growth in generation in these regions during this period has been mainly driven by the 
growth in demand in each region separately. This has not exactly been the case with the 
central and eastern regions as they are interconnected regions. The decisions regarding 
investments in generation capacity have been influenced by the combined demand of both 
regions. As of 1999, the central region has 29 per cent of its peak load met by imported 
electricity from the eastern region. On the other hand about 20 per cent of SCECO-Eastern 
peak load is exported to SCECO-Central. This means that the interconnection between the 
eastern and central regions plays major role in shaping the growth in their respective 
generation capacity. It is obvious that SCECO-Central would have to build the generation 
capacity needed to meet its peak load if there was no interconnection with the eastern 
region. Al-Shehri et al (1994) calculated the potential benefits from this interconnection 
and found it to be substantial for both companies due to the differential in their marginal 
generation costs. 
In addition, SCECO-Eastern benefits further from importing electricity from the SWCC 
plants. This company has been able to save considerably in costs by buying cheaper power 
from the desalination plants of SWCC. The data obtained from MIE show that the 
desalination plants produce a kWh of electricity at 3.3 Halalahs, while it is (on average) 
more than 6 Halalahs for the electricity industry. The low cost of electricity produced from 
the desalination plants is due to the economies of scope of producing water and as a by- 
product, electricity. Also SCECO-Eastern was able to capture the difference 
between the 
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
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price it pays to SWCC, which is 1.5 Halalahs per kWh, and the payment it receives from 
SCECO-Central, which is 5 Halalahs per kWh. 
This shows the importance of interconnection in cost saving arising from sharing reserves 
through energy trade. The effort is under way, especially in line with the announcement of 
the industry restructuring, to interconnect all regions for the purposes of sharing reserves 
and trading in electricity. This is also part of the preparation for the beginning of the Gulf 
Co-operation Council (GCC) interconnection project in 2002. The eastern region is 
expected to play a central role due to its location between the member states, as it has 
about 90 per cent of the GCC network and is the host of the headquarters of the project's 
commission. 
2.3.3 LOAD CHARACTERISTICS 
Storing electricity on a large scale is not economically feasible and this makes electricity a 
demand-driven industry. This would impose additional costs, as the generation and 
transmission capacities must be designed to meet the estimated system demand at its peak 
hour. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the peak time for the country occurs during the summer 
months as the consumption, especially by residential customers, is closely influenced by 
temperature level due to the use of air-conditioning. 
In addition to its impact on demand, high weather temperatures have a constraining effect 
on the operation of the genertion units by preventing them from reaching their designed 
capacity. As a result, the load factor ratio, which measures the utilisation level of 
generation capacity, is less than 48 per cent, which is low by international standards. 
According to Abu Ras and Azzam (1999) the large differences between the peak 
(maximum) and minimum loads indicate low thermal efficiency as some generation units 
operate at low load during the time of minimum peak. Also this would indicate continuous 
need for installing additional generation units with high operation costs to meet the peak 
load. So the shrinking of the gap between these levels would result in reducing the capital 
and operation costs significantly. This could be done through implementation of efficient 
pricing which reflects the actual cost of production and utilising suitable Demand-Side 
Management programmes (DSM). 
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Figure 2.4 compares the daily demand curves for summer and winter days, which represent 
the maximum and the minimum respectively for 1999 as obtained from the electricity 
company SCECO-Central. 
Figure 2.4: Daily Load Curves for a Summer and a Winter Days in 1999 
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Source: SCECO-central, System Operation Department (Interconnected Network Control Division). 
Figure 2.4 shows the maximum load for the year is 6,250 MW, which occurred on the 
afternoon of a working day in June. The figure also shows the minimum load for the same 
day, which is not the minimum for the whole year. In addition, it illustrates the minimum 
for the year (1,484) which occurred on a weekend day in February. The following 
calculations, although based on simplified assumptions, demonstrate the impact of the load 
fluctuations on the utility capital costs. 
Let us assume that the demand facing this company is at a constant level through out the 
year. Let us also assume this level is the average between the maximum and the minimum 
for the year, which is 3,867 MW. If the actual generation capacity is equal to this load, 
then the energy generated throughout the year (or 8,760 hours) is 33,884,920 MWh. Since 
the energy generated at the maximum capacity (at 6,250) is 54,750,000 MWh, then having 
a constant demand at 3,867 MW will save 20,875,080 MWh or 2,383 MW in idle capacity. 
This idle capacity is almost equal to the capacity of the largest power station in the 
country, with a 2,400 MW capacity and costs SR 1.1 billions. This example indicates how 
the fluctuation of the electricity demand during the year and even during the same day has 
a large and direct effect on the capital costs for the system. These capital costs are not 
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limited to generation costs, but also include the investment in the transmission capacity 
which is needed to prevent line congestion at the peak hour. 
The effects of demand fluctuation are more considerable in the case of electricity than in 
other industries, which explains the need for continued investment in the electricity 
industry. For these reasons, it is more economical to share generation reserves among the 
different interconnected regions or countries. Table 2.3 reveals this advantage by showing 
the ratio of monthly peaks to the year peak for each one of the five regions. 
Table 2.3: The Ratios of Month] v Peak. -.; tn the Yenr Penlc fnr I QQR 
Regions 
Months Northern Western Southern Central Eastern Country 
Jan 0.869063 0.556031 0.81283 0.590061 0.667445 0.65764 
Feb 0.745828 0.564418 0.855094 0.522339 0.625788 0.621269 
Mar 0.673941 0.690043 0.931321 0.523907 0.615403 0.664459 
Apr 0.617458 0.880086 0.976604 0.730992 0.764527 0.840878 
May 0.786906 0.905425 0.953962 0.859069 0.859977 0.895286 
Jun 0.93068 0.921663 1 1 0.964994 0.968966 
Jul 0.91656 0.913812 0.94566 0.871923 0.925321 0.93393 
Aug 1 0.963597 0.969057 0.932748 1 0.992242 
Sep 0.994865 1 0.957-736 0.947954 0.984947 1 
Oct 0.810013 0.967166 0.966038 0.863301 0.909452 0.946778 
Nov 0.532734 0.768558 0.871698 0.519831 0.700467 0.701077 
Dec 0.646983 0.669522 0.767547 0.506349 0.634539 0.642914 
Date Aug-1 5 Sep-05 Jun-14 Jun-09 Aug-22 Sep-05 
11-lour n. a 4: 00 PM 8: 00 Pm 3: 00 PM 2: 00 PM 1 4: 00 PM 
Source: Calculated from the 1ý11E Report (1998) 
Although the peak load usually occurs during the summer in Saudi Arabia, there is a 
regional variation in terms of the peak times. This would indicate the potential for cost 
savings as generation capacity in one region can function as a reserve for other regions. 
Table 2.3 provides us with three observations. Firstly, the peaks for all regions do not 
occur in the same month. Secondly, for regions with the same peak month, the day of the 
month and even the time of day are different. Thirdly, the central region has Only two 
months with peaks above 90 per cent of the year peak. These observations lead us to the 
important conclusion that the country should utilise further these regional differences. 
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The obvious enthusiasm in the last few years for having a completely interconnected 
national grid is a realisation of this advantage. The large size of the country means that it 
can benefit from different time zones; at least two will suffice. However, the political 
sensitivity of such a measure may make this suggestion unacceptable. Instead a shift of 
working hours by one hour could be a more acceptable solution. This may be a useful 
solution given the nature of electricity Demand-Side Management programme (DSM) 
where one hour or even less would make a difference. So more interconnections within the 
country and with the other GCC countries would produce significant financial benefits 
including a reduction in generation costs through sharing reserves and higher system 
reliability by meeting any unexpected increase in demand. 
2.3.4 EMPLOYMENT AND'SAUDISATION'IN THE INDUSTRY 
The electricity industry is characterised as a capital-intensive industry with an emphasis on 
highly skilled labour. The issue of employment is relevant for two reasons. Firstly, it is 
simply part of the overall expenses. This is an important issue in the context of privatising 
a loss-making industry. Secondly, the restructuring process has a direct impact on 
employment, which has social and political dimensions. 
The employment level in the electricity industry reached its maximum in 1984 with total 
employment of 30,551 employees. This coincided with the work on major generation, 
transmission and distribution projects for the industry, which resulted in a large influx of 
foreign workers. Replacement or 'Saudisation', which is the replacement of expatriate 
employees with Saudis, in the electricity industry has been part of the general government 
policy since the early 1980s. Even though Saudis have started to outnumber non-Saudis 
since 1987, only 69.1 per cent of the 28,785 employees in 1999 were Saudis. So this 
objective would need more years to be realised considering that the official Saudisation 
target is set at 81 per cent. 
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Table 2.4: The Percentage Share of Saudis in Electricitv Personnel (1982-1999) 
Category The Share of Saudis in Total Employment Annual Growth (%) 
1982 1985 1990 1995 1999 Saudis Non-Saudis 
Administrative 57.8 60.1 75.6 76.9 81 4.95 -2.67 
Engineers 10.6 11.2 22.9 25.9 35.3 30.24 1.72 
Technicians 30.3 29.9 47.5 55.7 64.5 10.57 -2.22 
Laborers 45.9 65.1 65 77.8 84.4 -0.7 -5.4 
ITotal 40 46.3 56 61.7 _Tq _1 F 5.6 -2.7 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Electricity, annual reports (different issues) 
Assuming the target for each employment category is also 81 per cent, an examination of 
table 2.4 shows that the industry has a long way to go in pursuing this goal. The table 
reveals that as of 1999, Saudisation has been achieved in non-technical jobs where 81 per 
cent of administrators and 84.4 per cent of labourers are Saudi nationals. However, about 
65 per cent of the posts of engineers and 35.5 per cent of those of technicians remain 
occupied by non-Saudi employees. 
Since the annual growth in the hiring of Saudi technicians is 10.57 per cent, it is possible 
that Saudisation of this category would be realised within relatively short time. However, 
the case of Saudisation of engineering jobs is more complicated. It is an issue related to the 
ability of the education system to provide a sufficient number of qualified Saudi engineers 
in the coming years. The negative growth rate for labourers and the positive growth rate for 
engineers reflects a move toward the maturity of the industry. So the combination of 
industry maturity and privatisation may increase the demand for engineers including non- 
Saudis. 
Hence, restructunng schemes need to address this issue constructively by providing the 
necessary training programmes as well as the incentives for existing employees to 
improve 
their skills. The measures would include giving the existing employees the chance to 
buy 
shares in the privatised company. Also, some countries provide a guarantee 
that the 
employees will not be fired within a certain number of years. 
Despite the disadvantages of 
this approach, it has the advantage of giving the workers sufficient time to 
improve their 
working skills, which the company also needs. 
So if these issue are not considered 
seriously, it is a possibility that a conflict may arise 
between the two official objectives of 
privatisation and Saudisation. 
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2.4 ELECTRICITY PRICING ISSUES 
2.4.1 CONSUMPTION TYPES 
The electricity industry currently provides its services to over 3.4 million subscribers, over 
95 per cent of whom are in the areas supplied by the four SCECO companies. The type of 
consumers the company is serving affects its financial position through the impact on its 
revenues as well as its costs. 
Table 2.5: Electricity Sold by Type of Consumption 
Type Eastern Central Southern Western Northern Total 
Fesidential 24.17 56-82 74.34 63.8 66.54 48.26 
Commercial 5.74 9.12 7.67 12.36 10.62 8.7 
Industrial 56.66 6.59 1.3 6.12 1.15 24.2 
Agricultural 0.67 4.97 0.61 0.18 5.75 1.8 
Government 11.94 19.05 13-03 14.48 13.23 14.6 
Hospitals 0.54 2.2 2.12 1.15 1.64 1.25 
Charities 0.28 1.25 0.92 1 1.91 1 1.6 1 1.6 
Total 
1 
100 100 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Electncity (1999). 
Table 2.5 shows that for the industry as a whole, more than 48 per cent of the consumption 
is by residential consumers and 24 per cent is. by industrial consumers, which is followed 
by the government at about 15 per cent. The situation varies between regions where 
SCECO-Eastern has the advantage of having a considerable number of large industrial 
consumers. The table reveals that about 57 per cent of its electricity is sold to these 
consumers, which include ARAMCO, as well as SABIC with its large petrochemical 
companies. On the other hand, SCECO-Southern sells over 74 per cent of 
its electricity to 
residential consumers, but the disadvantage for this company is that 
it is in the region with 
the lowest per capita income in the country. 
Even though the government subsidises this industry, it is ironic that the government 
offices and institutions are the customers who are not paying their 
bills in full. For 
example, the data from SCECO-Central show that over the period 
between 1994 and 1998 
these offices paid on average only 38.8 per cent of their 
dues while the percentage is 99.24 
per cent for the residential customers. 
This means that direct government involvement in 
the industry has its drawbacks as well as benefits. This situation was not very 
helpful in 
creating the transParency needed 
for making this industry commercially viable. 
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2.4.2 TARIFF STRUCTURE 
The prices for electricity consumption are based on a tariff structure, which is officially set. 
The tariffs are uniform across the country but they distinguish between consumers based 
on their type and the level of their monthly consumption. Table 2.6 shows the revised tariff 
structure for residential customers (commercial and government offices are also charged 
under identical structure). 
Table 2.6: Tariff Structure for Residential Monthly ConsuMPtion 
Consumption 
Blocks (kWh) 
1999 
(Halalah) 
2000 
(Halalah) 
Increase 
(%) 
Share in 
Consumption 
1-500 5 5 0 3.51 
501-1000 5 5 0 8.58 
1001-2000 5 5 0 20.8 
2001-3000 *10 10 0 17.85 
3001-4000 *10 10 0 15.68 
4001-5000 *13 13 0 8.28 
5001-6000 *13 18 38.5 4.5 
6001-7000 *20 23 15 3.06 
7001-8000 *20 28 40 2.18 
8001-9000 *20 32 60 1.36 
9001-10000 *20 36 80 1.05 
10001+ *20 38 90 13.15 
Total 100 
* Includes the additional 5 Halalahs that go to the 'Halalah Fund' 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Electricity (1999) 
The tariffs as presented in table 2.6 could be described as inverted block tariffs. Under 
such tariffs, the consumer is charged one price for consumption up to a certain number of 
kilowatt-hours per month and then charged a higher price for any additional consumption. 
There are some useful observations which can be drawn from this table. Firstly, the lowest 
three blocks pay the lowest price, which is 5 Halalahs, for any consumption below 
2,000kwh. According to Shaikh (1999), this base range can be considered too low in 
comparison with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries where the range is between 100 and 200 kWh. The political and social 
considerations of the welfare state, especially in a developing country such as Saudi 
Arabia, may provide an explanation for such a structure. 
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Secondly, the new tariff clearly exempts, from the increase in tariffs, groups of customers 
with any consumption below 5,000 kWh. These groups account for 74.8 percent of total 
residential consumption or 93 per cent of consumers. This again reflects the attempt to 
avoid lower and middle class population (assuming that the level of electricity 
consumption may reflect the income level to large degree). However, it remains to be seen 
if revenues generated from the increase in prices for the highest 25.2 per cent of 
consumption will be sufficient. This depends on the price-sensitivity of the demand by 
high consumption groups as well as the efficiency in bill collection. So there is a 
possibility that even the lower blocks will face higher prices in the future. The period of 
the next two years is critical as the new regulator is expected to review the operations of 
the industry, including electricity prices. 
Thirdly, the table shows that the revised tariffs have nine sets of prices in contrast to the 
previous structure with only four sets. Train (1994) illustrated that increasing the number 
of blocks leads to welfare gain as prices reflect costs more and diminish the chance of 
creating what is called 'collection points'. The collection points exist when the different 
consumers with different consumption levels are paying the same price. So the existence of 
such points depends mainly on the size of each block. This means that the revised structure 
reduces these collection points for consumption levels above 5,000 kWh. Since the 
transaction costs associated with having a greater number of blocks are expected to be very 
small, it is economically justified to have a greater number of blocks even for consumption 
below 5,001 kWh. However, such a decision is usually influenced by political and social 
factors rather than cost considerations and, hence, economic efficiency. 
As for industrial consumers, the old structure consisted of two blocks. Any consumption 
below 2,001 kWh is charged at 5 Halalahs while the charge for any other amount is 10 
Halalahs. Under the new structure industrial customers pay a flat rate of 12 Halalahs or 
$. 032 per kWh regardless of their monthly consumption level. Other consumers such as 
agricultural and charitable societies pay 10 Halalahs if their consumption is 
below 4,000 
kWh, but pay 12 Halalahs for any amount above it. 
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It is necessary to consider the reasons behind the simplification of tariffs for industrial and 
other large consumers. Setting different tariff structures for residential and industrial 
consumers could be explained by two factors. Firstly, residential rates usually, for social 
and political reasons, take into consideration the income level of the different consumers. 
So the ability of residential consumers to pay has more weight in the designing of the tariff 
structure than the cost of supplying them. Secondly, the costs for the system to supply one 
kW to large consumers are lower than supplying the same amount to residential 
consumers, due to the difference in their voltages. 
The investigation of electricity prices over three decades, as shown in Figure 2.5, indicates 
that the current tariff structure sets prices at a very low level. This is especially true in 
comparison with the price level prior to 197 1, when the industry was not subsidised and 
was operated by profit-making private companies. The prices were very high in 
comparison with current prices and varied across regions and even cities within the same 
region. The differences in these prices may have resulted from the inability of the 
companies, at that time, to reduce their average costs by exploiting their economies of 
scale. In addition to limited markets (the small size of the population), these companies 
had no access to transmission lines, which resulted in losing the opportunity to export their 
excess output. 
Figure 2.5: Development of Electricity Prices (1971-2000) 
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The reduction in prices since 1974 has been part of a tariff structure based on government 
subsidies to cover the difference between costs and revenues of the companies. 
The 
common explanation is that these subsidies were also intended to 
help these companies 
against increase in fuel costs. The decline in oil and 
fuel prices during the 1980s was not 
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reflected in a siiTular reduction in subsidies. This may indicate a continuation of the public 
policy of supporting this industry during this period of econoiniic transformation. Looking 
back at this development, it is reasonable to assume that this well intended policy made the 
industry, electricity producers as well as consumers, more dependent on such subsidies. 
The electricity prices in Saudi Arabia could be considered among the lowest in comparison 
with those in developed as well as developing countries. It might be expected that these 
tariffs would be low in Saudi Arabia due to lower fuel costs, but setting prices below costs 
of production and delivery reduces the chance for generating an internal stream of 
revenues and increases unnecessary electricity consumption. It is more useful to draw the 
comparison with similar neighbouring countries such as the other members of the Gulf Co- 
operation Council (GCC). These members, in addition to Saudi Arabia, include the five 
countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and United Arab Emirates. Figure 2.6 shows 
that the electricity average price in Saudi Arabia is US 2.8 cents per kWh. This is not very 
low in comparison with the average for GCC member states, which is US 2.6 cents per 
kWh. Notwithstanding the subsidisation of these prices across the GCC countries and the 
existence of some differences in their per capita income, the comparison of these prices 
remains meaningful. 
Figure 2.6: Electricity Prices in GCC Countries (in 1998) 
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Source: Gulf Co-operation Council General Secretariat, Economic Bulletin (1999) 
Figure 2.6 also reveals that Oman and Bahrain have the highest prices and this could be 
explained by the fact that these countries are neither oil nor natural gas producers. 
Hence it 
is reasonable to expect electricity prices to 
be lower in countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, 
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UAE, and Saudi Arabia. The large size of Saudi Arabia and the relatively high cost of 
electricity production in some of its regions such as Southern, may explain why it is above 
the GCC average. However, the increase in the current tariff structure will not be expected 
to alter the above comparison. In addition to Saudi Arabia, the other GCC countries have 
also announced their plans to revise upward their electricity tariff structure. 
2.4.3 FINANCIAL LOSSES 
The lack of interest of the private investors in the electricity industry has been and still 
directly linked to its weak financial performance. This performance has negative impacts 
on the ability of the electricity companies to invest in expanding their operations. Also it 
reduces their ability to borrow, as lenders are expected to have less confidence in 
companies with such a performance. In addition, the private sector can be more reluctant to 
lend to these companies unless the loans are based on govemment guarantees. 
Table 2.7: The Financial Losses of SCECOs (in Billion SR) 
Exhibit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Total Revenues 6.5 6.7 7.2 7.3 7.9 35.6 
Total Expenses 9.5 9.7 10.1 10.6 11.6 51.5 
Net Results -2.96 -3-02 -2-89 -3.24 -3.69 -15.8 
1% 1 -31.3 -31 -28.7 -30.7 -31.8 -30.7 
Source: SCECOs annual reports (1995-1999) 
Table 2.7 shows that these four SCECOs companies collectively had about SR 3.7 billion 
in net losses at the end of 1999, which makes their accumulated debt since 1995 reach 
SR15.8 billion. Some financial and organisational factors may have contributed to this 
negative outcome, but the most cited factor is the tariff structure. For example, the 
additional 5 Halalahs imposed as a surcharge in 1995 on any monthly consumption above 
2000 kWh generated over SR II billion for the so-called 'Halalah Fund'. This fund was 
under the supervision of a ministerial conunittee rather than collected by the companies 
themselves. This amount of SR II billion accounts for about 31 per cent of the above 
revenues or about 70 per cent of the accumulated losses. This example shows that a limited 
adjustment to the tariff structure ought to help significantly with the reduction, if not 
elimination, of the losses. Table 2.8 reveals the potential for improvement in the financial 
position of the four SCECO companies. 
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Table 2.8: Revenue. Cost and int-. r ]cXVh c,, Ii 4zriprn,, ;- 
SCECO Companies Revenue Cost Loss 
Central 7.88 11.5 -3.62 
Eastern 7.2 8.8 -1.6 Southern 6.3 20.8 -14.5 
Western 7.17 11.9 -4.73 
Average 7.1 13.3 -6.2 
jAverage (Excluding Southern) 7.42 10.73 
--- Lp=u. i riwaians 
Source: Annual Companies Reports (1998) 
Table 2.8 also reveals that the average revenue per kWh for the SCECO companies is in 
line with the industry average of 7.1 Halalahs. This can be explained by the fact that all 
these companies sell their energy under the same tariff structure. The situation is 
considerably different on the cost side, which reflects the variation in cost structures of 
these companies. The lowest average cost is for SCECO-Eastern which benefits from its 
location in a fuel-abundant region as well as having the advantage that most of its output 
isO sold to bulk industrial consumers. On the other hand, SCECO-Southern has very large 
residential consumers and is located in a region with very difficult geographical conditions. 
This put limits on its ability to generate enough revenues under these circumstances. 
With the exception of SCECO-Southern, the other companies would have been able to 
eliminate their losses if they had received the additional surcharge for themselves. Also the 
improvement in the productive efficiency of these companies would have helped close this 
gap. If the average revenue for the three companies increased by the 31 per cent (based on 
the Halalah Fund ratio in total revenues as mentioned above), then their revenue per kWh 
would increase to 9.72 Halalahs, which is very close to their average cost of 10.73 
Halalahs per kWh. This simplified calculation clearly shows that financial losses are not 
impossible to eliminate with slight increase in tariffs. 
So an improvement in the industry's financial performance would result 
if the restructuring 
and tariff reforms were combined with cost reduction. 
The reduction of costs should 
mainly target the generation expenses, which account 
for about 55 to 60 per cent of the 
companies' expenses. According to the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2000) the revised 
tariff structure would increase the industry's revenues 
by about 78 percent. This indicates 
1998 (in Halalahs) 
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the potential for the industry to be profitable in a relatively very short time as the current 
losses-to-revenues ratio is only 44 percent. However, the unexpected reduction in tariffs at 
the end of 2000 is not expected to damage this profitability prospect, but, more seriously, it 
has created concerns for private investors about the consistency of the restructuring process 
itself. 
2.4.4 ELECTRICITY SUBSIDISES 
The government has a direct involvement in the various aspects of electricity industry, 
including subsidisation. The government subsidies in the past took two forms. The first 
form is when the government pays the difference between the actual cost and the price. 
The second happens when the shareholders receive from the government a guaranteed 
annual dividend of 7 per cent for each share despite the fact that the companies incur 
losses. This latter form has the objective of keeping private investors interested in the 
industry and may also have provided a justification for indirect subsidies for the industry 
itself. The payment of these dividends has, however, been delayed, especially during the 
1990s. As will be shown by Table 2.9, the level of these subsidies may have been 
influenced by the conditions of the government budget. 
Table 2.9: Annual Growth Rate of Government Subsidies (%) 
Years Total Subsidies Electricity Subsidies 
1970-74 163.6 Not Subsidised 
1974-79 36.7 241.3 
1979-84 25.3 34.4 
1985-89 -7 -30.4 
1990-94 6.1 11.33 
1995 -34 0 
11996 -6.5 0 
Source: Ministry of Planning, Pigures ana mcts kiyyzs) 
The oil boom of the 1970s made the government able to subsidise a large segment of the 
population and different sectors of the economy. The total government subsidies to 
electricity and other sectors such as agriculture increased sharply between 1974 and 1984. 
The decline in oil revenues in the 1980s caused these subsidies to slow down and for the 
electricity sector it had been reduced ever since. The general trend is to reduce subsidies 
for many sectors of the economy including electricity industry. 
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2.5 FINANCIAL ISSUES 
The previous sections described the operational and pricing conditions under which the 
industry is run. This is would be very helpful in understanding the industry financial 
position and its ability to coup with future challenges. 
2.5.1 IN-VESTMENT REQUIREMENTS 
The factors behind the growth in electricity demand during the past thirty years may have 
become less forceful, but they remain substantial. The demand for the next twenty years is 
expected to grow at an annual rate of about 5 per cent. So it is expected that the country 
will need to have a generation capacity of 60,000 MW in the year 2020, which is about 
three times the current capacity. In addition to the expansion of generation capacity, 
transmission and distribution capacities have to be proportionally available. Figure 2.7 
illustrates investment requirements until the year 2020 as estimated by the Long Term 
Plan. 
Figure 2.7: Investment Requirements until 2020 
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Source: Long Term Electrification Plan, Electricity Corporation (1996) 
According to the Plan, the total investments needed for this industry are expected to exceed 
SR440 billion until the year 2020, or SR 23 billion annually. The generation investments 
are expected to account for 60 per cent of total investments, while transmission and 
distribution investments will account for 22 per cent and 18 per cent respectively. These 
investment figures also reflect not only challenges but also opportunities for private 
investors. 
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2.5.2 CURRENT FINANCING SOURCES 
Government support to the electricity industry came through the Electricity Corporation 
(EC) in the form of financial assistance and financing the establishment of power projects 
on behalf of the electricity companies. The total amount spent on these projects by the EC 
between 1977 and 1996 was about SR 26 billion or $6.9 billion (EC, 1996). Other 
governmental agencies such as the Saudi Industry Development Fund (SIDF) was 
responsible for providing funds to electricity companies until 1984, when this 
responsibility shifted to the Electricity Corporation. The SIDF data (1985) shows that this 
fund was able to provide these companies with loans valued at over SR 38 billion or $10 
billion between 1975 and 1984. 
The government involvement may have been useful during the oil boom but, as Looney 
(1992) suggests, this may have the effect of crowding out short- run private investments. In 
the case of electricity, the excessive government involvement may also have mixed results 
as it has introduced less accountability in the industry and may have made the electricity 
companies lack the incentives to be profitable. The following section will review the other 
forms of financing and their relevance to the future of the industry. Azzam (1996a) 
provided a breakdown of the methods that have been used already or could be used in the 
future, which include financing based on a cash-on-invoice basis, the Halalah Fund and 
commercial banks. 
2.5.2.1 TRADITIONAL METHODS OF FINANCING 
The traditional method of cash-on-invoice was common for small-scale generation projects 
but was also useful for financing some transmission and distribution facilities. Under this 
method the government pays contractors directly as soon as each stage of the project is 
completed as agreed. However, this method is not expected to contribute greatly to future 
expansions especially for meeting the capital requirement for most generation projects. In 
addition to this method, the use of export credits to finance some generation facilities was 
considered in the past, but the government was reluctant to provide a sovereign guarantee 
for such credits. 
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2.5.2.2 THE 'HALALAH' FUND 
The second method used was introduced in 1995 and known as the 'Halalah Fund' which 
is based on the additional surcharge of five Halalahs levied on any monthly consumption 
exceeding two thousand kilowatt-hours. The revenues from this fund were deposited in a 
special account at the central bank, SAMA. This fund was limited to financing generation 
expansion projects which made it very useful for attracting contractors to finance fund- 
backed projects. The significance of this fund manifested in its ability to finance over 44 
per cent of project costs during that period and the total amount deposited under the fund 
accounted for over 70 per cent of the industry losses. This fund was also useful in 
providing a security payment for important lump-sum turnkey projects. 
However, this fund has not been without some drawbacks as it may have created a 
disincentive to a company such as SCECO-East to operate efficiently as it perceives that 
some of its revenues are financing projects for other companies. This indicates that the 
usefulness of this method is diminished by such cross-subsidy. However, the cancellation 
of this fund and the explicit incorporation of the surcharge into the new tariff structure (see 
Table 2.6) may provide us with the conclusion that the elimination of the industry's 
financial losses is an achievable objective. 
2.5.2.3 THE COMMERCIAL BANKS 
The third source of financing for the industry is commercial banks. The foreign assets of 
the national banks are about a third of their total assets with net foreign assets of 19 per 
cent. This indicates the potential for these banks to play a major role in project financing, 
in the right supporting investment environment. The role of national banks in project 
financing has been on the increase during the last decade. The banking credit channelled to 
electricity utilities increased from SR 1.4 billion, which is 1.5 per cent of total credits in 
1993 to SR 8.5 billion (7.2 per cent) in 1996. As of 1997, these commercial banks are 
involved with the financing of about 24 per cent of the cost of four major generation 
projects around the country, while the Halalah Fund was able to guarantee the financing of 
the rest. 
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This example reflects the importance of providing security support to attract these banks to 
such projects. Another arrangement, which has been tried as late as 1999, was where one 
of the national commercial banks was invited to finance a transmission project using the 
Islamic banking scheme of Istisnaa. Under this scheme the electricity company SCECO- 
Central signed an agreement with the bank which was responsible for dealing directly with 
the contractor. When the project is completed the company will become the owner and 
then the bank will start to receive annual instalments for a number of years as determined 
in the signed agreement. 
The involvement of international banks in financing infrastructure and in particular 
electricity projects has been very limited. The example of the power station in Ghazlan in 
the eastern region is an interesting case to study. The project consisted of adding capacity 
to the station of 2,400 MW at $1.1 billion. The international syndicate loan method was 
used for financing the project. Cash from the existing operation provided 42 per cent of the 
total financing requirement. The security package, which accounted for 12 per cent, was 
based on the advance from large customers such as ARAMCO and SABIC. International 
banks that found the quality of the receivable package very attractive provided the rest. 
This example illustrates the possibility of attracting willing international funding if 
innovative schemes are presented and the right legal framework is in place. 
2.5.3 POTENTIAL FINANCING SOURCES 
2.5.3.1 BOO, BOT AND BOOT SCHEMES 
The involvement of the private sector in infrastructure projects under schemes such as 
Build-Own-Operate (BOO), Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and Build-Own-Operate- 
Transfer (BOOT) are new concepts for the country. Under these schemes investment 
banks participate by arranging both equity and debt finance for the project. The viability of 
this method greatly depends on the transparency of the process and good security support 
to attract private operators and their financial backers. The first indication of interest in this 
method was in 1997 when SCECO-Westem invited bids for building a Shoaiba power 
plant with 1,750 MW on a lump-sum turnkey or on BOOT basis. Under the BOOT scheme 
SCECO-Western would purchase electricity from the independent power producer (IPP) 
against monthly payments over twenty years. According to Khoshaim (1997), the financial 
structure of the project was supposed to have 30 per cent of total capital In equity. The 
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developer would have a 50 per cent stake in the equity while the rest would be shared 
between the company and domestic investors, either directly or through a holding 
company. A syndicate of domestic and international banks would generate the debt capital. 
Two international groups were commissioned to study the feasibility of these schemes. By 
1998, it became apparent that the BOOT scheme would not materialise given the existing 
tariff structure as prices were below the actual production costs and there was a lack of a 
suitable foreign investment framework to reduce project risk. 
This case should not be used to make a sweeping judgement on the potential of these types 
of finance for three reasons. Firstly, the BOOT scheme had never been top priority for 
SCECO-Western as it was a distant alternative to the other traditional methods. In addition, 
there were high expectations that the merger of SCECOs under one electricity company 
was very imminent and as such this kind of long-term contract would be taken up by the 
newly formed company. Secondly, the experimentation with such a large project was in 
itself a risky proposition. Therefore, it would be better in the future for these schemes to be 
tried on smaller scale projects. Thirdly, the investment laws, which were supposed to 
govern these agreements, are going to be changed in the very near future. The government 
had approved in 2000 three measures to improve the investment envirom-nent in the 
country. These measures include: a more transparent foreign investment code, 
reorganisation of investment commission and the permission for the Saudi Industry 
Development Fund (SIDF) to finance projects fully owned by foreign investors. 
2.5.3.2 OTHER SOURCES 
The lack of significant demand for these different methods of financing was due to the 
availability of funds mainly from public sources. The changing conditions mean that these 
methods and other forms of equity and debt financing will remain very relevant for the 
future. Internal cash flows may benefit from a changing tariff structure, but they may 
remain insufficient. Sufficient cash flows do not exclude the need for funding 
diversification, which is necessary for the minimisation of the financing costs. There is an 
opportunity to benefit from privately sponsored investments including national and foreign 
direct investment. According to Azzam. (1996b), like other infrastructure projects, 
electricity projects could tap international equity markets by issuing Global Depository 
Receipts (GDR). The role of Saudi Arabia in multilateral organisations such as the Arab 
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Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) may also help in providing the 
needed backing for private power projects. 
This is on the equity side; on the debt side there is the potential for export credits to help in 
financing power projects if the new Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) proves its 
creditworthiness and is able to provide the required repayment guarantees. The experience 
of the Ghazlan power station shows that using international syndicated loans is a realistic 
option when banks find the presented security package attractive. Also the industry would 
find it useful to benefit from lower interest rates if international bond financing is an 
acceptable choice. 
Islamic financing methods can contribute greatly, especially when combined with the 
conventional forms of financing. These forms of financing may prove to be useful for 
power projects, especially as they require long maturity debt financing. Also they would 
provide Islamic investors with long-term investments on more acceptable terms. These 
methods are various but usually include Istisna, Mudarabah (trust financing) and Ijarah 
(leas) arrangements. The method of Istisna is defined as a contract to purchase a product 
now which is going to be manufactured in the future against a price agreed upon. Payments 
are made to the contractor at each stage of completion of the project. This purchasing 
mechanism is likely to be the most relevant among these methods for electricity projects. 
Under Mudarabah, a project partnership is established between the provider(s) of capital 
and the client (i. e. entrepreneur), in consideration of which the partners get an agreed 
proportion of the net profit. The method of Ij arah (leasing) involves the bank buying and 
then leasing for rental fee equipment required by the client. 
2.6 RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATISATION 
Government involvement during the initial stage of the restructuring process, especially in 
developing countries, is inevitable and can even be necessary for long-term success. 
Yajima (1997) believes that the government presence would introduce flexibility in the 
choice of the reform model for the electricity industry. He contrasts the reform experience 
of the US with those of countries such as Chile where full reform models have been 
realised with government engagement. Sioshansi (2000) explains how private ownership in 
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the US electricity industry made the modification of the existing structure more 
complicated. He argues that issues such as stranded costs have to be dealt with before an 
efficient competition can be established. These views indicate that the existence of private 
interests in the industry prior to restructuring would complicate the process itself. The 
complication may result when some of these parties believe that the process would 
negatively effect their own interests. These expectations may even give these participants 
the incentives to undermine the process itself. 
2.6.1 THE OBJECTIVE OF RESTRUCTURING 
The electricity industry has gone through different stages of restructuring during the last 
twenty-five years with the long-term objective of creating a modem and self-financing 
industry. This industry was singled out by the Sixth Development plan (1995-2000) as the 
main candidate for full privatisation in the medium and long term. It emphasises profit 
making in the industry as the ultimate objective of the restructuring process. The 
government commitment to privatising the electricity industry has been presented within 
the context of providing the private investors in the industry with the opportunity to make 
profits on their investments. This notion is reiterated by the Seventh Development Plan 
(2000-2004), which puts great emphasis on market-based pricing for the services, even 
those provided by public enterprises. This official attitude is expected to contribute 
positively toward creating the conditions needed for the industry to raise finances based on 
its creditworthiness, especially as the declared official objective is to make this industry 
completely unsubsidised (MEED, 19 March 1999). 
The need for broader a approach to deal with this objective has been under consideration 
since 1995 with the coming of new technocrats to the Ministry of Industry and Electricity. 
This development had created a debate about the revitalisation of the industry. There were 
two different views regarding how this goal can be achieved. The proponents of the first 
view (price reform) argued that the existing structure could be maintained while the reform 
should focus on improving the tariff structure, which need to be coupled with an efficient 
system of bill collection. 
The proponents of the second view (restructuring) argued that the above suggestions were 
necessary, but they had been tried since 1982 without any notable success. 
So they 
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believed in restructuring the whole industry to make it commercially viable and attractive 
for permanent private investments. The proponents of the first view made some reasonable 
suggestions, but it could be described as a status quo argument. Also the recent changes in 
the industry may indicate that the second argument has won the policy maker's approval. It 
is not unexpected that both arguments acknowledge the government's role in the reform 
process in a developing country such as Saudi Arabia. It is worth noting that within the 
second view there were two different approaches to the speed and the scope that the 
restructuring should take. The difference between the two approaches is based on their 
respective perceptions of what was attainable in practice. 
The current restructuring plan is a transitional step toward full privatisation of the industry. 
The regional SCECOs and the northern companies were merged at the beginning of 
January 2000 into one holding company (i. e. SEC). The immediate objective of the plan is 
to make the existing industry structure commercially viable and more attractive to private 
investors. The implementation of the new tariffs is likely to make this joint stock company 
profitable and ready for privatisation starting with share flotation. The ownership rnix of 
the government and private sectors in the company remains equal to their original shares as 
in the previous companies prior to the merger. This means that the government owns about 
84 per cent of the new company equity's capital, while the private sector owns the rest. 
The company's board of directors comprises twelve members including six members from 
the private sector (NIEED, February 18,2000). Also the top two positions in the 
administration were given to former SCECO-eastern officials which has been very 
welcomed development by the private sector. 
2.6.2 REGULATORY ISSUES 
The privatisation of the industry should not result in replacing the public monopoly with a 
private monopoly. This will be especially true during the next two years when SEC will be 
the sole supplier of electricity. This situation requires thorough supervision from the newly 
appointed independent regulator to prevent any exploitation of its monopolistic powers. 
The next period would result in other tasks for the regulator, as he will be responsible for 
dealing with different issues as the industry is separated into generation, transmission and 
distribution segments. 
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The generation segment of the industry is to be opened for direct private investments and 
competition between private producers. The prevailing expectation among many high 
ranking officials in the industry is that the SEC will become the owner of the national grid 
while the regional distribution networks will be offered to private sector through franchise 
bidding. Since the new reform gives the large customers the freedom to choose their source 
of supply, it is expected that even residential consumers would be able to have the same 
choice in the future. These issues and other regulatory issues will be under revision by the 
independent regulator who is expected to submit his first regulatory review of the industry 
by the end of 2002. 
One of the issues, which is expected to arise in the future, is the issue of transmission 
pricing. This issue would have to be in place prior to the full privatisation of the industry. 
The unbundling of the industry will make the transmission grid play a major role in linking 
consumption centres with generation sources. As electricity trading increases, the demand 
for transmission services will grow as well. The benefits from competition in generation 
will not materialise if this natural monopoly segment of the industry is not well regulated. 
So the transmission function is the main segment which the regulatory system has to 
consider at an early stage of the restructuring process. This becomes necessary in order to 
reduce potential disputes among the different participants such as generators and 
distribution companies (or large customers). 
2.6.3 EXTERNAL PLAYERS 
2.6.3.1 SELF-GENERATION PROJECTS 
The fact that the iron and steel company, Hadeed, began building its own power generation 
plant is a significant development for the electricity industry. This is particularly true as the 
new reform gives such large customers the opportunity to sell any excess capacity that it 
may have. This situation may become more common when the tariff structure gives the 
incentive, through time-of-use pricing, to such large consumers to shift their demand from 
the peak hour and benefit from selling their excess capacity at market price at that hour. 
2.6.3.2 SALINE WATER CONVERSION CORPORTATION (SWCC) 
In addition to these projects, the involvement of the Salin Water Conversion Corporation 
(SWCC) in power generation would provide additional sources of competition. The 
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corporation has already announced its intention to expand these projects by involving 
private investments in the new dual-purpose desalination plants, under BOO or BOOT 
schemes. The electricity generated by these plants is known to be produced at a very low 
cost which may help create an environment for more competition and cost reduction in the 
industry as a whole. 
2.6.3.3 THE ROYAL COMMISSION OF JUBAIIL AND YANBU 
The other change in the industry is the establishment of the joint stock company, Utility 
Corporation (UCO), in 1999 with SR 2 billion in capital. The purpose of this company is to 
carry out the operation, management, and expansion of infrastructure facilities for the 
industrial cities of Jubail and Yanbu. One of the main tasks for this new company is the 
provision of over 3000 MW capacity of electricity for the two cities. The main partners in 
this company are the Royal Commission of Jubail and Yanbu, the Public Investment Fund, 
SABIC and ARAMCO. 
The immediate objective is to involve Uco in leasing the Royal Commission utility assets 
until valuation is completed and they are transferred to Uco ownership. The shares of this 
new company will be floated three years after its formation, on the condition that two of 
these years must be profitable. Currently the management services' contracts for the 
utilities in these two cities have been given to the American companies, Parsons and 
Bechtel (MEEED, 23 July 1999). 
2.6.3.4 THE GCC INTERCONNECTION PROJECT 
The expected interconnection of national grids of the GCC countries into one integrated 
system, with its headquarters in Saudi Arabia, would introduce more competition 
into the 
Saudi electricity industry. The large industrial consumers, especially those located in the 
eastern region, will be able to buy electricity from independent power producers 
in other 
countries such as Qatar or UAE. The expectation is that within a 
few years from the time 
when the interconnection is operational a pool mechanism will 
be established to facilitate 
trading on a half-hourly basis. So it is likely that these developments would 
have very 
positive future effects on the direction, speed and the 
dynamic operation of the Saudi 
Arabian electricity industry. 
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CONCLUSION 
The history of the electricity industry shows that this industry was originally in the domain 
of the private sector. The government's involvement in the industry could be viewed as a 
transitional process with specific objectives for each stage. The objective of electricity 
industry's modemisation, through creating a modem and robust infrastructure, followed by 
the objective of privatisation through the improvement of its finances. 
The review of the issues facing the industry shows that, despite its large financial 
requirements, there is no lack of interest or shortage in funding availability for the 
electricity industry. What is needed are innovative methods backed by creditworthiness 
and a transparent legal framework. The recent reforms in the industry as well as changes in 
the country's investment laws could greatly help in improving the environment for private 
investment, national and international alike. This is particularly true in the case of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) which is needed not only for funding purposes but also for 
providing the know-how and the managerial expertise. As a result, the industry is entering 
a stage where competition between different private companies, initially in the generation 
activities, is the ultimate objective. 
Nevertheless, the benefits from introducing competition will not materialise if it is not 
complemented by a regulatory regime that is fair and transparent. So for the reform to be 
credible in practice, it has to tackle directly some of the economic and legal issues that 
would arise under the new structure. For example, opening up the generation and 
distribution activities to private companies will require clarification of major issues 
regarding the use of the transmission network, such as transmission pricing. Therefore, 
prior to their entry into the industry, these private participants need to have clear sets of 
rules relating to the issues of pricing and cost allocation. The objective of this thesis is to 
examine three different methods for pricing transmission. It contributes to the above debate 
by presenting, for the first time, an empirical comparison of these methods based on actual 
data. In addition to its academic contribution, the thesis will be useful for future policy 
making, not only in the case of the Saudi Arabian electricity industry, but also in other 
countries in the Gulf region and beyond. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Literature Review 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters provided a review of the issues facing the economy of Saudi 
Arabia in general and its electricity industry in particular. These issues include policies 
which are related to privatisation and restructuring, some of which are under way and some 
of which are planned for the future. Hence, prior to proceeding further to the main focus of 
the thesis, it would be appropriate to provide at this stage a review of the literature which is 
related to these issues. This chapter aims at clarifying the meaning of privatisation and 
more broadly the policies of restructuring and reform. 
In order to attain this objective, the link and overlap between privatisation and other 
concepts such as restructuring, liberalisation, competition and regulation are discussed. 
The chapter focuses on the electricity industry and explores the issues that could arise from 
privatising and restructuring such an industry. Attention is drawn to the contentious issue 
of transmission pricing which arises as a result of privatising and unbundling the industry 
into the separate segments of generation, transmission and distribution. Thus, the chapter is 
organised into three main sections. The first section analyses the issue of privatisation and 
related matters; the second focuses on the electricity industry and transmission pricing; and 
the third presents a summary of the chapter and conclusions. 
3.2 PRIVATISATION 
Since the start of the British experience of privatisation in the early 1980s, many countries 
have tried different forms and methods of privatisation. Kikeri et al (1992) indicate that 
since then privatisation has become widespread and more than eighty countries now 
have 
considerable privatisation programmes. Although the term 'privatisation' 
is a recent term, 
Johnson (1990) believes that the practice itself could be traced back to the 1940s when the 
goverment of the Federal Republic of Germany divested 
itself of the Volkswagen 
company. 
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3.2.1 DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS 
One of the main questions in the privatisation debate is: what exactly do we mean by 
privatisation? In the words of Donahue (1989): "Privatization is not only an inelegant term; 
it is also lamentably imprecise" (p. 5). The literature on privatisation provides no agreed 
single definition of this term, but most of the definitions emphasis the meaning of handing- 
over ownership from the public to the private sector. Most sources show that privatisation 
is a process with the ultimate aim of improving performance of the different economic 
sectors of the economy. Thus, the criterion in judging the different definitions is not which 
is right and which is wrong, but rather that each definition should be judged on its 
usefulness for a particular purpose. 
Ward (1999) believes that privatisation has no strict legal definition. It could include the 
involvement of the private sector in operating or investing in publicly owned assets and 
also the involvement of the private sector in the provision of services previously provided 
by the public sector. Cowman (1990) includes in his definition the transfer of activities of 
public enterprises, which produces and sell industrial, commercial, or financial goods, to 
the private sector. 
Jackson and Price (1994) give a breakdown of activities, which could be included under 
privatisation. These were the sale of public assets, deregulation, opening up of state 
monopolies to greater competition, contracting out, the private provision of public 
services, joint capital projects using public and private finance, and reduction of subsidies. 
Prager (1992) indicates that privatisation can mean the transfer of ownership, but he points 
out that ownership and control are not necessarily synonymous, and it is control which 
usually determines results. He asserts that it is possible for ownership to remain with the 
state and control to be privatised, such as in the case of long-term rental contracts. It is also 
possible for ownership and fundamental decision-making to remain with the state, but for 
production to lie in private hands, such as in management contracts and contracting out. 
According to him, the most substantial improvement in efficiency results when private 
ownership is introduced without restrictions on entry into the industry concerned. This 
means that for privatisation to succeed it has to be combined with the introduction of 
competition. 
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Cavandish and NEstry (1992) consider privatisation as a process designed to broaden the 
scope of private sector activity and to encourage the public sector to adopt some of the 
efficiency-enhancing techniques normally used by the private sector. Kay and Thompson 
(1986) believe that privatisation introduces changes into the relationship between 
government and the private sector in the forms of deregulation, denationalisation, and 
contracting out. Thus, it could be said that these authors regard privatisation as a dynamic 
process with the ability to redraw the frontier between the public and the private sector. 
Such views lead us to differentiate between privatisation and other related concepts such as 
liberalisation, conunercialisation, corporatisation and deregulation (or more accurately re- 
regulation). According to Roberts et al. (1991), privatisation is the transfer of ownership of 
assets from the public to the private sector and liberalisation is the introduction of 
competition into regulated and monopolistic industries, which can be public or private. 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) emphasise an important difference between liberalisation and 
privatisation. That is public ownership does not necessarily mean the lack of competition 
and private ownership does not necessarily imply competition. 
A conflict can arise between the policies aimed at introducing privatisation and those 
aimed at introducing liberalisation. Kay and Thompson (1986) have identified the 
'paradox of privatisation' whereby the management of industries subject to privatisation 
resist the introduction of liberalisation. As a result, concessions are made by the 
govermnent to ensure management support for the smooth introduction of privatisation 
causing liberalisation to diminish. In addition, a government interested in reducing the 
public sector borrowing requirements may have a disincentive to liberalise as a monopoly 
results in a higher market price (and revenues) than an industry subject to competition. 
Hunt and Shuttleworth (1996) draw some distinctions between the three terms: 
commercialisation, corporatisation and privatisation. Commercialisation introduces 
changes in government behaviour through more focus on profitability rather than through 
introducing changes in organisation. Corporatisation is the formal move from direct 
government control to a legal corporation with separate management. At this stage, 
economic regulation could be introduced for the purpose of guiding pricing and investment 
policies. Privatisation is the move from a publicly- to a privately-held corporation. 
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Horsnell (1999) sees commercialisation as an alternative to full or partial privatisation 
where commercialisation of the state enterprise makes the enterprise try to imitate the 
behaviour of private companies. This process includes measures such as full accounting for 
each subdivision of the company, ending cross- subsidi sation between its different 
activities, and enhancing the ability of the company to raise funds from the international 
capital market on its own. Hence, this view focuses on the behaviour dimension of the 
comparison rather than on ownership transfer per se. On the other hand, Kessides (1993) 
sees conimercialisation as the status of a public enterprise which is financed mainly by 
internal revenues and operates as a autonomous business and its has very limited access to 
public funding. Corporatisation turns a public enterprise into a legal entity subject to 
company law, with formal separation of ownership and management responsibilities. 
According to MacKerron (1999), liberalisation is very general concept, but it is normally 
taken to mean a process in which trade restrictions are reduced and subsidised 
arrangements are removed. This may or may not have any direct connection with the 
process of privatisation. Privatisation means the transfer of the ownership of an enterprise 
from public to private, but some governments use the terin 'privatisation' when they 
actually mean corporatisation. The term corporatisation is used to describe the process of 
transforming utility activities from those which are part of government to those of a 
corporate structure, using the accounting and managerial techniques generally used by 
private corporations. Deregulation demands a high level of effective competition between a 
significant number of participants, and requirement of the absence of natural monopoly 
characteristics which is difficult to meet. Thus, the real challenge in privatisation is 
effective re-regulation involving new agencies which have to be greatly independent from 
the government's direct influence. 
3.2.2 PRIVATISATION METHODS 
Savas (1992) believes that the methods of privatising public enterprises could involve three 
strategies: divestment of enterprises or assets, displacement through the government's 
gradual withdrawal and delegation by contracts and franchises. Ward (1999) indicates that 
privatisation could include the unbundling of a vertically integrated public monopoly, the 
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sale of shares through public offerings, the financing and operation of infrastructure 
projects and the introduction of private sector management to a public enterprise. 
Ramananadham (1989) categorises the measures which the privatisation process can 
include. The first measure relates to ownership and includes total denationalisation and 
liquidation; the second relates to organisational changes to holding company structures and 
changes within monolithic structures such as leasing competition and restructuring; the 
third is operational and comprises contracting-out, pricing principles, resorting to the 
capital market and the rationalisation of government control. 
Wright and Thompson (1994) listed three main forms of sales which privatisation could 
take: sale to the public through flotation, sale to incumbent management and employees 
and sale to a third party. Jones et al (1990) draw attention to the fact that the distribution of 
the proceeds from the divestiture depends greatly on the timing, before or after flotation, of 
the restructuring of the firms to be privatised. In this case the government may be tempted 
to sell firms with monopoly power intact for the purpose of maximising its flotation 
proceeds and then restructure afterwards. Stevens (1989) believes that the other temptation, 
for some governments, is to sell enterprises which are considered a burden on their 
budgets. However, this approach may not result in reducing this burden as selling a loss 
maker would involve a lump sum, which would reflect the expected negative cash flow. In 
addition, other costs for selling public enterprises should be considered, such as the lost 
opportunity to promote liberalisation which is much easier prior to privatisation than 
afterwards. 
According to Kuczynski (1999) the process of privatisation involves through three main 
steps: setting up the commercial structure of the industry, deciding on the regulatory 
framework, and selling off the industry. He indicated that there are choices at each step as 
in the case of electricity where transmission can be treated as the only component to be left 
whole while everything else is decentralised, or it can be influenced by the merits of 
vertical or horizontal integration. Also there is the issue of how to reconcile adequacy of 
investment with regulation of price or profitability. 
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Ilwan et al (1999) believe that the privatisation of an enterprise can be categorised as 
either a one-step, two-step or multi-step process. In one-step privatisation, the ownership 
of a public enterprise is divested through the sale of all the equity to the general public. In 
two-step privatisation, the 'controlling block' of shares is sold to strategic investors who 
assume management control of the enterprise, followed by the placement of shares in the 
capital market. In multi-step privatisation, gradual corporatisation is implemented while 
the deregulation framework is being put in place and new investments, such as Build-Own- 
Operate (BOO) or other similar schemes, are undertaken by the private sector. Thus, Multi- 
step privatisation is particularly suitable for politically sensitive activities such as those of 
electricity or gas. 
3.2.3 OVVNERSI-HP AND EFFICENCY 
In the privatisation literature, the discussion of efficiency focuses the attention on the issue 
of public versus private ownership. According to Ve1janovski (1989), Adam Snuth 
favoured the 'privatisation' I of Crown Lands on efficiency grounds as he observed that 
publicly owned land was 25 per cent less efficient than privately owned land. This has 
been explained by way in which private ownership was able to provide the owners with 
strong incentives to use resources efficiently. In his Prolegomena or Introduction to 
History, Ibn Khaldoun, the fourteenth century Arab thinker, raised doubts about the 
usefulness of the state involving in activities which were supposed to be in private hands. 
He observed that commercial and agricultural activities on the part of the government were 
ruinous to tax revenues (i. e. the economy) and harmful to the subjects (i. e. social welfare). 
In contemporary economics, the attitudes towards public and private ownership may have 
been shaped by the theories of property rights and public choice. Lindblom (1977) looks at 
property rights as the granting of authority to control assets to persons and organisations, 
both private and public. He explains that well-defined rights to profit in the private sector 
makes this sector perform better than the public sector. However, the public choice theory 
is concerned more with behaviour in the public sector, where bureaucrats pursue their 
As the term privatisation is a recent tenn it is not expected that Adam Smith used it as such, but his 
preference for private over public ownership 
is very well recognised. 
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own utility rather than the public interest. This approach to public and private ownership 
acknowledges that there are agent-principal problems in all forms of ownership. However, 
the literature on the subject indicates that these forms of ownership differ in their 
performance due to the difference in incentives in the face of asymmetric infonnation. 
Rees (1985) argues that privatisation could change the nature of the agent-principal 
relationship by reducing the distortion of the information flow between principals and 
agents through the introduction of more effective incentive systems that tie agents to the 
principals' objective. However, De Fraja (1993) believes that even in the public sector the 
introduction of the appropriate incentives to the managers, such as in the form of higher 
payments may encourage a higher effort level. He also indicated that the public enterprise 
is not necessarily less efficient than private enterprise, but can in some cases, be more 
efficient. 
Like many researchers who agree that privatisation is a means and not an end in itself, 
Parker and Wu (1998) consider that the main objective of privatisation is the improvement 
of economic performance through the increase in productivity. Although Hemming and 
Nfiranda (199 1) recognise the fact that privatisation does not necessarily guarantee an 
increase in economic efficiency, they believe that the increase in competition will 
ultimately produce gains in allocative and productive efficiency. They assert that gains in 
allocative efficiency will result from more efficient allocation of resources to 
better 
economic and social objectives, and that gains in productive efficiency will result 
in 
producing the same level of output at a lower cost. According to these authors, 
the 
strongest incentive for this improvement in economic efficiency 
is due mainly to the 
introduction of the risk of bankruptcy or take-over, which implies that the cost of 
production is lower for a firm in the private sector than in the public sector. 
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However, as Ferguson and Ferguson (1994) explain (as illustrated in Figure 3.1), 
privatisation can improve productive efficiency but it may also reduce allocative 
efficiency. 
Figure 3.1: Gains and Losses from Privatisation 
Costs and Revenues 
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Source: Ferguson, P. and Ferguson, G. (1994) Industrial Economics: Issues and Perspectives. 
Figure 3.1, above, is based on the assumption that privatisation could put the management 
under greater pressure from shareowners, causing costs to decline (i. e. lower marginal 
costs) and prices to rise to monopoly levels. In this case, the presumed positive impact of 
privatisation on economic efficiency occurs as the gains from productive efficiency (area 
EFBG) outweigh the loss in allocative efficiency (area ABC). They also believe that the 
profit incentives would give managers the reason to introduce new products and processes. 
As a result, the short-r-un allocative loss would be offset by the successful innovation 
which would advance the welfare of society over time. These positive outcomes from 
privatisation could be even higher if privatisation was combined with competition which 
results in lower competitive prices associated with higher output. 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) reported on the empirical studies of the importance of property 
types (public or private), but the results were less informative than expected. They 
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criticised the focus in many of these studies of the ownership variable and their failure to 
take proper account of the effects on performance of differences in market structure, 
regulation, and other relevant economic factors. They particularly criticised the 
methodology used by some of the studies which may have led to a bias in favour of private 
ownership. Pollitt (1995) studied the performance of over 275 electricity utilities mainly 
from the US. He found that there was no significant difference in the performance of 
publicly-owned companies in comparison with that of privately-owned companies. 
The World Bank, in its World Development Report 1996, indicates that an extensive 
empirical literature shows generally that private enterprises, in industrial countries, exhibit 
higher productivity and better performance than public enterprises. Also, the report 
presented the outcome of comparative studies of performance before and after privatisation 
in eighteen countries including six developing countries. The analysis of the sixty-one 
privatised companies indicated stronger conclusions in favour of private ownership. It 
showed that in at least two-thirds of post-privatisation cases, there were increases in 
profitability, sales, operating efficiency, and capital investment without any increase in 
unemployment. However, most of these studies were based on cases from industrial 
economies where advanced capital markets and infrastructure exist, which diminishes their 
relevance to developing economies. 
Martin and Parker (1997) reviewed several empirical studies from developed as well as 
developing countries, which deal with the relationship between efficiency and ownership 
type. They reported that some of the studies support the notion that private ownership leads 
to higher performance, while others show no statistical significant difference. Their 
conclusion is that even if private firms are more profitable than public enterprises, profit 
should not be the only indicator of efficiency. This is particularly true as these firms 
operate in monopolistic markets and consequently are able to overcharge. Majumdar 
(1998) conducted a cross-sectional study consisting of 67 Indian state-owned, 63 privately- 
owned and 27 foreign-owned enterprises. He analysed the performance of these enterprises 
and found that the state-owned enterprises exhibited poor performance despite the fact that 
all firms operated in an equally competitive environment. The conclusion of his study was 
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that institutional factors such as protection of fin-ns from failure and cheap capital provided 
by the government should be eliminated as they are sources of soft-budget constraints. 
Nellis (1999) found from the case of the transition countries that the evidence of good 
results from privatisation comes mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, but evidence 
from Russia and Ukraine shows less promising results. He noticed that private ownership 
in these latter countries often does not lead to restructuring and competition and even some 
partially state-owned enterprises perform better than privatised enterprises. In these and 
other transition countries, clear performance improvements occur only in cases where the 
companies were sold to foreign investors, while there is very little difference between the 
performance of public and private enterprises. However, Havrylyshyn and McGettigan 
(1999) surveyed a selection of similar empirical studies from these countries and reported 
that privatised enterprises performed much better than public enterprises. 
Tittenbrun (1996) put forward the argument that even if most studies suggest that public 
enterprises are less efficient than private ones, there are some studies which indicate the 
opposite conclusion. Hence, the existing evidence is insufficient to show that public 
enterprises are inherently less efficient than private ones. Abu Shair (1992) believes that 
the market mechanism is the single most important determinant in improving efficiency 
and minimising agency costs. Hence, in his view, it is market structure, and not ownership, 
which brings about the success or failure of privatisation. 
Hemming and Manssor (1988) believe that the efficiency of privatised enterprise results 
from economic and financial liberalisation, which allow market forces to influence the 
performance of enterprise. Bishop and Thompson (1992) indicate that most econoinists are 
generally agreed that simply changing the ownership type is not sufficient, and that this Is 
not even necessary, for efficiency improvement. What is important, in their view, is that 
competition, or at least the threat of it, is present and credible. 
Waterson (1995) believes that the preference for competition shown by most economists is 
solely related to attaining efficiency as they consider Inequity as a separate issue. 
Crew 
(1986) argues that while economists either suppress or purposefully ignore this issue, 
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equity seems to be a main concern of the public and of the regulators. Nicholson (1998), 
using the social welfare function, illustrates that this separation is not always socially 
optimal. He demonstrates that efficiency is necessary for maximising social welfare, but is 
not sufficient. This means that society sometimes accepts a trade-off between the goals of 
efficiency and equity if the true optimal outcome, by the Pareto criterion, is unattainable. 
Zajac (1993) emphasises that the debate on this issue should take into account the fact that 
economic efficiency is not unique but depends on the initial distribution of income or 
resources, and it is at best only a necessary condition for justice. 
3.2.4 PRIVATISATION, RESTRUCTURING AND REGULATION 
The explanation for government economic intervention in the market is justified by the 
presence of market failure. Sherman (1989), B6s (1994), and Cooter and Ulen (2000) 
summarise the sources of competitive market failure as follows: the existence of 'public 
goods', externalities, severe informational asymmetries and technical conditions such as 
economies of scope and economies of scale which create a natural monopoly. Thus, it has 
become common in the literature to find many writers such as Fine (1990) who believe that 
the original rationales for the existence of public enterprise are based on the problems of 
natural monopoly and externalities. 
When an industry exhibits the characteristics of natural monopoly, it becomes more useful 
al for a single firm to solely occupy it. According to Vickers and Yarrow (1985), obt 
the benefits of productive efficiency without the disadvantages of monopolistic behaviour 
is possible if policy initiatives include public ownership, competitive forces, regulation, or 
franchising. Kessides (1993) cautions that although market failures make government 
intervention acceptable, this does not necessarily justify government involvement in all 
aspects of the service provisions. In addition, she draws attention to the fact that new 
technologies would alter what is traditionally considered a natural monopoly and would 
introduce more competition. The best example of this is the technical changes in electricity 
generation which have made it possible for an efficient level of production to 
be reached 
by much smaller power plants than in the past. 
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Many authors such as Zank (1991) and Walters (1989) have raised concerns about public 
monopolies being replaced by private monopolies which require the creation of a 
regulatory agency. Salvatore (1996) indicates that the public interest theory supposes that 
regulation is introduced to deal with market failures and to ensure that the economic 
system works in a manner consistent with the public interest. However, he points out that 
the capture theory claims that regulation may result in laws and policies that restrict 
competition and promote the interest of the firms that they are supposed to regulate. 
Price (1994) argues that regulatory intervention is undertaken to overcome market failures 
with the objective of improving the outcome of free markets. This implies that even if 
private markets are preferred in most of the privatisation debates, they are not necessarily 
superior to public ownership. Hence, there is a need for economic regulation due to the 
presence of monopoly power. She considers this regulation inevitable and may even be 
desirable in industries providing services through a common network, such as electricity 
transmission. 
According to Jackson and Price (1994), the appropriate form of regulation depends on the 
structure of the privatised industry. Some industries are unbundled prior to privatisation, 
such as electricity and water, while others are privatised as vertically and horizontally 
integrated monopolies, such as telecom and gas. In the first case, the natural monopoly 
element can be isolated and regulated, which makes it easier to encourage entry and 
competition in the other elements. Newbery (1995) indicates that it is not necessary for 
prIvatisation to be preceded by industry restructuring and regulatory reforms. He uses 
Chile as an example where regulatory reforms were introduced prior to privatisation, in 
contrast to the US, UK and Norway where privatisation was shown to occur before 
industry restructuring and regulatory reforms. 
Waldeman and Jensen (1998) and Stelzer (1989) argue that the vertical unbundling of the 
electricity industry would be likely to result in lower industrial prices relative to residential 
prices. One of the reasons behind this outcome is that generating companies would 
compete for large commercial accounts. Hence, for deregulation to benefit captive small 
customers, a certain level of regulation is necessary to prevent this cross-subsidisation. 
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However, this regulation is less necessary when the industry is restructured to introduce 
competition in as many aspects of the industry as possible. Weyman-Jones (1989) believes 
that the generation segment is expected to form a competitive market, transmission and 
distribution are to remain as regulated network monopolies, and the supply services could 
become a contestable market. The success and the workability of this system depend 
greatly on the availability of and access to the transmission and distribution networks. 
The distinction between fixed costs and sunk costs is crucial in this discussion. Vickers and 
Yarrow (1985) argue that even if an industry is a natural monopoly, it is possible that the 
threat of entry would be sufficient to deter an incumbent finn. from exercising its 
monopolistic power. The theory of contestable markets attributed to Baumol (1982) 
considers that the main condition for this entry to be credible is that sunk costs are 
completely absent. As a result, all entry costs are recoverable and exit is costless, which 
makes it possible for a natural monopoly market to be contestable without further need for 
regulation. Martin (1993) believes that the possibility for sunk costs to be zero is very 
limited as that depends on the nature of resale markets for capital assets. The degree of 
sunkenness not only depends on the specificity of the assets, but also (to a lesser degree) 
on the costs of resale of the assets, including transportation costs. 
Weyman-Jones (1994) points out that dealing with the problem of sunk costs in the natural 
monopoly aspects of the electricity industry can be achieved through keeping the network 
either as a private but regulated company or as a publicly-owned company while 
guaranteeing open access to encourage competition. This way the company 
incurs sunk 
costs without threat of entry, but it remains subject to either rate of return 
(RoR) regulation 
or a price-cap using the price-setting rule, RPI- X, where the 
first term is Retail Price 
Index and X represents a productivity factor. 
Averch and Johnson (1962) believe that a regulated company under RoR 
has no incentive 
to invest in technology to improve operational efficiencies. In addition, they 
believe that 
such regulation would lead to excess capitalisation, which 
is known as the Averch-Johnson 
effect. Crew and Kleindorfer (1992) criticise the rate of return regulation 
for its failure to 
effectively protect the firm 
from entry, and its rigid price and cross-subsidised price 
structure. Laffont and Tirole 
(1993) see price-cap regulation as a reasonable alternative to 
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RoR because it gives better incentives for efficient production by the regulated natural 
monopoly. However, Banks (1996) criticised the process of setting the efficiency factor 
(X) and he considers price-cap regulation no more than a variant of rate of return 
regulation. 
Thompson (1992) cautions that the centrality of the productivity factor (X) in the price cap 
regulation creates some problems. In addition to the political nature of the selection of this 
factor, productivity changes are difficult to predict and the choice of the factor affects the 
allocation of benefits, due to increase in productivity, between shareholders and customers. 
Alexander and Irwin (1996) compared the effect of rate of return and price-cap regulations 
on the risk that affects the regulated utilities' capital cost. They concluded that a price-cap 
raises the firms' capital costs, which implies that regulators using a price-cap should 
permit these firms to earn a higher return in order to attract new investment capital and 
improve the quality of their service. Bums and Weyman-Jones (1998) indicate that the 
impact of the X factor on productive efficiency is related to whether the profit maximising 
utility is risk averse or risk neutral. While the value of this factor is critical for productive 
efficiency in the first case, it is less so in the second where the utility will try to beat any 
price cap to obtain the profit. 
Beesley and Littlechild (1989) have suggested that the choice between the two regulatory 
regimes of price cap and rate of return could be determined by the characteristics of the 
industry concerned. An industry moving towards a competitive structure may be regulated 
by a price cap, partly because the problem of incentive is reduced by the industry itself 
having both the opportunity, through changing technology, and the reason to reduce cost, 
due to potential competition. Price (1994) argues that these two forms of regulations differ, 
in that price cap applies only to monopolistic sectors while rate of return covers the entire 
industry. However, the application of rate of return regulation is more difficult in an 
integrated industry, where costs and infrastructure are shared by different sectors, than in a 
unbundled industry. 
In general, the form that regulation would take is influenced by the structure of the 
monopolies concerned. Shleife (1985) gives the example of using yardstick competition to 
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regulate the performance of electricity regional distribution companies. The horizontal 
separation of the electricity industry makes it possible to evaluate the performance of each 
company in relation to the average. Weyman-Jones (1995) considers yardstick competition 
as a special case of incentive regulation as it decouples a utility's price structure from its 
own reported costs. In addition, he argues that this form of regulation has the advantage of 
helping the regulator to deal with the problem of asymmetric information. 
3.2.5 PRIVATISATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Privatisation is a reform policy that has been recommended to many developing countries 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and most donor countries. Prager (1992) 
argues that the movement of third world countries toward privatisation is influenced by 
two factors: firstly, the conviction that public sector performance was less than expected; 
secondly, external pressure from the IMF and WB, especially on these countries who rely 
on structural adjustment loans to reduce the role of the public sector in their economies. 
The discussion of privatisation in developing countries draws attention to the necessity of 
examining the factors which have led to the growth of the public sector in these countries 
in the first place. Zini (1992) believes that the main reason for government involvement in 
economic development is related to the fact that the private sector has not delivered as 
expected. Also, the governments in these countries have access to costly information and 
are more able to undertake risks than the private sector. In addition, due to the weak 
development of capital markets in these countries the government is more capable of 
mobilising savings than the private sector. However, Ghafoor and Weiss (1999) argue that 
this intervention has its drawbacks as it affects pricing and investment decisions in public 
enterprises, particularly in the infrastructure. The combination of subsidisation and the 
rapidly growing demand for these services increase future investment requirements to a 
level which is beyond the ability of the government. 
According to Bouin and NEchalet (1991), the degree of government involvement varies in 
developing economies. The government may take control of activities which it considers 
are strategic industries making public enterprises widespread. 
Alternatively, the 
75 
government may adopt policies which encourage private sector to play a crucial role in the 
economy. Finally, some governments may selectively use state-controlled industries to 
serve special interests. Chaudhry (1992) believes that the scope of government intervention 
in the economy in developing countries is not necessarily based on ideology. He gives the 
example of the governments of Saudi Arabia and Iraq where, despite the differences in 
their ideological inclination, the public sectors in both countries play major role in the 
economy. 
According to Ali (1996), ideology as well as politics and economics has had a major 
impact on the extent of government involvement in the economic development of some 
Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Tunisia. However, he argues that the 
relative influence of the factors composing the triad in this involvement varied from one 
country to another and within the same country over time. He believes that not only does 
the economic factor come third in importance as far as the role of the three governments in 
economic development is concerned, but also that it is greatly influenced by the political 
factor. Most of the participants in a conference, organised by the Arab Monetary Fund 
(AMF) in 1988, about privatisation in Arab countries, concluded that ideology has some 
effect on the extent of the state intervention in these economies. 
The conference participants classified these countries into three groups based on the 
rationale for government intervention in the economy. The first group included countries 
which had experienced a socialist transformation during the 1960s, such as Egypt, Sudan, 
Syria, Iraq, Algeria and South Yemen. In these countries, the public sector involvement 
was considerable and was not limited to strategic industries, but included economic 
activities such as the retail sectors, contracting, book publishing and even hotels and 
restaurants. The second group included Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco, which are countries 
that did not adopt the socialist ideology, but had development strategies based on 
interventionism. This development may be rooted in historical factors where the colonising 
power departed but left foreign projects, which then had to be given national certification. 
The third group included the Gulf States, such as Saudi Arabia which officially adheres to 
the philosophy of free-market economy. In this group, the public sector controls the oil 
sector due to its strategic nature and some strategic 
industries such as petrochemicals. The 
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private sector has a major role in other sectors, even though the partnership with the public 
sector remains very considerable. 
For all practical purposes the two different points of view, mentioned above, come to the 
same conclusion that there is extensive involvement in the economy by the government 
regardless of the ideology or the rationale behind this intervention. The conference 
participants concluded that privatisation was necessary in the first group, but it was less so 
for the second group and was not very urgent for the oil-dominated group. This 
observations also implies that the extent of government intervention reflects the potential 
and scope of privatisation programmes. 
Cassese (1992) finds it ironic that the process of privatisation, which is supposed to reduce 
the government's role, requires considerable government involvement and a strong 
bureaucratic structure. He asserts that the promotion of some industries and the weakness 
of the private sector due to the lack of entrepreneurial initiatives or the shortage of private 
capital makes this sector in need of government support. Also, he finds that public 
enterprises, especially in less developed countries, are entrapped in a vicious circle. They 
are in charge of performing unprofitable activities, which make them dependent on 
financial aid from the government. This dependency results in more bureaucratic and 
political involvement in the activities of the enterprises, which reflects further links to the 
government and more demand for such enterprises to carry out unprofitable activities. 
Chang and Singh (1992) indicate that not only economic but also institutional and political 
factors have a direct impact on the performance of public enterprises. They argue that 
another approach to dealing with the problems of the public sector in developing 
economies is through promoting the private sector rather than going through the complex 
process of privatisation. El-Naggar (1989) disagrees with this approach as it 
ignores the 
dynamics of change in an economy with a large number of state-owned enterprises. 
Instead, he suggests incremental privatisation where these enterprises are to be privatised, 
but in gradual phases. 
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Jackson and Price (1994) caution that the actual experiences of privatisation in these 
economies show that the process may have helped the government with its finances 
(though not by as much as is often assumed) but failed to produce the dynamic efficiency 
gains that had been hoped for. They attribute this outcome to two causes: firstly, the fact 
that in many cases the privatised firms are sold back to their original owners who lack the 
managerial skills; and, secondly, the rent-seeking behaviour of managers of privatised 
industries who demand subsidies and legal protection rather than working on improving 
the competitiveness of their firms. Thobani (1999) believes that misallocation of risks, 
between government and investors, is another cause of failing to benefit from privatisation 
especially in the infrastructure. Guarantees from governments, such as in the case of 
purchasing power at a predetermined price regardless of demand or guaranteeing a 
minimum revenue for BOT contracts, may reduce the efficiency incentives for private 
investors and increase liabilities for the government. 
According to Berrie (1992), the central issue in understanding the limited progress in 
pursuing the privatisation policy is not desirability but feasibility. The main obstacles are 
the private sector's high dependency on government subsidies, undeveloped capital 
markets and work-force opposition. Bayliss and Fine (1998) believe that the success and 
even just the implementation of privatisation depend upon complex economic and political 
preconditions. For example, Abu Shair (1997) indicates that the argument for private 
ownership is based on the assumption of the existence of financial markets, which 
facilitate the transfer of property ownership. However, most developing countries do not 
have developed markets and if they do they are inefficient and lack the codes and 
institutional arrangements to protect property rights. 
Cassese (1992) explains the lack of success in privatisation in developing countries 
in 
terms of two paradoxes: firstly, there must be a well-developed private sector and a strong 
financial market, but the existence of a large public sector in these countries 
is the very 
reason that the private sector is weak; secondly, 
in more recently independent countries, 
the public enterprises are the result of a process of confiscation of 
foreign capital and this 
contradicts the need to put the control of some privatised sectors 
back under the 
management of foreigners. 
For the implementation of privatisation to be successful it has 
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to recognise the fact that privatisation is a political process rather than a social one. Hence, 
the report by the United Nations Development Program (1993) identifies the 'sins' that 
developing countries need to avoid in the implementation of this process. These sins 
include the attempt by the government to maximise its revenues rather than creating 
competition, public monopolies being replaced with private monopolies, and the 
procedures used in the process which may lack transparency and lead to corruption and 
nepotism. 
Irwin (1997) draws attention to one of the challenges facing privatisation in developing 
countries, which is that of dealing with the social and political implications of changing 
price structures. Economic efficiency requires that prices vary between different 
consumers according to their price elasticity and different times of use. He calls for an end 
to price subsidies, as this policy in developing countries is unsuccessful in achieving its 
main objective of assisting the very poor. Stevens (1998) agrees that distortion of prices, 
such as in the case of price subsidies, is not a good way to redistribute income, although in 
developing countries it may be the only way. 
Walters (1989) accepts that the existence of a capital market makes the process of 
privatisation much easier, administratively and politically, but he does not consider it a 
necessary condition. He cites the case of Chile, where the government has carried out an 
extensive and successful privatisation programmes despite the limitations of the capital and 
financial markets. Young (1992) believes that the limited nature of capital markets is not 
an intractable problem. He suggests that privatisation could be used to develop a capital 
market by adopting a privatisation programme that creates widespread ownership. This 
could be done through sale to the general public through flotation of shares, sale to the 
employees or management of the enterprise concerned, and sale to the consumers of 
its 
services. According to Robinson (1991) this is in line with the argument 
by most 
economists that the prime aim of privatisation is to liberalise markets so as to obtain the 
benefits from more competition. 
Yoder et al. (1991) conducted an empirical research study of the correlation between 
privatisation, as measured 
by the share of private sector spending of Gross National 
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Product (GNP), and some development indicators for forty-five developing countries. The 
study concluded that there is no significant correlation between privatisation and economic 
development and it emphasised the importance of the institutional factors that may affect 
development rather than just private sector growth. However, Abu Shair (1997) argues that 
given an appropriate framework of institutional reform, the process of privatisation has the 
potential to contribute to the economic and social development in these countries. 
3.2.6 PRIVATISATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE 
The speed and the scope of the movement toward privatisation vary between developing 
countries. Malaysia, along with Turkey, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and most of the 
Eastern European countries followed broad schemes of privatisation. Hensley and White 
(1993) consider the Malaysian case different from the others as in this case the country was 
viewed as a corporate entity. The government provided the policy parameters and support 
while the private sector provided commercial expertise and ingenuity. This privatisation 
experience was based on the encouragement of projects initiated by the private sector 
itself, especially in infrastructure projects. Malaysia utilised innovative tools of 
privatisation such as of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and Build-Own-Operate (BOO) 
which became the vehicles for the execution of ambitious infrastructure plans. 
Malhotra (1997) points out that developing countries have to create the necessary 
investment climate which encourages the use of these arrangements in infrastructure 
projects in general, and in electricity in particular. This envirom-nent should include, 
among other factors, a transparent process, competition in bidding, fair allocation of risk, 
and predictable policies. Roseman and Malhorta (1996) believe that private power 
producers could play a dynamic role, which would demand their involvement 
in the 
restructuring process of the electricity industry. In addition to their role 
in increasing the 
generation capacity and reducing public spending, these producers could enhance the 
potential of competition in the generation segment of the 
industry. Dunkerley (1995) 
indicates that this trend in developing countries is a departure from the traditional, public- 
sector-dominated methods. These new methods also 
have the advantages of providing a 
vehicle for private investment, especially 
for international investors who could introduce 
know-how and new financing and management techniques. 
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Hawdon (1998) explains that in some variants of the BOT scheme, the power plant is 
owned and operated by a private foreign company for a substantial period. The site and 
fuel are provided by the host country, which also buys the electricity generated. The clear 
advantage of such an arrangement is that capital to build the plant is provided by the 
private generator, so there is no foreign exchange requirement for the government. The 
nature and the structure of BOT schemes vary from project to project, but they are highly 
complex. Although David and Wong (1994) admit this complexity, they argue that seeing 
these schemes as unnecessarily risky is unjustified. They explain that under theses schemes 
there are inevitable sources of risks such as borrowing and investment is on a limited 
recourse basis, a sovereign guarantees from the host government are limited to the initial 
stage of the project and uncertainties associated with exchange rates and inflation. 
David and Fernando (1995) stress that negotiating a successful BOT project should clearly 
resolve the following issues which include: 
9 the debt-equity ratio and how the equity is allocated between the host country 
and the private power developer; 
the formation of the company which will implement and operate the project; 
agreements for power purchase and fuel procurement as well as agreements 
covering construction and operation stages; 
9 agreement on the energy pricing formulae which should include a basic price 
and adjustments for fuel prices, exchange rate fluctuation and inflation; 
& technical procedures and standards such as start-up frequency, reserve 
allocation and plant dispatch; and 
* the financial model showing reasonable cash flows for the project and a fair rate 
of return on equity to the developer. 
In the electricity industries of developing countries, where the objective of increasing 
generation capacity is very much needed, these schemes have become more relevant than 
ever before. One of the advantages of BOT, especially for developing countries, is that the 
ownership of a project which is considered to be strategic would return to the government 
at the end of the agreed period. Hensley and White (1993) draw attention to another 
advantage from adopting the BOT or BOO schemes in project financing. These schemes 
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separate the project risks from the (host) country risk because lenders advance money 
against the cash flow of the project rather than the government's guarantee. The project 
company or consortium raises the debt financing from commercial sources, while members 
of the consortium provide equity which usually amounts to 30 per cent of the total project 
cost. This equity reflects the level of conm-iitment to the project and presents a protection 
against bankruptcy. 
Pollio (1998) emphasises the importance of requiring sponsors and operators to take a 
direct equity stake in the project. This requirement leads to financial efficiency because It 
creates a strong linkage between the profits of the different parties and the overall 
performance of the project. However, these schemes are highly beneficial, but are not 
sufficient for sustainable financing. According to Jechoutek and Lamech (1995) the 
elegantly engineered financial instrument or transactional modality should not to be seen 
as an end in itself, but rather has to be combined with sector and corporate reforms. 
Sustainable financing of the sector concerned requires the introduction of more corporate 
financing and not just the reliance on project financing. 
In addition, the opening up of the electricity industry for these schemes of private 
generation should be approached with some prudence, not only because it is a relatively 
new concept for most developing countries but also because it may create problems of its 
own. For instance, Albouy and Bousba (1998) indicate that the overall positive impact of 
IPPs on economic development, especially in Asian countries, came with some significant 
effects. These effects included higher exposure to foreign exchange risks and over-capacity 
in cases such as Indonesia and Malaysia, where too many programmes were implemented 
too soon. 
3.3 THE CASE OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
Most of the traditional literature on the electricity economics focuses primarily on the issue 
of regulation, while the more recent literature explores issues related to the 
increasingly 
debated alternatives for restructuring the industry. This due to the fact that the institutional 
transformations of the industry, in developed and developing countries alike, 
have had 
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reaching effects on the different aspects of the industry in terms of ownership, operation, 
regulation and pricing. 
This section reviews the changing structure of this industry, with special attention given to 
the evolving role of the transmission segment within this new environment. The focus is on 
the contentious issue of transmission pricing, which is an indispensable element in any 
restructuring scheme. In particular, having the efficient and implementable transmission 
pricing is critical for facilitating the evolution of a competitive electricity market. 
3.3.1 RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATISATION OF THE INDUSTRY 
Restructuring and privatisation are not synonymous, as restructuring does not necessarily 
imply changes in ownership and privatisation does not necessarily imply changes in 
structure. In the case of the electricity industry, however, restructuring usually comprises 
the elements of restructuring, privatisation and deregulation (i. e. re-regulation). There is 
wide agreement, in the literature, that restructuring should begin with legal and 
institutional reforms; to be followed by the liberalisation of the industry, before any 
substantial privatisation is achieved. 
Although different countries may have the same objectives of the establishment of efficient 
markets and the introduction of competition, Hadjilambrinos (1999) emphasises that 
political and institutional traditions influence the restructuring direction that each country 
takes. Some governments may view privatisation not as a part of a broad restructuring 
programme with competition as an objective, but as a way of improving the government's 
fiscal position through maximising privatisation proceeds. 
Lock (1995) and others suggest that prior to privatisation, the electricity industry should be 
broken up into separate generation, transmission and distribution companies, and that such 
companies must be turned into more viable and economically efficient entities through 
corporatisation. However, Arocena et al. (1999) argue that corporatisation of the industry, 
instead of involving its initial disintegration would amount to the government's raising 
money through an implicit tax on future electricity consumption. This caution 
is well 
founded but the dilemma is that if the electricity industry is losing money, it is unlikely to 
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be sold easily. Thus, it is worth trying to privatise such companies, exposing them to the 
pressure of competition at an early stage of the process. 
3.3.1.1 INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITION 
Most restructuring cases involve, simultaneously, a horizontal as well as a vertical break- 
up of the electricity industry. Klein (1998) describes horizontal restructuring as the 
situation where two or more entities are created in a single area of economic activity (i. e. 
power generation), while vertical restructuring involves the separation of different stages 
of the production chain, such as electricity transmission, from the competitive segments of 
generation. In his view, vertical separation has the advantages of facilitating less 
regulation, by isolating natural monopolies from competitive segments, and reducing the 
monopolistic power of vertically integrated utilities. 
In the literature on economic regulation, there is an implicit conviction that the best 
regulators are the free-market forces themselves. Newbery (1995) argues that competition 
is more effective than regulation in promoting efficiency. Therefore, he maintains, it is 
considered a good public policy to regulate only the natural monopoly aspects of the 
electricity industry. Also, the reform should include an open transmission system, even 
under public ownership, and create competition in generation and possibly distribution 
through privatisation. 
In the opinion of Lock (1995), what is more important is that comprehensive regulation 
and an independent regulator should be part of the broad restructuring strategies for the 
electricity industry. Jackson and Price (1994) consider the separation of the electricity 
supply into a service distinct from distribution to be an innovative concept. However, this 
needs to be coupled with more selective and specific forms of regulation to those parts, 
which are natural monopolies, and permitting the introduction of competition wherever 
possible. 
3.3.1.2 TRANSITION COSTS OF RESTRUCTURING 
Despite the changing organisation of the industry, co-ordination within and among the 
generation, transmission, and distribution segments remains necessary. 
Herriott (1989) 
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believes that co-operation under the new structure should cover both commercial and 
technical aspects. This would include economy power transactions, unit commitment, joint 
planning in generating and transmission, co-ordinated maintenance, spinning and capacity 
reserve transactions. 
However, the move towards more market mechanism in the industry has created its own 
sceptics. Baxter et al. (1997) argue that restructuring involves considerable transition costs, 
such as stranded investments. These costs include physical assets and financial liabilities, 
to which the industry has committed itself prior to the introduction of competition into the 
market. Joskow and Schmalensee (1983) expressed some doubts that the introduction of 
competition into electricity markets could accornmodate, without loss of some economic 
efficiency, the organised co-operation that is necessary for least-cost planning and 
operation. 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) find that there is a contradiction between creating a central co- 
ordination, to overcome the externalities resulting from full decentralisation, and the 
objective of promoting greater competition through the introduction of more independent 
decision making. Banks (1996,1999) believes that the unbundling of the electricity 
industry might have only created uncertainty without being able to introduce successful 
financial instruments to minimise the risks. Thus, he thought it is unwise for countries with 
successful electricity industries to rush into this process with no guarantees that it would be 
correctly applied. 
This argument could be accepted if the industry exhibited a good performance in ternis of 
low prices for consumers and reasonable profit for producers. In reality, however, many 
countries have had to reform their industries precisely because of the failure in achieving 
these desirable outcomes. The policy dilemma, then, is to consider the expected benefits 
resulting from restructuring versus the problems and the costs associated with such a 
complicated process. Hence, the question of how this trade-off should 
be resolved is 
becoming one of the most interesting issues in electricity economics. 
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3.3.2 THE NEW ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
3.3.2.1 CHANGING GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES 
Although claims about natural monopoly have influenced public policies and academic 
discussions for many years, these claims have become less relevant to some activities of 
the modem electricity industries. There is a general recognition that this industry consists 
of at least two distinct businesses: production (i. e. generation) and delivery (i. e. 
transmission and distribution). While the delivery business retains the characteristics of a 
natural monopoly, the generation business is no longer considered a natural monopoly. 
Primeaux (1986) was one of the writers who strongly challenge the theory of natural 
monopoly and its application to electricity utilities. Arocena et al. (1999) argue that both 
static and dynamic (e. g. 'learning by doing') economies of scale do not exist in power 
generation. In addition, many empirical studies, such as Bernstein (1988) examined the 
investment costs of power projects which are in the range between 40 and 600 MW, and 
reached the same conclusion. More recent studies, such as those conducted by Doyle and 
Maher (1992) and Bayless (1994) reveal that the new technology of Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbines (CCGT), has made it possible for efficient production in generation to be reached 
on a much smaller scale than ever before. 
According to Berrie (1992) the prospects for Independent Power Producers (IPP) are 
greatly improved as these new technologies point downwards in scale, price and optimum 
size, away from 2000 MW and towards 200-500 MW power generators. This trend has 
made market competition more possible especially with the faster installation of smaller 
generators. For example, Meade (1987) reported that generation facilities under 10 MW 
were allowed, in the US, to sell power to end users under bidding contracts without any 
official approval. 
3.3.2.2 COMPETITION IN GENERATION 
Klein (1998) observed that, in recent years, the notions about which segments are truly 
natural monopolies have been challenged strongly and repeatedly. 
Thus, the potential for 
competition has been expanded and the extent of regulation 
has become limited. Trebing 
(2000) believes that restructuring would make it possible to introduce competition into the 
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generation segment while the natural monopolies of transmission and distribution would 
have remain regulated. Robinson (1991) argues that competition in genertaion is necessary 
for achieving higher economic efficiency. The gains in productive efficiency can happen 
through lower costs, and the gains in allocative efficiency can be achieved by bringing 
prices into closer alignment with these costs. 
The reduction in monopoly power of the traditional utilities is, according to Flavin and 
Lenssen (1994), due to the recent technological changes in electricity generation and the 
introduction of IPPs as competitors. The developments in generation technologies, such as 
co-generation or distributed generation, have made it possible for small generation 
facilities to be strategically located near the consumption centres. These developments not 
only have a positive impact on competition but are also a contributing factor in cost 
reduction. According to Hoff et al. (1996), these small sources of generation can relieve 
capacity constraints on the system, which reduce variable costs and investment 
requirements. 
Cardell and Ilic (2000) recognise that the growing popularity of these technologies is due 
to their short construction time and low capital costs. However, the authors caution that 
these changes introduce uncertainties, such as the impact on the technical operations and 
control of the system. In addition to this technical uncertainty, financial complexity is also 
introduced. Kim and Alm (1990) point out that purchasing electricity from independent co- 
generators and reselling it to consumers raises concerns regarding pricing and payments, 
which need to be addressed. 
3.3.2.3 TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION 
Both transmission and distribution are considered to be naturally monopolistic activities, 
subject to regulation, in the sense that duplication of lines between two locations is 
inefficient. Armstrong et al. (1997) point out that the distinction between these two 
activities is that the transmission network is high-voltage and national in scope, whereas 
the distribution network is low-voltage and local. When the electricity industry consists of 
vertically integrated utilitiesq this distinction is less critical, 
but restructuring and 
privatisation have highlighted some significant practical and regulatory 
issues such as third 
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party access. In a wholesale market, trading (i. e. 'wheeling') can be conducted not only 
across the competing utilities distribution network but also over the transmission lines. 
Sansom. (1995) argues that it is not economically nor technically necessary to have 
transmission and distribution operated by single company in an unbundled structure. The 
option of regional separation is essential for yardstick competition, especially as there are 
very limited economies of scope between distribution activities in different regions. Since 
transmission is naturally monopolistic over large areas that contain several regions, vertical 
integration between transmission and distribution is incompatible with the regional 
separation of distribution companies. Also, another advantage of this separation is that 
retail supply competition between regional companies become possible. 
3.3.3 TRANSFORMATIONS IN TIHE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
In the 1980s, Fred Schweppe and other colleagues at Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology expected a considerable transformation in the industry's structure which 
would not take very long to materialise. They envisioned the ideal unbundled (i. e. 
deregulated) marketplace for electricity to consist of three main segments as in the 
following figure: 
Figure 3.2: Schweppe's Vision of an Unbundled Electricity Market 
Regulated 
T&D 
Company 
Deregulated 
Independent 
Entities 
Electric Energy Flows <=> 
Information, and/or Money Flows 40-0. 
Source: Schweppe et al. (1988), Spot pricing of electricity, p. 76 
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Figure 3.2, above, shows that the participants in the electricity industry can be grouped 
within three main segments. The first segment is a regulated transmission and distribution 
company which operates physically and financially as an intermediary. This company can 
be a public company but if it is a private one it should be regulated on the basis of a rate- 
of-return framework The second segment consist of many independent, private generating 
companies which sell electricity to the transmission and distribution company. The third 
segment comprises the electricity consumers who buy electricity from the transmission and 
distribution company. 
Although Joskow and Schmalensee (1983) expected the electricity industry to be 
restructured along similar lines to those outlined above, they did not agree that the 
transmission and distribution segments should necessarily be integrated into one company. 
These two visions conform to what it is called a single-buyer structure, which is nowadays 
considered a temporary and a transitional stage. Hence, these early works did not foresee 
the enormous restructuring and divestiture currently progressing in the electricity 
industries of many countries, which went beyond this vision. 
3.3.3.1 ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING MODELS 
The increasing public concern about efficiency in the electricity industry and recent 
technological innovations, especially in generation, have led to calls for abandoning the 
traditional model of a vertically integrated industry. Tenenbaum et al. (1992), and Hunt 
and Shuttleworth (1996) are well-known authors in the literature who take a similar 
normative approach in presenting a comprehensive analysis of the ways to structure an 
electricity industry. 
Tenenbaum et al. (1992) gave a broad review of the different structures and regulations of 
the electricity industry. Four restructuring models were presented and each one of them 
differed by the extent to which it introduced privatisation, as in the following: 
Model 1: This model consist of one or more vertically integrated, privately owned 
companies with each one in a franchised market. In this model privatisation is 
introduced without competition. 
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Model 2: This model maintains the traditional structure of Model 1 but allows 
competition in generation, with continued regulation of transmission and 
distribution. 
Model 3: This model expands on Model 2 by stressing the role of the transmission 
segment in the form of a 'common carrier' which must transmit electricity in a non- 
discriminatory way. In this model, the transmission owners are obliged to provide 
transmission access to competitors and to other wholesale buyers and sellers. 
Model 4: This model assumes that the whole industry is privatised and vertically 
separated. In this model, the independent transmission company owns the network 
and controls the dispatch function. Regional distribution companies are obliged to 
provide access to competitors and to their own consumers. 
Hunt and Shuttleworth (1996) identified four similar restructuring models. These models 
are not differentiated on the basis of ownership, but rather in terms of the degree of 
competition and choice that each model provides to the participants. The first model is 
described as monopoly model, the second as a purchasing agency (i. e. monopsony) model, 
the third as a wholesale competition model and the fourth as a retail competition model. 
The following figure illustrates these four models: 
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Figure 3.3: Restructuring Models for Electricity Industry 
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Source: Hunt, S. and Shuttleworth, G. (1996), CoLnpetition and Choice in ElecIdgity, p. 24 
The models in the figure are not based on ownership; for example, government-owned or 
private monopolies can fit into the first model. The most important characteristics of each 
model are those of competition among generators, choice for retailers and choice for final 
consumers. Hunt and Shuttleworth (1996) believe that restructuring an electricity industry 
to allow full competition is technically and economically feasible. They conclude that the 
fourth model is the most economically efficient model, because it has the most competitive 
market structure. 
When one comes to apply these models to the real world, there is no single model that can 
conform to the structure of a particular country, and in reality the distinction between these 
models is not always straightforward. Tenenbaum et al. (1992) indicated that the electricity 
market of England and Wales has some features which are not necessarily found in Model 
4. This market has retail competition, but also allows distribution companies to own equity 
interests in generation (i. e. backward vertical integration). 
The dynamic nature of electricity industry restructuring would ultimately introduce many 
choices and possibilities. Hyman and West (1989) believe that competition in the 
electricity industry could exist in a number of ways. Vertically Integrated utilities can 
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choose between using their own generation or buying it from other utilities or independent 
power producers. Many regional utilities or independent producers can sell in the 
wholesale market, and customers can choose between self-generation, or purchase from the 
local utility or even from external sources. 
3.3.3.2 TRADING MECHANISMS IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
The important cornerstone in promoting competition in generation and in the wholesale 
electricity market is the structure of the market itself. Newbery (1999) points out that this 
market consist of both a spot (physical) market and a market for risk sharing through 
trading in financial instruments. Sioshansi and Morgan (1999) argue that the type of 
generation mix is a determining factor in choosing the suitable market mechanism. While 
it is more suited for a system where the bulk of generation is thermal to choose a pool 
mechanism, a system where the majority of its generation is hydro-based has good reason 
to select the long-term contract mechanism. 
Mork (2001) emphasises that the decision to choose between a pool or bilateral contract 
should be based on factors such as price volatility and security of supply on the one hand, 
and prices transparency and market liquidity on the other. The emphasis is on the argument 
that the price transparency associated with pool-based markets can produce more 
competition and (allocative) efficiency. Murray (1998) also favours this approach over 
bilateral contracts, which, while they benefit the involved parties individually, these 
contracts produce suboptimal outcomes and the overall costs may generally be higher. 
However, the price transparency of the pool requires information availability, which, due 
to the repetitive nature of the electricity market, can create an incentive for collusion 
among generators. This problem has introduced calls for keeping some details confidential 
in order to make it harder for the bidders to guess the actions of their rivals. Crarnton and 
Schwartz (2000) believe that information about bidder identity associated with each bid is 
especially vulnerable to collusive use. Bower and Bunn (2000) reviewed the relevant 
literature on the auction theory and draw attention to suggestions for combating these 
collusion problems, such as by delaying the release of information about bids and auction 
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Due to the longer-term nature of CFDs, Lowrey (1997) believes that the Electricity 
Forward Agreements (EFAs) provide the market participants with much greater flexibility. 
Bower and Bunn (2000) indicate that a vital part of an electricity spot market is the 
forward market where consumers and generators meet voluntarily to trade bilateral 
contracts, but in a mandatory day-ahead market, both CFDs and EFAs must be financially 
settled against prices set in this market. 
3.3.3.4 ELECTRICITY POOLS 
Barker et al. (1997) compared the governance and regulation of new style power pools in 
different countries and categorised these pools into 'tight' and 'loose' pools. The tight pool 
is a pool that has a centralised dispatch based on the marginal generation costs, and 
specified capacity and operating reserve requirements, which are subject to financial 
penalties for non-compliance. The loose pool is a pool with some co-ordination of 
operations and planning but with no central dispatch and usually no specific reserve 
obligations. What distinguishes these new style pools from the old ones are that the former 
are created to maximise competition in generation (subject to reasonable reliability 
standards), to compete on price, and to be open to all market participants. 
Murray (1998) provided an overview of the alternative market structure and mechanisms 
that have been established or are being considered to realise competition in generation and 
supply. He presented three different types of pools; gross, net and zonal pools, which are 
outlined as follows: 
The gross pool is where all energy is traded between generators and suppliers and 
where the market clearing price is set in advance based on estimated marginal 
generation costs with the objective of minimising the total cost of production. 
Participants in this pool hedge against the volatility of pool prices by striking two- 
way hedging contracts to adjust pool payments to a pre-agreed contract price. 
The net pool is where most of the energy is traded directly between generators and 
suppliers through bilateral contracts. The difficulties surrounding the prediction of 
the actual demand and generation availability make this type useful in clearing the 
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residual supply and any uncontracted demand. However, this arrangement does not 
create full competition because bilateral contracts lack the necessary transparency. 
The zonal pools become possible when different areas of the system have different 
prices due to transmission constraints. Thus, the price differentials and level of 
interconnection capacity create 'bid' zones for the trading between the pool 
authorities or directly between generators in the different zones. This arrangement 
introduces further complexity but highlights the importance of investment in 
additional transmission capacity. 
3.3.3.5 NEW PLAYERS IN THE ELECTRICITY MARKET 
The new electricity industry has introduced new entities and an innovative trading climate. 
The treatment of electricity as any other commodity has given rise to new institutions and 
players. With the creation of electricity spot and futures markets, marketers, brokers, and 
resellers have become visible participants in these markets. The significance of these 
transformations is in the ability of these players to provide a number of highly-valued 
products and value-added services. 
The marketers, through their involvement in electricity markets, attempt to co-ordinate 
different power sources through bilateral contracts with generators. Sioshansi and Altman 
(1999) attribute the growth of demand for the services provided by such players to three 
factors. Firstly, the presence of market price volatility has made it necessary to manage 
risk. Secondly, there is the participation of small players who need to rely on marketers for 
important trading, brokering, and information services. Thirdly, the considerable locational 
and temporal price differences create considerable arbitrage opportunities. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the continuous evolution of the electricity markets could 
reach new highs. It has been suggested that the auction approach to electricity pricing and 
trading might become possible in the near future. Sheble (1999) envisions that the 
implementation of auctions in the electricity industry would be accomplished through a 
computerised market. This would require generation and transmission players to submit 
offers that reflect system operating conditions and demand centres need to submit bids that 
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represent their valuation of requested demand. The only caveat is that the auction centre 
would have to assign only contracts that do not violate system security and reliability. 
3.3.4 THE ROLE OF TRANSMISSION 
3.3.4.1 TRANSMISSION IMPACT ON COMPETITION 
The function of electricity transmission is considered of vital importance in the efficient 
planning and operation of the electricity industry in both vertically integrated and 
unbundled structures. Weyman-Jones (1995) points out the economies of massed reserves 
which could result from having one interconnected system. This advantage is caused, 
according to him, by the fact that "the risk of failing to meet demand on a system of nodes 
is less than the sum of the separate risks of failing to meet demand at individual nodes" (p. 
426). Joskow and Schmalensee (1983) believe that the transmission network has positive 
effects, which include the realisation of plant-level scale economies, production 
efficiency, reduction in total capacity requirements and increased reliability of supply. 
These benefits could also be realised in an unbundled structure where power trade could 
occur between vertically integrated (though monopolistic) companies or in trading through 
an electricity spot market. The move toward disaggregation of the industry has enhanced 
the role of transmission not only in terms of exchange of power but also in facilitating 
competition in the power trade. Yarrow (1994) argues that introducing competition 
especially in generation is one of the major direct benefits from substantial investment in 
transmission. 
Bornstein et al. (1997) examined the competitive impact of transmission on competition 
in 
generation, in the context of a model of two geographically separated markets, each 
dominated by a single supplier. The main finding of this investigation was that the 
availability of increased transmission capacity enhanced the potential 
for competitive 
entry, in the form of electricity imports. More importantly, the mere presence of 
this threat 
discouraged monopolistic behaviour in each market, even though the entry was not 
realised. Hence, it could be concluded that 
having some excess transmission capacity, even 
if unused, is useful in keeping prices 
low. 
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These findings reflect the role of transmission networks in creating competition between 
different sources of generation as well as providing the consumers with choices. However, 
this positive role might be lost depending on the structural as well as the regulatory 
approach to dealing with this monopolistic segment. Tenenbaum and Henderson (1991) 
emphasise that market power in the electricity industry lies in the ownership or control of 
the transmission network. For example, a combined generation and transmission utility 
wishing to sell power could use its transmission control to block lower-priced suppliers 
from competing. This could be overcome, according to Doyle and Maher (1992), if there is 
open access where the transmission company operates as a common carrier and the 
generation segment is competitive. 
Flavin and Lenssen (1994) believe that restructuring the industry should extend retail 
wheeling even to residential consumers, who otherwise could become captive to the 
distribution companies and, hence, subsidise large consumers. According to Tenenbaum et 
al. (1992), industry reforms should include both a competitive wholesale electricity market 
and open access transmission. They emphasise that the key to healthy competition is 
knowing who has access and who has the right to use the network. This then requires 
conduct regulation to ensure that competitors get comparable transmission services. 
3.3.4.2 THE TRANSMISSION COMPANY 
The transmission of electricity is basically a service provided by 'a transporter' which is 
the entity responsible for transmitting the power between different points on the network. 
This service is provided to match instantly the generation of electricity with any changes in 
demand. This entity can be a publicly owned company, but in a privatised structure it 
should be regulated like any other natural monopoly. In electricity industries where a 
competitive market has been adopted, separate companies usually own the generation and 
transmission segments. Thus, restructuring usually puts transmission and generation under 
separate ownership, which eliminates the incentive for the transmission company to 
manipulate the competitive market. 
Herriott (1989) is of the view that the transmission company should be a provider of a 
transportation service rather than a buyer-reseller of electricity. The access of this company 
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to the cost and demand information makes it able to account for all transactions and 
optimise the investments in generation and transmission capacity. Trebing (2000) discusses 
two alternatives for organising transmission segment. The first alternative is the creation of 
a non-profit administrator, or independent system operator (ISO), who is responsible for 
scheduling electricity transfers and establishing transmission prices. The second alternative 
also involves an independent administrator but here the transmission company is a 
regulated for-profit company. The proponents of this approach argue that it has a 
performance incentive that makes it preferable to the first alternative, which is in any case 
a transitional step toward the creation of the for-profit company. 
According to Berrie (1992), the owners of this company can be the generation companies, 
the distribution companies or both, or it could remain as an unaffiliated company. He 
classifies the transmsission entity into three categories: common carrier, market-maker or 
purchasing agent. In the case of the common carrier, an independent company operates the 
transmission network, while both generators and distributors are able to contract directly 
with each other. In the case of the market-maker, an autonomous transmission company 
could buy and sell electricity from generators, and sell to distributors. This case induces 
economic efficiency, as purchasing policy is based on the merit order of generators rather 
than on long-term contracts. In the case of the purchasing agent, the transmission company 
accepts the contracts made between generators and distributors and dispatch them in terms 
of the cheapest offered price. This case has the advantage of eliminating the ability of 
generators to manipulate and game the market, but this comes at the expense of market 
transparency. 
3.3.4.3 THE COST OF TRANSMISSION SERVICES 
According to Chao and Peck (1996), there are three cost components in electricity 
transmission: losses, congestion costs and costs of ancillary services, which include the 
provision of reactive power and spinning reserve. Thus, transmission costs can be split 
into 
two parts: fixed costs, which include infrastructure assets, operating and maintenance 
charges and ancillary services, and variable costs, which include losses and congestion. 
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Since electricity is a demand-driven industry, this makes it imperative to consider also how 
much demand centres, especially large consumers, are using the transmission network. 
Thus, it has been suggested by Weedy (1998), among others, that reactive power, as a 
source of transmission losses, is priced and charged to large consumers. He argues this is a 
natural step as these consumers have direct impact on transmission costs, including, 
reactive losses, through the fluctuations in their demands. 
Hunt and Shuttleworth (1993a) like Church and Ware (2000), consider that purchasing 
power by the transmission company is no different from buying capital and labour as 
factors of production. The transmission company needs to buy active and reactive power to 
compensate for the transmission losses incurred in transporting energy. This makes the 
transmission company liable for these losses, which induces efficiency in the network 
operations as the company has the incentive to optimise transmission expansion. However, 
this company is normally subject to regulation, which aims at distancing its profit from its 
operation of the system, for when losses are considered part of income, there is an 
incentive to increase rather than reduce losses and congestion on the system. 
Electricity transmission involves high economies of scale where the increase in the 
transmission capacity is unavoidably higher than the increase in demand. Thus, the nature 
of transmission investment would create excess capacity, even in expansion planning 
which is optimal. Hence, a high proportion of the transmission costs is fixed, and these 
costs are sunk even in the long run. According to Ring and Read (1996a), electricity 
transmission has high sunk costs because transmission assets have no economic alternative 
use other than transporting electricity. Dismukes et al. (1998) were able to show the 
existence of increasing return to scale in the provision of electricity transmission over all 
relevant ranges of capacity and distance. This confirms the presumption that this segment 
is a natural monopoly and should be regulated. 
3.3.4.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSMISSION PRICING 
The ultimate objective of restructuring the electricity industry is to give the retail customer 
direct access and choice between competing power sources. Hence, the identification and 
separate pricing of the electric service components is necessary to allow customers to 
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choose their preferred generators. The uncertainty introduced by the unbundling of the 
industry and the rapid development of competitive bulk power markets has increased the 
importance of transmission pricing. According to Hughes and Felak (1996), the unique 
nature of a transmission network has made such pricing more difficult than pricing systems 
for generating capacity and energy. 
Bornstein et al. (1997) point out that when one considers the unusual physical attributes of 
electricity transmission, this trade problem exhibits some interesting characteristics. 
Electricity can be easily 'reshipped', which gives the marketers the ability to buy 
electricity at one point and have it delivered to another point at very little or no cost to 
themselves. Also, electricity is a perfectly homogenous commodity which means that price 
differences can be easily arbitraged. This implies that trading in electricity requires the 
pricing of transmission costs and the determining of who should pay for transmission 
services. 
The transmission pricing issue increases in importance as the industry advances further 
toward more competition. With the exception of Model I (vertically integrated monopoly), 
transmission pricing becomes vital for all the models discussed in Tenenbaum et al. (1992) 
and Hunt and Shuttleworth (1996). In Model 2 (purchasing agency or monopsony), the 
competition in generation makes transmission prices a factor in the evaluation of bids. The 
contracts for purchasing power, for example, should determine which party is responsible 
for the transmission costs. Obviously, transmission prices become more central to Model 3 
(wholesale competition) and Model 4 (retail competition), where generators can trade 
directly with distribution companies, retailer or consumers. 
Bushinell and Stoft (1996) argue that the vexing issue of transmission pricing is one of the 
major consequences of electricity industry restructuring. These prices affect the socially 
optimal decisions made by the different users as well as facilitating smooth transformation 
of the process itself. Bamoul (1996), and Bamoul and Sidak (1995) argue that when the 
transmission owner provides the transmission service to itself and to its competitors, then 
transmission pricing becomes even more necessary for economic efficiency. They suggest 
that access to this service be priced under the efficient component pricing rule, which 
100 
requires this service provider to charge itself exactly the same price (i. e. marginal cost) for 
its use that it charges its competitors. 
The importance of dealing with the issue of transmission pricing is due to the fact that 
transmission prices have a direct impact on allocative efficiency, by feeding into electricity 
retail prices, and on productive efficiency. According to King (1996), private investors in 
generation incorporate the comparison between transmission prices and fuel costs into their 
investment decisions. Thus, a good transmission pricing method is one that encourages, or 
at least is not inconsistent with, efficiency in the expansion of generation and transmission 
capacity. It should give the optimal signal for new generation with an efficient level of 
transmission use. 
The trend, especially in developing countries, has been toward variants of BOOT type 
private investments and independent power producers. Winning contracts for these pro'ects 
from the host utility or purchasing company usually depends on the advantage of the 
proximity to consumption centres. Since primary fuel sources usually exist far from 
locations where electricity is consumed, the transportation costs of fuel as well as 
electricity become an essential determining factor. Transmission costs are normally 
integrated into a composite unit charge, but the introduction of these private projects has 
increased the demand for transparency of accounting and separation of electricity cost into 
its different components. 
Notwithstanding the general recognition of the importance of transmission pricing in the 
industry's restructuring, setting charges for transmission remains a complex and 
contentious issue. The complexity is due to the fact that electricity is homogeneous and 
non-storable on large scale. This makes it impossible to determine physically which 
generator's output is supplied to a particular load. The conflicting interests of system users 
make their acceptance of a common pricing rule for transmission very difficult. 
Green (1998a) concluded from his investigation of the UK electricity market that 
transmission pricing must be set prior to privatisation to limit disputes. He showed that 
even a good transrnission pricing scheme, such as marginal cost pricing, can be rejected 
101 
when some generators or distribution companies, especially in an oligopolistic market, find 
it disadvantageous. These findings highlight the necessity to introduce transmission pricing 
method which achieve economic efficiency and, also, can be implemented. 
CONCLUSION 
Even though there is no agreement on a single definition for privatisation, most of the 
definitions in the literature emphasise the transfer of assets from the public sector to the 
private sector. Thus, the criterion in judging the different definitions is not what is right 
and what is wrong, but rather each definition to be judged based on its usefulness for a 
particular purpose. 
Much of rationale for privatisation is based on the assumption that private ownership is 
superior to public ownership. However, the empirical studies regarding the impact of 
ownership on the performance of privatised industries remain inconclusive. More 
importantly, the performance of such industries is related to market liberalisation and the 
presence of competition, or at least the threat of entry. 
Improving performance as one of the objectives from privatisation of other industries has 
been sought in electricity industry. The change in generation technologies came at the time 
when restructuring and privatising of electricity became a policy objective in many parts of 
the world. This made it possible to introduce horizontal restructuring, by allowing a 
number of private companies to operate in the generation segment. It also introduced 
vertical restructuring through the separation of competitive activities, such as generation, 
from the monopolistic segments, such as transmission and distribution. Hence these two 
sides of restructuring can increase competition and facilitate regulation by isolating the 
relevant activities which need to be regulated. 
The different models for restructuring the electricity industry emphasise the central role 
that transmission services could play in facilitating competition in the privatised segment 
of the industry. In addition to facilitating plant-level scale economies 
by generators, 
consumers can benefit from the ability to purchase power 
from competing sources of 
0 
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generation. The costs of these services introduce the spatial element into the price of 
electricity, but also become source of disputes among the users such as generation and 
distribution companies. 
The elimination of this contentious issue would enhance the movement toward further 
restructuring and competition in the industry, which should benefit the consumers at the 
end. However, at this stage the existing methods of transmission pricing unsuccessfully 
tried to satisfy the conflicting objectives of economic efficiency, transparency, fairness and 
implementation. The difficulties with the current methods demand the introduction of 
another alternative, which try to strike a balance between these desirable objectives. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Transmission Pricing Methods 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
A transmission service is no longer just the service of moving power between different 
points on the network (i. e. the transmission grid). This service has been transformed, with 
vertical separation of the industry, to include facilitating the instant trading and dispatching 
of electricity between separate points on a single system and also between a number of 
interconnected systems. 
The transmission company is the entity which has the responsibility of transporting the 
power from generation sources to demand centres. The revenues of this company are 
supposed to be based on the services it provides and priced accordingly. In setting these 
charges, attention has to be balanced between the objective of economic efficiency and 
other objectives such as transparency, fairness and acceptability of the charges by the 
participants. 
The transmission pricing methods have evolved over the past decade due to the increase in 
electricity trading and the institutional transformation of this industry in many parts of the 
world. Several methods have been developed to address the issue of charging for 
transmission services, which are necessary services for trading in electricity markets. The 
following section 4.2 provides a general introduction to four methods; contract path, 
4postage stamp', marginal cost pricing and electricity 'tracing". Section 4.3 elaborates on 
the marginal pricing method because it is the standard reference in the literature of 
transmission pricing and also it is the benchmark for the most desirable attribute of 
economic efficiency. Section 4.4 presents in details the main features of the new method of 
electricity tracing. 
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4.2 GENERAL REVIEW OF TRANSMISSION PRICING METHODS 
4.2.1 CONTRACT PATH METHOD 
The contract path method is a very simple method, which was developed in the early days 
of the electricity industry in the United States (Perera, 1994). According to this method the 
contracting parties assume a specific path from a generation source to a consumption point 
on the transmission network. This is done in a similar fashion to the transportation of 
conventional commodities where a buyer and a seller choose between different paths for 
delivering the product. The charge for the transaction in an electricity contract is usually 
allocated on the basis of the relative size of the user (i. e. pro rata). 
While electricity flows follow the laws of physics (i. e. electricity travel along the lines 
with least resistance), the path of the financial contract does not necessarily follow the 
physical path of the electricity. According to Chao and Peck (1996), this misalignment 
between the contract path and the physical paths results in no compensation being given to 
the owners of the transmission facilities which are actually used. This divergence is not 
only unfair, but also causes private costs and social costs to be different which results in a 
gross distortion to economic efficiency. 
The acceptability of this method, in the past, was due to the fact that electricity was traded 
between clearly determined parties over a limited number of tie-lines. However, this 
method which is obviously not compatible with the complexity of today's electricity 
markets. Hogan (1992) considers this method too simplistic and thus unsuitable for 
efficient electricity trade, because it has little to do with the actual cost of electricity 
transmission. Ilic et al. (1997) believe that this method also leads to a 'pancake effect', 
where a electricity travelling over number of intervening networks in series may be 
charged at multiple rates. 
4.2.2 POSTAGE STAMP METHOD 
This method differs from the contract method in that it considers the average transmission 
costs of the system rather than the costs associated with a particular contracted transaction. 
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With this method, every user pays a postage stamp charge, which is a uniform pro-rata 
charge according to the participant's usage as measured by the participant's size. Hic et aL 
(1997) indicate that a postage stamp transmission rate is usually based on the annual 
system transmission costs divided by the peak system MW capacity. The simplicity of this 
method has caused it to be very commonly used and preferred by electricity authorities due 
to the ease of its implementation. 
However, this method is subject to considerable criticisms mainly on the grounds that the 
postage stamp charges give incorrect economic signals. Baldick (1998) believes that with 
this method the charges distort the operational and capital planning decisions of the 
system. Hughes and Felak (1996) argue that these charges do not send efficient pricing 
signals to competing generators. For example, these charges cause a generator that heavily 
uses the transmission network to have a lower delivered price than otherwise. This can lead 
to an incorrect mix of generators, which makes the overall costs higher than necessary. 
4.2.3 MARGINAL COST PRICING METHOD 
This method is a great improvement on the previous methods as it joins economic 
principles with the laws of physics which govern power flows. With this more 
sophisticated method, the price for one extra MW at a delivery node should equal to the 
marginal cost of generating and transmitting (transporting) this unit to that node. This 
concept has evolved into what is currently known as the nodal spot prices, which were 
developed by Bohn et al. (1984b) and Scheweppe et al. (1988) from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT). 
Despite the advantage of this method on the grounds of economic efficiency, its usefulness 
in practice is limited by factors mostly associated with the decentralised aspects of an 
unbundled electricity industry. In a vertically integrated utility, the complexity of the 
algorithm is eased with the availability of all necessary information to the 
dispatcher who 
has the objective of meeting the instant demand with the lowest total costs (generation, 
transmission and distribution). The separation between these different functions, as well as 
the introduction of market rules into the industry, increase the complexity of using this 
method. Also, the conflicting 
interests of the participants make disclosure of essential 
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information very difficult and even create the incentive to resist any rules which jeopardise 
these interests (Kwok, 1997). A more detailed account of these limitations of the marginal 
cost pricing method of transmission in a deregulated structure is presented in section 4.3.6. 
4.2.4 ELECTRICITY TRACING METHOD 
The complexity of pricing electricity transmission in comparison to conventional 
commodities is due to its unique physical characteristics. The fact that electricity cannot be 
stored on large scale, and its homogeneity, make it impossible physically to determine 
which generator's output is supplied to a particular load. However, the electrical 
engineering literature of the last a few years has witnessed attempts to trace, albeit 
notionally, the flow of electricity on the transmission lines. Bialek (1996) and Kirchen et 
al. (1997) independently were able to develop two approaches to tracing electricity. These 
two approaches of the tracing method aim at allocating the flows and consequently the 
transmission losses between the users (i. e. generators and/or demand centres) of the 
network. 
The matrix-based approach of Bialek and the graph-based approach of Kirschen et al. are 
based on the same main assumption of the Proportional Sharing Rule (PSR). The essence 
of this rule is that nodal inflows are shared proportionally by the nodal outflows. The main 
difference between the two approaches is that Bialek's approach is more general, as it 
applies even to networks with circular power flows which makes it more suitable to 
systems with meshed networks. Also, it applies to both networks with and without losses, 
while Kirschen's approach applies only to networks without losses. This means that 
Bialek's approach can directly allocate transmission losses (resulting in more accurate 
charges), and according to Acha et al. (1997) this approach has been proven to 
be 
mathematically sound. 
The simplicity, transparency and fairness of the tracing method in allocating transmission 
costs are generally acknowledged in the literature 
(see, for example, Hogan (1997) and Pan 
et al. (2000)). However, the question of 
how this method scores on the issue of economic 
efficiency remains an open one. 
This thesis aims at examining this issue by studying how 
the tracing charges would compare with charges 
based on the ideal marginal cost pricing. 
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4.3 MARGINAL COST PRICING OF TRANSMISSION 
Marginal cost pricing of transmission is an optimalitY problem, which is considered in 
microeconomic theory as a resource allocation problem. The analysis of the concept of 
optimum output for a multi-plant firm goes back to the discussion and debate by Patinkin 
(1947) and Leontief (1947). George et al. (1949) was the first to work out the solution for 
this optimisation problem in the production of electricity by taking into account the 
transmission costs (losses). This effort has been also explored further by Westfield (1955) 
who included an application of marginal cost analysis to a real case from electricity 
industry, namely the American Gas and Electric Company System with its over forty 
power plants. Thus, the relevant framework for this problem is that of a multi-plant firm 
with an objective of allocating its inputs between its different plants taking into 
consideration transportation costs. In the 1980s, Scheweppe and his colleagues from MIT 
were able to extend this framework even further with their development of nodal spot 
prices for electricity in a deregulated industry structure. 
There is a trade-off between the economies of scope gained from vertically integrated 
utilities and the gains from unbundling the electricity industry due to the opening for 
competition. When transmission is operated under the deregulated structure, especially in 
pool arrangements, the system operator needs to rely on the information provided to him 
by the different generators regarding their respective bids, assuming they reflect their 
marginal operational costs. The operator has the responsibility of maintaining the stability 
of the system by co-ordinating the actions of the generators. The objective of electricity 
industry within an unbundled and deregulated structure is to maintain, as much as possible, 
the economic dispatch applied by the operator in a vertically integrated utility. 
4.3.1 THE NATURE OF TRANSMISSION LOSSES 
What makes pricing the electricity transmission differ from pricing other transported 
commodities is the non-linear nature of transmission losses. Transmission losses over the 
lines are shown (George et al. 1949, Scherer 1977) to be an approximately quadratic 
function of the transmitted power. For a line with a given voltage: 
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Transmission Loss (mw/mile) =R. 12 =R- (Power) 2 (Equation 4.1) 
Where; 
I is the current over the line, and 
R is the resistance coefficient for the line. 
Figure 4.1: Transmission Losses and Line Flow 
Total Losses (MW) 
L(m) 
(m/2) 
0 
m/2 m Power transmitted 
between any two nodes 
(MW) 
Source: Adapted (with considerable modifications) from Scherer, C. (1977), Estimating Electric Power 
System Marginal Costs, P. 215 
The above equation indicates that marginal losses (the first derivative) are twice the 
average losses. This is confirmed by Figure 4.1, which shows the relationship between the 
slope of each of the rays and the slope of the (relevant) tangent lines. The slope of the 
radiance line OA through point A is lower than the slope of the tangent line at the same 
point. This means the marginal losses are higher than the average losses at the associated 
level of power transmitted on the network. A similar relationship results from the slopes of 
the line OB and the tangent line at point B. The figure shows that the marginal and the 
average losses at a higher level of transmitted power are higher than those at a lower level 
of power. This is consistent with the fact that transmitting a higher level of power would be 
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at a higher cost because of the non-linear nature of electricity transmission. This is 
illustrated by the figure, where a certain percentage increase in the power transmitted 
results in an increase in transmission losses by a higher percentage. 
4.3.2 ECONOMIC DISPATCH IN MULTI-PLANT UTILITY 
Marginal analysis is a fundamental principle and useful tool for the allocation of resources 
for a vertically integrated utility as well as for an unbundled industry. Figure 4.2, below, 
shows that the objective of the operator in the short run is to allocate total demanded 
output between the different plants with different capacities at the least total costs. The 
dispatcher or the operator in this utility is required to allocate the output among these 
plants to minimise costs by equating the marginal costs for each dispatched plant. 
Figure 4.2: Marginal Analysis Application to Load Scheduling 
Marginal cost of plant 1 Marginal cost of plant 2 
--I 
x x 
Total Demand (D)= Ql+Q2 
Source: Westfield, F. (1955) 'Marginal Analysis, Multi-Plant Firms, and Business Practice: An Example', 
Qu terly Tournal of Economics,, vol. 69, May, pp. 253-268. 
Assuming no transmission losses, the above figure shows that the optimal output of the 
multi-plant utility is set where the marginal generation costs of the 
different plants equal 
the system marginal cost, X. Thus, the welfare-optimal price would equal marginal 
production cost (as in non-spatial commodities) and this would 
be the same for the spatial 
case of electricity when there 
is no transmission cost. 
> D< 
Plant I Output (Q I) Plant 2 Output (Q2) 
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In the case of the optimisation problem when there are transmission losses, the dispatcher 
equates the marginal delivered costs and not just the marginal generation costs. The 
marginal delivered cost from each plant is the marginal generation cost plus the marginal 
transmission cost allocated to the plant. This means that each plant must be operated at a 
rate such that their respective marginal delivered costs are equal. When there are 
transmission costs, price is greater than marginal cost, and the difference is the marginal 
cost of transmission (Dansby, 1980). 
When the utility is vertically integrated, the transmission costs are internal to the firm and 
that makes the allocation of these costs among the plants merely an element of economic 
dispatching rather than a joint cost allocation. The allocation of these costs is an issue of 
conflict and dispute when the industry is unbundled and generation, transmission and 
distribution are vertically separated. It is one of the major contentious issues that a 
deregulated structure has to deal with, if the expected benefits from restructuring and 
competition of electricity industry are to be realised. 
Regardless of the institutional transformation introduced into this industry, the operational 
side of the system must be run according to the same principles as apply in a vertically 
integrated utility. In both cases there is a need to have a central controller with an objective 
of matching the generation instantly with the demand and that has to be at a minimum cost. 
In an unbundled structure the society replaces the utility, the system operator replaces the 
dispatcher of the utility and the objective is to maximise social welfare rather than the 
utility's profit. 
4.3.3 THE THEORY OF NODAL SPOT PRICES 
The objective of the system operator is to maximise the social net welfare, subject to the 
limits imposed by the physical nature of the electricity network. This is an optimisation 
problem not very much different from that of the multi-plant firm which tries to minimise 
its costs (or maximise its profit) subject to some generation and transmission constraints. 
Vickrey (197 1) is considered the first to have proposed nodal spot pricing, which he called 
6responsive pricing'. However, the optimisation problem in obtaining nodal prices was 
introduced explicitly by Bohn et al (1984b) and Schweppe et a] (1988). 
ill 
Hsu (1997) and Green (1998b) represented this problem, where the system operator uses 
the standard welfare criterion of maximising the social net welfare (W), that is benefits (B) 
minus costs (C), from consuming electricity subject to the following set of constraints: 2 
* Energy Balance Constraint: the generation must equal the demand plus 
transmission losses where any violation of this constraint causes a blackout 
of the whole system; 
* Transmission Line Flow Constraints: the flow (z) on a line i must not 
exceed its designed maximum capacity; 
Individual Generation Constraints: the output of a generator can not exceed 
its capacity; and 
Total Generation Constraint: the sum of output from all generators does not 
exceed the total generation capacity for the system. 
Thus, it is necessary to 
Maximise W B(dk) - C(gj) d, g k 
Subject to 
ldk+ Losses -I gj 
k 
zil < zi max 
gi < gi max 
Y 
gj:! ý g"it 
(Energy Balance Constraint) 
(Line Flow Constraints) 
(Individual Generation Constraints) 
(Total Generation Constraint) 
2 Bohn et al. (1984a) and Wu et al. (1996) cited an additional set of operational 
constraints, such as the limits 
for voltage deviations. 
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where: 
dk is the demand at node k, 
gi is the generation at node J, 
zi is the flow along line i, 
zi max is e maximum flow allowed on line i 
gi max is the generation capacity at node j, and 
gcrit is the total amount of generation available (critical capacity). 
The basic assumption of the model is that the network has n nodes and net injection at 
n-1 of them. The residual injection occurs at the last node (i. e. the known in Power 
Systems jargons as the swing bus) where the marginal generator is normally assumed to be 
located. Hence, the marginal generator has no impact on the total losses which make the 
marginal losses at this node are zero. 
Rewriting the above optimisation problem as a Lagrangian: 
Maximise I B(dk)-IC(gi) 
d, g ki 
Ale E dk+ Losses - gi 
k 
-A 
QS Zil - Z, 
max ) 
max (gj max gj 
gcit g 
The first order conditions are; 
ja 
QS 
azi 
=0 aB + aLosses 
]_ 1] 
adk adk i adk 
(Equation 4.2) 
(Equation 4.3) 
and 
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ac aLosses agi QS 
azi 
agi -A 
max (Equation 4.4) 
where: 
J'k is the shadow price on the energy constraint, 
'Ui 
QS is the shadow price on the line flow constraint (Quality of Supply), 
jui 
max is the shadow price on the individual generation capacity constraint, and 
is the shadow price on the total generation capacity constraint (Curtailment 
Premium) 
Assuming that the consumer at node k maximises his utility if the price he is willing to 
pay ( Pk ) equals his expected marginal benefits, then we obtain the following equation: 
Pk=pe 1+ 
Mosses 
+ Ad 
QS 
adk 
] azi 
adk 
Assuming that dk and gj are located at the same node, then 
aLosses aLosses azi azi 
adk =- agi , and adk agi 
(Equation 4.5) 
This means that increasing dk by 1 MW has the same effect on losses and congestion over 
line i as decreasing gj by 1 MW. So, the first order condition for generation can be 
rewritten as: 
ac 
+ 
lai 
max + aLosses QS 
azi 
agi agi agi 
Mosses aZi ]+ JAQS 
adk 
= Pk (Equation 4.6) 
adk i 
Hence, the nodal price is the saine for generator and load that are located at the same 
location on the network. 
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Define P* as the price at the swing bus. If there is no shortage of capacity at the marginal 
generator, then there is no over all shortage of capacity and +y=0. So, at the swing 
bus, the price equals the marginal generation cost: P 1k. The marginal generating cost 
of the marginal generator becomes the system marginal generation cost (A). The price for 
other nodes, such as node k is: 
Pk=P* 1+ 
aLosses 
1+ aLosses 
I 
adk adk 
] 
(Equation 4.7) 
When there is no shortage of capacity (i. e. ý= 0), the price at node k equals the system 
marginal cost (A) plus the marginal losses given value by P*. So, an increase in demand by 
1 MW at node k increases the system losses by 1 MW, the generation level has to increase 
by (1 + 1) MW, and the price at node k should be (1 + 1) times the price at the swing bus. 
The impact of an increase in demand on total losses is not always positive because it 
depends on how this additional demand is met and how it affects the net flow on the lines. 
When the increase in demand is supplied from a generator at the same bus and the net flow 
remains unchanged, then marginal losses are zero. Also, the marginal losses are positive 
when the line net flow increases due to the increase in demand. Inversely, the marginal 
losses are negative when the line net flow decreases due to the increase in demand. 
Thus, the sign and the value of these losses depend on the location of the source of the 
additional generation. The nodal prices and transmission charges are directly influenced by 
the choice of the marginal generator. For some systems, the choice of the marginal 
generator changes considerably when there are more than one potential marginal generator 
at any point in time. As a result, the human judgement of the system operator, according to 
Wu et al. (1996), is needed at least for the selection of the thermal constraints and 
contingency constraints which have influence over the directions of the line flows. 
Even if the marginal generator of the system is fixed, the volatility of the nodal prices will 
remain when transmission constraints are active. So, in the case of 
line constraint, a more 
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expensive generator on the demand side of the constraint is dispatched and a cheaper one 
on the generation side is constrained off. 
A (A + r) + 
aLosses 
+ QS 
azi 
adk adk 
(Equation 4.8) 
So, the price at node k can be different from the marginal generation cost (A) depending on 
the losses and/or the existence of congestion over the transmission line. 
4.3.4 THE MARGINAL LOSSES AND PENALTY FACTORS 
By assuming that the transmission constraints are not active (, uýS = 0), the nodal price for 
a demand node, such as k, is 
AA 
aLosses 
adk 
] 
(Equation 4.9) 
The increase in demand by one extra unit may cause an increase (decrease) in the net flow 
on the lines, which in turn leads to an increase (decrease) in losses. Consequently, the price 
at this node will be higher (lower) than the price at the node where the marginal generator 
is located. These two nodal prices will be the same when the increase in demand has no 
effect on net line flows. One more observation from equation 4.9 is that for the nodal price 
to be non-zero, it is necessarly that 
aLosses 
# -1. When 
aLosses 
= -1, the consumers at adk adk 
this node obtain their demand free of charge, such that 
Pk =0, which is obviously 
unrealistic. 
For a generation node, such as j, the nodal price when there 
is no congestion is: 
pj 
aLosses (Equation 4.10) 
agi 
I 
116 
The increase in generation may cause an increase (decrease) in the net flow on the lines, 
which in turn leads to an increase (decrease) in losses. Consequently, the price at this node 
will be lower (higher) than the price for the marginal generator. These two nodal prices 
will be the same when the increase in demand has no effect on net line flows. 
Rewriting the previous equation gives us the following: 
Pi 
where 
1 
aLosses 
agi 
I 
aLosses 
agi 
(Equation 4.11) 
is called the penalty factor (Wood and Wolleneberg, 1996). 
The penalty factor is an essential in economic dispatching. For example, assuming all 
generators have equal marginal generating costs, the generator with a penalty factor near 
unity is expected to be dispatched first because it has the lowest on losses. 
It is necessary that 
aLosses 
:; & 1. If 
aLosses 
agi agi = 
1, an increase of generation by I MW 
causes the losses to increase by the same amount and the price at this node would be zero. 
This indicates that the generator is producing at no charge, which is unlikely to happen in 
practice because there is no incentive for this generator to supply this extra MW. 
For the marginal generator, the price (Pj) equals its marginal operation costs (A). In this 
case, the penalty factor is one and the marginal losses are zero. The values of the penalty 
factors are important elements in economic dispatching. These values show how each 
generator's additional output affects the system total losses. The Impact of the sign and the 
value of marginal losses on the values which the penalty 
factor can take show how 
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influential the choice of the marginal generator is in allocating the system transmission 
costs among the participants such as generators and loads. 
4.3.5 THE REVENUES OF THE TRANSMISSION COMPANY 
Hunt and Shuttleworth (1993b) showed how the principles of transportation economics are 
very much applicable to electricity transmission. The demand for the transport service is 
derived from the market conditions of that product. In addition, price differential between 
any two locations can be explained by the transportation costs between them, which is 
equal to the marginal cost of transport. The authors analysed similar issues related to 
transporting electricity and conventional commodities, but overlooked the issue of 
incentives for the transport company. The quadratic relation between the volume of power 
transmitted and transmission losses (see equation 4.1) gives the transmission company 
(TC) a perverse incentive to increase losses rather than to reduce them. This means that 
this company can increase its revenues by operating the network inefficiently. 
The revenues of the TC are generated from the difference between its payments to 
generators and the payments it receives from demand centres. These revenues are based 
on the differences in nodal prices, which depend on losses and line constraints. The sum of 
these differences is called Network Revenues (NR) or Merchandise Surplus (MS) (Bialek 
and Kattuman, 1999): 
MS Pk(dk - gk) >0 
kE-= Q 
where Q is the set of all network nodes. 
(Equation 4.12) 
Both demands and generators contribute to the Merchandise Surplus (MS) depending on 
their impacts on the losses and congestion of the network. The demand centres in the areas 
where demand exceeds generation (net importer area) contribute positively to the 
MS 
aLosses 
and 
azi 
because are positive. Similarly, the generation in the net exporter areas adk adk 
contributes positively to the 
MS because 
aLosses 
and 
azi 
are positive. agi agi 
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On the other hand, if the areas are net exporters, demand centres reduce losses by 
increasing their demands. In this case, the TC pays the consumers for increasing their 
demand, which is unrealistic and unlikely to be implemented. In addition, the MS is an 
insufficient source of revenues for the TC. For example, BrAton (1997) has reported from 
the experience of Norway that the transmission company raised no more than 34 per cent 
of its revenues from charges for energy losses. 
Another disadvantage of the transmission charges based on marginal pricing is that the TC 
charges the demand centres more than their actual costs. These charges for marginal losses 
can be illustrated in the following: 
Loss = RD 
2 (Equation 4.13) B 
where; 
DB is the demand at node B; and 
R is the line resistance coefficient. 
This means that 
Marginal Loss - 
a(Loss) 
= 2RDB (Equation 4.14) aDB 
The price at this node PB should cover two components: the energy price (P*) and the 
value of marginal losses at this node (P* 
a(Loss) 
aDB 
Hence, 
PB =p+a 
(Loss) 
p+p* (2RDB) TDB 
(Equation 4.15) 
The total payment by the demand at this node is equal to the price times the quantity 
demanded such that the total payment by load B is as follows: 
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PB DB =P* (I + 2RDB)D, 6 
P (D + 2RD 
2 
B 
Since Loss = RD 
2 
B 
Then; PBDB =P* (DB + 2(Loss)). 
(Equation 4.16) 
(Equation 4.17) 
From the above, it is obvious that the payment by the customer at this node equals the 
payment for the load plus additional payment equals twice the value of actual losses. In 
this case, the payment by load B is double its actual transnuission cost, and the difference 
becomes part of the MS collected by the TC. 
4.3.6 LIMITATIONS ON MARGINAL COST PRICING 
Even though this method is based on short run marginal cost pricing, which is known in 
economic theory to guarantee economic efficiency, it faces serious practical limitations. 
Oren et al. (1995) and Hughes and Felak (1996) point out that this method is much more 
suitable for radial electric systems, because in some cases electricity can travel from points 
(i. e. nodes) with high costs to points with low costs, which is in contrast to the economics 
of transportation. However, this observation overlooks the fact that this occurs when 
electricity flows travel toward more expensive nodes through these low cost nodes due to 
the presence of line congestion. Green (1997) points out that marginal pricing of 
transmission costs leads to large spatial differentials in charges which, although desirable 
from an economic point of view, result in strong objections from distant users. 
The other limitation associated with this method is an institutional one, where the 
application of the method is based on a number of assumptions and a considerable amount 
of information, which diminishes its practicality in an unbundled structure. Shuttleworth 
(1996) and Christie et al. (2000) believe that the marginal pricing method cannot be 
implemented on a non-discriminatory and transparent basis due mainly to the considerable 
complexity of the algorithm used. 
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Khan and Baldick (1994) point out that in an unbundled industry the dispatcher does not 
have direct access to the necessary information, especially that of generation costs, which 
is available to his counterpart in a vertically integrated industry. Thus, they doubt that the 
resulting transmission prices are efficient, because there is no guarantees that the dispatch 
of generators is optimal and that it incorporates all system constraints. This indicates that 
the desirable outcomes from marginal pricing may not necessarily materialise in an 
unbundled industry. 
Bushnell and Stoft (1996) and Wu et al. (1996) point out that the presence of line losses 
and constraints increase the revenues collected by the transmission company, which feeds 
into the criticism of this method on institutional grounds. Hence, this company would have 
a perverse incentive to increase rather than decrease the transmission losses and congestion 
in the transmission system. However, this criticism ignores the fact that this incentive for 
inefficiently operating the system is minimised when the revenues of this company is 
regulated, as a natural monopoly. 
Due to the quadratic nature of transmission losses, marginal cost pricing results in the 
transmission company over-recovering the short-run transmission costs, as the payment to 
generators is lower than the payments by demand centres. One way of dealing with this 
issue is for the difference to be distributed to the demand centres, but this is not usually 
done on the basis of marginal pricing. Another way is for this net revenue to be used to 
remunerate part of the fixed costs, with and the remainder raised through additional 
surcharges, such as access charges. However, many authors such as Bohn et a]. (1984a) 
emphasise that these charges would have negative effects on the economic efficiency of 
pricing at the margin. 
There is an agreement in the literature on transmission pricing that nodal spot prices are 
very volatile as the supply of electricity has to be matched instantly with any change in 
demand, and because of the dependency on the marginal node. Chapter Six of this thesis 
will illustrate how the sign (positive, negative or zero) and the value for marginal 
transmission loss depend on the choice of the marginal generator in the system. For 
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example, marginal transmission losses can be negative, which implies that end-users ought 
to be paid for an increase in their consumption in a market based on spot prices. 
4.4 THE ELECTRICITY TRACING METHOD 
In conventional, transported commodities, it is relatively easy to trace a particular shipment 
to a particular producer or a particular distributor (or even a consumer). Unfortunately this 
is not the case with electricity, where it is impossible to distinguish between homogenous 
electrons. Thus, the electricity transmission costs in deregualted market can be considered 
joint costs, which must be allocated in a fair and efficient manner between the different 
users of the network. The new method of electricity tracing is an attempt to overcome this 
problem by its ability to trace the power flows and the losses associated with them, and 
consequently identify who is responsible for these costs. 
This section, which is based on Bialek(1996,1997,1998) and Bialek and Kattuman 
(1999), aims at explaining the method's basic assumption of the Proportional Sharing 
Rule. The method's matrix formulations are introduced by initially presupposing a network 
with no transmission losses and then a network with losses. The section ends by presenting 
the rational for the method in the context of co-operative game theory. 
4.4.1 THE PROPORTIONAL SHARING RULE 
The main assumption of the tracing method (in both Bialek's and Kirchen's approaches) is 
that the power travelling through a node (inflows) is proportionally shared by the power 
leaving the node (outflows). Figure 4.3, below, illustrates this rule. 
Figure 4.3: Proportional Sharing Rule 
I 
qm 
(40MW) 
(70MW) 
k qk- 
I 
(60MW) (30MW) 
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Figure 4.3 shows a segment of the network where four lines are connected to a node 
denoted i. Two of these lines carry inflows of 40 MW (qj in line j-i), from generator j, and 
60MW (qk in line k-i), from the generator k. The other two lines carry outflows of 70MW 
(qm in line i-m), to load m, and 30MW (qI in line i-I), to load 1. The total inflows through 
this node are 10OMW, 40 per cent of which are supplied by linej-i from generatorj and 60 
per cent by line k-i from generator k. 
The rule is then used to apportion the outflows on each line leaving node i and supplied to 
loads m and 1. For example, the 70 MW supplied to load m consist of (70x 40)/100 = 
28MW from generator j through line j-i and (70x6O)/100 = 42 from generator k through the 
line k-i. This could be done in a similar fashion for load 1. Inversely, the same rule can be 
applied for generators where, for example, 42 MW (or 70 per cent) of the 60MW produced 
by generator k go to load m and the rest goes to load 1. 
Thus, this assumption underlining the PSR means that the tracing method deals with the 
share of the load (or generator) in transmission flows and costs rather than the impact on 
them. This is a major feature which needs to be considered in the comparison with the 
marginal cost pricing. Another distinction is that while the marginal pricing makes both 
loads and generators pay for their impact on costs, the tracing charges recover these costs 
either from loads or generators. The only way that both loads and generators can pay is for 
the total losses to be split by a certain percentage such as 50: 50. 
4.4.2 THE APPORTIONING OF POWER FLOWS BETWEEN LOADS 
This section generalises the PSR, as applied above to individual node, to a network with n 
number of nodes by utilising the network incidence and adjacency matrices (see Appendix 
B for the derivation of these matrices). This section uses the average line flows (i. e. no 
losses) to trace where the electricity of a particular demand centre comes from. 
The total nodal flow is the sum of inflows (or outflows) through node i and takes the 
symbol Pi (in the sections on tracing method). 
By considering the inflows, the nodal 
power flow is expressed as: 
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Pi =E 
U) 
I pi-i + PGi for 
E a( 
where; 
ai(u) 
pi-j 
PGi 
is the set of upstream nodes which directly supply node i, 
is the line flow into node i in linej-i, and 
is the generation at node i. 
(Equation 4.18) 
Since I Pj-i I=I Pi-j the line flow Ipi-jI = Ipj-d is related to the nodal flow at nodej by 
substituting I Pi-j I cji Pj , where cji =I Pj-i 
I/ Pj , and rewriting equation 4.18 such that 
pi =I Cii Pi + PGi 
jE=- ai(u) 
Moving the cji Pj tenn to the left-hand-side, gives us: 
je a") 
Pi - cji Pj = 
PGj Or A. P= PG 
jE a") 
where; 
Au is the (nxn) upstream distribution matrix, 
P is the vector of nodal through-flows, and 
PG is the vector of nodal generations. 
(Equation 4.19) 
(Equation 4.20) 
(U) The matrix Au is called upstream because the set ai corresponds to all nodes which are 
upstream from node i. The (ij) element of Au is equal to 
1 for i=j 
-i 
I/P 
I 
[A. ], 
j -Cji Pj j forj c aýu) 
0 otherwise 
If Au I exists then P=A u-'PG and 
its i-th element is 
pi = A-' Gk for ya 
IU lik 
P 
k=l 
(Equation 4.21) 
(Equation 4.22) 
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This is an important equation as it shows the contribution of the k-th generator to i-th nodal 
power (i. e. [A ul 
lik PGk)* Since Pi is equal to the sum of the load demand (PDj) and other 
outflows in lines leaving node i, the proportional sharing rule makes it possible to calculate 
the outflow in line i-1 from node i as 
Pn 
=tp P. P. JC [A for all aýd) (Equation 4.23) UI 
lik PGk 
pi Pi 
k=1 
where aid is the set of downstream nodes which are directly supplied from node i. 
Similarly, the load demand PDi can be calculated as 
ppn 
Di 
= 
Di [A-' for i=1,2,..., n (Equation 4.24) PDi pi 
IU lik PGk 
pi Pi k=l 
This is an important equation as it shows the contribution of the k-th generator to the i-th 
Di 
PGk [A 
ul and is useful 
in deternuning where load. This contribution is equal top - 
lik /P' 
the electricity of a particular load comes from. 
4.4.3 THE APPORTIONING OF POWER FLOWS BETWEEN GENERATORS 
This section uses the average line flows (i. e. no losses) to trace where the electricity of a 
particular generator goes to. By considering the outflows, the nodal power flow is 
expressed as: 
pi = ylpi-I aýd) I 
PDi = 
1, Cli Pl + PDi for (Equation 4.25) 
lEa (d) 
I 
where cli =I Pi-i 
JlPi 
- 
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Rewriting equation 4.25: 
p 
., c, iP, = 
PDj or Adp = PD 
IE=- a 
ýd) 
I 
where; 
Ad 
p 
PD 
is the (nxn) downstream distribution matrix, 
is the vector of nodal through-flows, and 
is the vector of nodal demands. 
(Equation 4.26) 
The matrix is called downstream because the set a ýd) contains all nodes which are I 
downstream from node i. The (ij) element of Ad is equal to 
for i-1 
-cli = -IPI Cj 
ýd) 
d -i 
11P, for 1 :: a, (Equation 4.27) 10 
otherwise 
Adding Au and Ad gives a symmetric matrix, which has the same structure as the nodal 
admittance matrix (i. e. the matrix used in load flow solution). 
If Ad' exists then P= 
Ad 1 PD and its i-th element is equal to 
n 
pi 7- 1 
[Adl lik PDk 
k=l 
for i=1,2,..., (Equation 4.28) 
This is an important equation as it shows how the nodal power, Pi, is distributed between 
all the demand centres in the network. Since Pi is equal to the sum of generation at node i 
and all the inflows in lines entering the node i, the proportional sharing rule makes it 
possible to calculate the inflow to node i from line i-j to node i as 
I= 
lpi-il 
pi = 
lpi-ii 
n 
A-' P,, k for all jc aýul (Equafion 4.29) Pi-j pp 
J[ 
d 
lik 
ii k=l 
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Similarly, the generation P Gk can 
be calculated as 
ppn 
Gi p Gi 1 -1 PGi 
i -j 
[Ad lik PDk for i=1,2,..., n (Equation 4.30) pi Pi 
k=l 
This is an important equation as it shows the share of the i-th generator output which is 
used to supply the k-th load demand. This share is equal toPGi PDk 
[Adl lik /P' 
and is useful 
in determining where the electricity of a particular generator goes to. 
By considering both equation 4.24 and 4.30, we have 
PDi PGk[Aul PGk PDi[Adl [A 1p 
lik 
_ 
Iki 
U 
lik 
-i 
pi Pk [Ad'] 
ki 
- Pk 
(Equation 4.31) 
The network has n nodes where each node could have a generation, load or both. Thus, 
assuming that there is ng generators and nj loads in the system, it is necessary to determine 
n9 nj elements of matrix A ul or 
Ad' 
4.4.4 ALLOCATION OF LOSSES TO LOADS 
This section provides the allocation of the transmission losses to loads. This requires 
modifying the section 4.4.2 to include losses by assuming that the network is fed with the 
actual generation. This also assumes that there is no power is lost in transmission which 
implies that the nodal power at each node is adjusted upwards (i. e. to include losses over 
upstream lines). Thus, the unknown gross nodal power at node i is Pi(g') and the 
unknown gross flow in the line i-j entering this node is Pi(g"'). i 
QýOss) I=Iý gýoss) I, PjI the gross nodal power can be expressed as Since IF,. -j -1 
p. (gross) PjWo's) + PGj for i (Equation 4.32) i -j je U) 
cwoss) = SS) 
I/ Pj(g'), the flow PjWo's) can be replaced by c4'ss) Pýg'ss). And since ,I 
Pjýgiro -j J1 I 
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IPý gýoss) P (gross) = 
jPj-j I/ Pj The only approximating assumption of the method is that J-1 i 
where Pj-i is the actual flow from node j in line j-i and Pj is the actual total flow through 
node j. This assumption implies that the distribution of gross flows at any node is the same 
as the distribution of actual flows. Hence, equation 4.32 can be re-written as 
p (gross) 
Pý-i 
p (gross) PGi 
jE ai(14) 
pi 
or Au Pgross = PG (Equation 4.33) 
where; 
Au is the upstream distribution matrix calculated from the actual flows, 
Pgross is the unknown vector of gross nodal flows, and 
PG is the vector of the actual nodal generations. 
Since Au and PG are known, solving equation 4.33 will give the unknown gross nodal 
flows, Pgross- As a result, the proportional sharing principle can be used to determine the 
contribution of generators in the gross line flows and gross loads. 
Hence, the gross outflow from node i in line i-I is 
p (gross) I 
(gross) C=- aýd) p (gross) P, 
P, 
=- I[Au, 
PGk for all 
i 
P. (gross) Pi k=1 
lik 
and the gross demand at node i is 
p(gross) in p (gross) D- gross) 
PDi 
p(gross) = 
PD 
I P( J[Aul PGk Di p(gross) i 
lik 
i 
pi pi k=l 
(Equation 4.34) 
(Equation 4.35) 
The importance of this equation is that it shows what would be the gross load at a given 
node if the network were fed with the actual generation. 
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Consequently, the losses allocated to the load at node i are the difference between the gross 
demand and the actual demand at this node such that 
APDj = p(gross) -p Di Di (Equation 4.36) 
The following figure, Figure 4.4, is a numerical example for applying the method to a 
network with gross flows. 
Figure 4.4: A Network with Gross Power Flows 
D3 
, ý=309.8 um 
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ai 
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The following equation, equation 4.37, is constructed on the basis of Figure 4.4 and 
equation 4.33. 
1 0 0 0 
p (gross) PGI = 400 
-60/400 1 0 0 
gross) P2( PG 
2= 114 
-225/400 0 1 -83/283 
(gross) P 0 
-1 15 / 400 -173/173 0 1 
3 
(gross) 0 L P4 L 
Solving this equation gives the following values of gross nodal powers: 
Pgross ý- [400 174 309.8 289]T. 
(Equafion 4.37) 
The share of actual demand in actual nodal power flow is equal to the share of gross 
demand in gross nodal power flow. And since the actual demand at node 3 and node 4 is 
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30OMW and 20OMW, respectively, the gross load demands at these two nodes are simply 
calculated as 
(300/300)X309.8 = 309.8MW, and 3 
D("") = 289x(200/283) = 204.2MW 4 
Hence, by applying equation 4.36, the loss apportioned to 133is equal to 9.8MW while the 
loss apportioned to D4is 4.2MW. 
000 
Since A -1 
0.15 100 
u 0.6907 0.293 1 0.293 
_0.4375 
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and applying Equation 4.35 and the usage of A ul relevant elements makes it possible to 
show where the power supplied to each load comes from. For example, D3 receives from 
GI (gross) load equal (300/300)x 0.6907x 400 = 276.3MW. which is multiplying the 
share of actual demand of D3 in power flow at node 3 by (3,1) element of A ul 
by the 
generation at node 1. The following table, Table 4.1, summarises these results. 
Table 4.1 Allocation of Losses to Loads 
Generators Loads Total 
D3 D4 
G1 276.3 123.7 400 
G2 33.5 80.5 114 
Total 309.8 204.2 514 
Loss 9.81 4.2 14 
4.4.5 ALLOCATION OF LOSSES TO GENERATORS 
This section provides the allocation of the transmission losses to generations. This requires 
modifying the section 4.4.3 by assuming that the transmission losses are completely 
removed from the line flows. This also assumes that there is no power is lost in 
transmission which implies that the nodal power at each node is adjusted downwards 
without violating the Kirchhoff's Current Law. Hence, the unknown net nodal power at 
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p(net p(nýt). SiMila node i is i) and the unknown net flow in the line i-j entering this node is i-I r 
to the process of using the gross flows in the algorithm in section 4.4.4, this section uses 
the net flows instead. 
I p(nft) pýni et) I, Since j_, j 1. the net node power balance equation can be expressed, when looking 
at the outflows as 
p (net) - 1: (net) p (net) C (net) p p for i=1,2,..., n (Equation 4.38) Di =I li + PDi 
le a ýd) ýd) I 1E a, 
where C (net) p (ýet) P, (net) 
p (net) p (net) p 11p As the transmission losses are small, it can be assumed that 
I 
-i I so 
that equation 4.38 can be re-written as 
p (net) 
aýd) 1 
PI-i I 
p(nel) =p P, I 
Di 
or Ad Pnet : ---- PD 
where; 
PDet is the unknown vector of net nodal flows, 
Ad is the downstream distribution matrix, and 
PDis the vector of the actual nodal demand 
(Equation 4.39) 
Since Adand PD are known, solving equation 4.39 will give the unknown net nodal flows, 
P, Using the proportional sharing rule, the net inflow to node i in line i-j can now be 
calculated as 
p(nýt) n (n 0 
Ip'-jI 
p (net) .1 -1 
] PDk for all aý") 
p (net) 
Pi 
p ., 
[A 
d ik 
(Equation 4.40) 
ii k=1 
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while the net generation at node i can be calculated as 
(net) pn 
net) 
Pý 
Gi 
_p 
(net) 
PGi 
p(net) Gi J[A 1 PG(i .p (net) id PDk p 
i 
Pi 
k=l 
lik 
(Equation 4.4 1) 
The importance of this equation is that it shows what would be the net generation at a 
given node necessary to cover the system demand if we assume the network without any 
power lost. Thus, the losses allocated to the generator at node i are the difference between 
the actual and the net generation 
_ vi =p_ 
p(nel) AP, Gi Gi (Equation 4.42) 
at this node. The following figure, Figure 4.5, is a numerical example for applying the 
method to a network with net flows. 
Figure 4.5: A Network with Net Power Flows 
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The following equation, equation 4.43, is constructed on the 
basis of Figure 4.5 and 
equation 4.39. 
1 -59 173 -218 / 300 -112 
/ 283 p 
(net) 
net) ( 
0 
0 
0 0 -171/283 
P2 
net ) ( 
- 300 (Equation 4.43) `ý-- P 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
-82/300 
0 
1 J 
P3 
(net) 
[ 
P4 
D3 
LPD4 : --- 200_j 
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Solving equation 4.43 gives the vector of net nodal flows: 
Pnet ý [387.7 170.4 300 282]T. 
The share of actual generation in actual nodal power flow is equal to the share of net 
generation in net nodal power flow. And since the actual generation at node I and node 2 is 
40OMW and 114MW, respectively, the net generations at these two nodes are simply 
calculated as 
G (net) = (400/400)X387.72 = 387.7 and I 
G (net) = (1 14/173)x 170.4 = 112.3. 2 
Hence, by applying equation 4.42, the loss apportioned to G, is equal to 12.3MW while the 
loss apportioned to G2 is 1.7MW. 
Since A d0 
0 
0.341 0.8909 0.6017 
1 0.1648 0.604 
0 1 0 
0 0.273 1 
and applying equation 4.41 and the usage of Ad' relevant elements makes it possible to 
show where the power produced by each generator goes to. For example, G1 supplies D3 
with (net) power equal (400/400)x 0.8909x 300 = 267.4MW. Which is multiplying the 
share of actual generation of G1 in power flow at node 1 by (1,3) element of Ad' by the 
demand at node 3. It is worth noting that the amount supplied from GI to D3 of 267.4 is 
less than one shown in Table 4.1 because in the fonner case net rather than gross flows are 
used. The following table, Table 4.2, surnmarises these results. 
TnhIp. A 9. Allocation of Losses to Generators 
Loads Generators Total 
G1 G2 
D3 267.4 32.6 300 
D4 120.3 79.7 200 
otal 387.7 112.3 500 
Loss 12.31 1.7 14 
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4.4.6 THE PSR AND CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY 
The usage of co-operative game theory is common in the context of joint cost allocation 
problems, such as in the cases investigated in Littlechild (1970) for telecommunication 
industry and Young (1994) for roads and dams projects among others. The previous 
sections have demonstrated the centrality of the Proportional Sharing Rule in the recovery 
of transmission losses as joint costs. This rule is fair as it does not discriminate against any 
particular nodal inflow or outflow, which makes it acceptable by the generators (or loads). 
This aspect of the tracing method is examined, within the framework of co-operative game 
theory, in Bialek and Kattuman (1999), who showed that this rule leads to a cost allocation 
solution that meets the relevant requirements for an equilibrium. This examination is 
summarised in this section. 
As shown in Figure 4.3, the PSR treats all inflows equally with respect to outflows by 
considering node i as a perfect n-fixer of flows. This means that each MW of inflows has an 
equal chance of flowing to each line leaving this node. In this example, the flow in i-m (as 
well as the flow in i-1) consists of a share (qj1q) from the inflow fromj-i and a share (qklq) 
from the inflow from k-i. The quadratic function of losses means that loss per MW is much 
higher in line i-m than in line i-1. If generator k is assumed to supply most of its output to 
line i-1, it will be expected to bear a much lower loss charge than if it is assumed to supply 
most of its output to line i-m. Thus, it is necessary that all generators are willing to co- 
operate in the assignment of these joint costs and they find it advantageous to accept it. 
4.4.6.1 THE COST ALLOCATION GAME 
The aim of this section is to define the appropriate game for examining the proportionality 
assumption. A general cost allocation game, represented in characteristic function form, is 
a pair (N, c), where N: = j 1,2,. .. nI is the set of participants and c 
is a cost function called 
the characteristic function. The symbol N can be thought of as the set of generators, but it 
is possible to consider it as the set of MWs that flow through the node. The characteristic 
function (c) specifies the minimal cost that will be assigned for each possible coalition of 
players arranging matters to suit its members. 
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Coalitions are one of the main aspects of co-operative games that are central to the 
determination of the solution. While it is reasonable to assume that each player will 
compare any proposed allocation with the pay-off it can obtain by working alone, any 
group of players may also find that they can do better for themselves by co-operating only 
among themselves and excluding others from the arrangement. With respect to each 
coalition possible, these players can be expected to hold out for their worth, that is for what 
they can bring to the coalition. The prospect of this coalition formation must be respected 
by the solution of the game. Thus, the worth of any player, which is the share it can be 
expected to get in the game as a whole, must have some relation to its worth to all possible 
coalitions. 
As each subset of I 1,..., R I is a potential coalition, there are 2R coalitions and the cost 
function (c) attaches a real number to each one of them. If an allocation is such that no 
coalition can do better by themselves, the allocation can be considered a good candidate to 
be in the core of the game and hence acceptable by all players. 
In the case of transmission loss allocation, these players (or MWs) could be labelled. For 
example, the 1th unit of power generated by the generatorj is labelled asjl and the output 
of this generator can be denoted by the set Jj1 I, where 1 runs over natural numbers from 1 
up to and including M, if j generates M units of power (MW). 
Assuming that there is only one line leaving node i in Figure 4.3, instead of two. In this 
case, an alternative labelling system is used to refer to the players, by considering a one-to- 
one mapping from the set of MWs flowing through the node to the set of natural numbers, 
running from 1 to R. It is worth noting that these numbers are just labels, which makes it 
possible to consider the flow from the node to the outflow line as a process whereby 
players are 'toted up' as fed to the line, one at a time, in the order 
in which they have been 
labelled, I to R. Hence, each MW is charged with the incremental transmission loss when 
it joins its predecessors in the outflow line. With a convex cost function, this charge is 
unfair as it depends on the order in which players are entering 
the line. Although this 
procedure is efficient, it needs adjustment to ensure 
fair treatment to all players. 
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4.4.6.2 THE SHAPLEY VALUE 
The Shapley value is an acceptable solution because it has a stable (unique) set equilibrium 
and hence it lies in the core of the game. So, as no coalition can do better, the allocation 
will be acceptable to all players. The cost allocation in this case is symmetric, monotonic 
and additive. The Shapley value looks at the game on the basis of the characteristic 
function alone rather than the identity of the players. It also captures the idea that the worth 
of an individual player is the average of his worth in all possible coalitions. In this context 
of the co-operative game, each coalition is considered to be one permutation of the 
possible ordered set of players that can be accounted to have increased the flow (and loss) 
in the line. With a convex loss function, fair treatment of the players requires the 
consideration of all possible orders which are equally likely. 
Each ir E=- I-IR can be thought of as a coalition, where Tc is a permutation of the set I 1,..., R 1, 
with the players accounted as flowing out in the sequence 7t(l), Ti(2),... ' 7T(R). Also, each i 
C: 11, ... R 
I, can be considered as determining its worth relative to permutation TE, based on 
its marginal cost when the accounting is done in this order. 
The marginal cost vector relating to permutation n is given by: 
Mi 
7r (C) 
= C(P(lr, i) 
Yji 1) 
- C(P(lr, 
i)) (Equation 4.41) 
where P(. ), in this section only, is the set of predecessors of i with respect to R, 
P(g, i) -= 
tj (=- Rýg(j) < g(i)j - 
Marginal cost is increasing in the number of predecessors, 
IPI, or more precisely: 
M (c) P+ 11)2 _(I 
pl)2) (Equation 4.42) 
This means that i places highest value on that pennutation. where 
it is the first to be 
accounted to flow out, as this allocates 
the smallest marginal transmission loss. The set of all 
possible permutations of 
J 1,..., R I is denoted byIIR - 
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The Shapley value of the game is defined by 
-IIE MjT(C) (c(P(ir, i)ujij)-c(P(; rj))) (Equation4.43) 0 R! ffErl, iE(I 
.... R) 
This value represents the average of the additive marginal vectors of the game. The 
sym. metric property of the Shapley value means that it is consistent in treating all players 
equally. The monotonicity property ensures that transmission charges are non-negative and 
that they do not fall with the increase in generation, which means that the charges to each 
player are proportional to its costs. As a result, this value allocates to each MW of power 
generated by each generator its fair share in total transmission losses. The additivity 
property is more relevant when the charges need to be decomposed into their components. 
Finally, the discussion should be extended to include the case where there is more then one 
line leaving node i as illustrated in Figure 4.3. With a convex loss function, allocating to 
any generator a larger share of the power flow in a line that carries more power than others 
will attribute to it a much larger share of transmission loss, which would be unfair. The 
outflow from the node to the different lines can be, in a notional manner, 'toted up', MW 
by MW, in the order in which they have been labelled, 1 to R. This process can be done by 
having successively numbered MWs which are accounted for as fed to different lines, till 
all inflows have been disbursed. Another scenario is that these MWs are accounted for as 
fed through in blocks to a line till its power flow target is met, before the next line is fed, 
and so on, until all inflows are accounted for. The Shapley value considers equally all 
possible permutations of the set I 1,... R). If each has the same probability (I/R! ), this 
implies that each MW has equal probability of leaving the node on any of the outflow 
lines. In short, the PSR is implicit in the detern-fination of the Shapley value, which 
justifies it on the grounds of co-operative game theory. 
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CONCLUSION 
The transformation of the electricity industry into a decentralised structure has highlighted 
the need to rethink the means by which are generation and transmission segments are co- 
ordinated. This co-ordination can be achieved through a price mechanism that should lead 
to efficient outcomes. The close link between transmission and generation means that the 
design of good transmission pricing schemes has to incorporate the appropriate costs of 
both, otherwise the incentives for efficient use and development of the system are 
distorted. Thus, the unbundling of the industry and the introduction of competition have 
put the issue of transmission pricing at the heart of the restructuring and privatisation 
process. As a result, this evolution has focused the debate on the very critical issue of 
selecting the correct transmission pricing method. 
This chapter has explained how the traditional pricing methods such as the contract path 
and the postage stamp are no longer keeping up with, and are ill suited to, the changes in 
the industry. It has also presented the theory of transmission pricing which finds its roots in 
the well-established marginal analysis, specifically in the marginal cost pricing of a multi- 
plant firm with transportation costs. The marginal method has shown its advantage of 
incorporating the laws of physics governing electricity with the principles of economics 
guiding efficient markets. However, in addition to the complexity of its assumptions, there 
are some obstacles that diminish the usefulness of the method in a decentralised structure. 
For example, full implementation of the method requires very detailed data, which cannot 
be sufficiently available to the system operators without commercially sensitive 
information being compromised. 
The chapter has also reviewed the electricity tracing method and 
its assumptions as well as 
demonstrated, in considerable details, its linear algebraic foundations. In addition to 
being 
mathematically sound, the method 
is simple and transparent with very limited data 
requirements. The economic efficiency of 
the method is an open question, but this research 
study aims at exploring this 
issue empirically in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Tracing Allocations of Variable Costs (Losses) of 
Transmission 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Regardless of the structure and the institutional arrangement of an electricity industry, the 
laws of physics governing electricity remain the same. This is especially the case with 
transmission losses, which occur as a result of transporting power from generation sources 
to loads (demand centres). The longer the distance between generators and demand centres 
in a network, the higher the energy losses on its transmission lines. So transmission losses 
must be accounted for and allocated fairly among the different users of the system. 
The unique nature of electricity makes it impossible to determine physically which 
generator's output is supplied to a particular load. What complicates this transportation 
problem even further is that additional power produced or consumed at a node instantly 
affects the flows for the other nodes in the network. Thus, it has been difficult to develop 
any transmission pricing rule that not only economically efficient but also simple, fair and 
transparent. 
The method of electricity tracing is able to apportion the power flow and consequently the 
transmission costs between the network's users. This chapter illustrates the allocation of 
the variable costs 3 (i. e. losses) by applying the tracing method to real transmission data. A 
general description of these data is presented in section 5.2; section 5.3 shows the 
allocation of these costs to the 109 demand centres, while section 5.4 shows the allocations 
to the 16 generators in the network. 
3 Due to the non-existence of line congestion, this thesis concentrates on transmission 
losses as the variable 
costs. The allocation of 
fixed costs will be dealt with in Chapter Eight. 
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5.2 THE MATHEMATICAL PACKAGE AND DATA USED 
The allocation of transmission costs using the tracing method is based on the formulation 
of incidence and adjacency matrices and the use of linear algebra tools (see Appendix B). 
Thus, it is fitting to use mathematical package software such as Gauss or MATLAB 
(Matrix Laboratory), which are specially designed packages for numerical computations. 
The availability of the MATLAB package was the factor determining its usage, in this 
thesis, for obtaining the tracing results. 
This chapter uses the output data from the Load Flow Program (LFP) of the Saudi 
Consolidated Electricity Corporation in the central province (S CECO -Central). This 
program contains detailed information about the company's connected high voltage 
transmission lines of 38OkV, 230kV and 132kV. These 215 double-circuit lines, which link 
151 nodes that include 109 loads and 16 generators. The areas of this network, which are 
included in the company's UP, are presented by the shaded region as shown in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1: The Network Included in UP Results 
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The LFP divide the network into six areas: the capital Riyadh (Al) and its suburbs, the part 
of the eastern region (A2) which exports power to the central region, the Qassim region 
(M), the Kharj region (A4), rural areas outside Riyadh (A5) and the Dwadmi region (M). 
The topological links between these six areas are shown in Figure 5.2. The figure also 
illustrates the geographical positions of the 16 generators of the network. 
Figure 5.2: Transmission Network Connecting the Six Areas (numbers in MW) 
Notes: 
G= Generators 
A= Areas 
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Table 5.1 shows the generation, demand and imported power for each one of these areas - 
1. r. _i -- -- -- - .-- I-ar, ioa 
Network Areas Generation 
us tor 3ý,, my-k-ýentra 
Load 
j in 1996 
Imports 
MW 0 yc 0 
10 
MW % MW 
Al: Riyadh-City 3995 62.2 4405 - 70 -410 A2: Eastern* 1787.7 27.8 117.8 1.8 1669.9 
A3: Qassim 535 8.3 890.3 14 -355.3 A4: Kharj 101 1.6 499.2 7.8 -398.2 A5: R-Rural 0 0 277.6 4.4 -277.6 A6: Dawadmi 0 0 130.7 2 -130.7 
, Total 6418.7 6320.5 981 
-5ource: z!, k-rk-u-t-entrai, LOW Plow Program (3.15 p. m., 9 June 1998) 
* part of SCECO-Eastern's network 
The table clearly demonstrates the concentration of most of the system in area Al, which is 
the capital city, Riyadh. This area has 70 per cent of the demand and 62.2 per cent of the 
generation, including the generation capacity imported from the eastern province (A2) 
which requires additional power to satisfy 410 MW or 9.3 per cent of its load. The table 
also shows that all the areas (except A2) are net importers of electricity, which indicates 
the importance of transmission for this network. The total for the last column is 98 MW 
which is the total transmission losses over for this network or about 1.5 per cent of 
generation at the peak hour. 
This is a relatively low percentage in comparison with the usual percentage for 
international systems, which in developed countries is in the range of 2 to 5 per cent. This 
low percentage in the case of SCECO-Central is due to the over-capacity in transmission 
that resulted from the availability of government funds during the oil boom of the 1970s 
and through the 1980s. While this may have created a modem transmission system, it may 
also have resulted in an over-investment in transmission and inefficient planning. 
Obviously, this is not expected to persist as the industry is entering into the privatisation 
stage. At any rate, these losses are costly 
if we consider that they are roughly equal to the 
amount of electricity generated 
by the sixteenth generator (G16) with 101 MW and even 
twice the electricity produced by the seventh generator 
(G7) with 50 MW. The significance 
of these costs is even greater as these 
two generators have the highest genertion costs in the 
system and hence are supplying 
the power needed to meet the additional demand during 
peak periods. 
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It is not expected that there would be line flows (and thus losses) on all lines, as that 
depends on the role of each line in terms of linking generators to demand centres. This 
network contains 215 transmission lines but naturally the flows, and thus the losses, on 
each line are not the same. This means that the users of lines with higher flows and losses 
(implying higher capacity) are expected to have a higher share in the overall system costs 
than the users of less costly lines. The following figure illustrates the relation between the 
number of the transmission lines and losses on them. 
Figure 5.3: Losses on the Transmission Lines 
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Figure 5.3 shows that most of the losses (68 MW) of this network result from the power 
flowing over a limited number of lines (23), which account for only 11 per cent of the total 
number of lines. The explanation for this is that these losses occur on 
lines with high 
power flow such as the interconnecting lines (i. e. tie-lines) 
between the six areas. In 
addition, the concentration of generation (62.2 per cent) and 
demand (70 per cent) in Al 
means that a large number of lines are used to supply this 
demand. Figure 5.4, below, is a 
simplified version of the actual network 
in Al but reasonably illustrates both the proximity 
of generation and load centres to each other as well as 
the link of this area with outside 
sources of generation. Figure 
5.4 shows that the lines in this area are relatively short. 
Consequently have lower losses than losses over the tie-lines which are 
long and transmit a 
0 
0 50 100 150 200 
large volume of power. 
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4ý1. 
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The high density of this network as in the case of area Al contributes to this discrepancy as 
what affects losses is net power flow; that is, the more demand centres there are sharing a 
line the more its losses are reduced than increased. Thus, having more demand centres 
sharing the same lines results in lower losses in area Al despite its being the largest area in 
terms of demand. In addition, the generators in this area have benefited for a long time 
from below international fuel prices. This has resulted in generators locating near demand 
centres, which has also reduced losses on most of these lines. This is expected to change as 
the industry becomes more market oriented and less dependent on subsidisation, with the 
result that more private generators will have the incentive to locate in cheap fuel areas in 
the eastern region of the country. 
5.3 ALLOCATION OF TRANSMISSION COSTS TO LOADS 
5.3.1 THE RATIONALE FOR CHARGING LOADS 
A society is considered inefficient when using its scarce resources if costs are not reflected 
in prices. In the case of electricity, the price of one MW at a consumption point should 
reflect not only the cost of producing it but also the cost of receiving it at that point. When 
transmission losses are ignored, the market price of electricity is lower than the socially 
optimal price. Therefore, this commodity, from a social point of view, is overproduced and 
the allocation of resources is inefficient. 
The extent of the losses depend on the net power flows on the lines, which means that the 
addition of demand at a line will reduce the net flow and losses. As a result, the location of 
loads, especially of large consumers, has impact on transmission costs and hence charges. 
The reduction in unnecessary transmission losses results in productive efficiency by saving 
in generation costs, as the generation capacity for the system 
is normally designed to cover 
both demand and losses. 
The transmission costs are not only affected by where the consumption occurs but, equally 
as important, by when it occurs. 
At peak hour, one MW costs more to transmitted than at 
an off-peak because it 
is given a higher value due to a higher marginal generation cost (X) 
and can be associated with 
line constraints, which occur at peak rather than off-peak times. 
Thus, these losses during peak time can 
be avoided when some loads are encouraged to 
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alter their consumption pattern. The following example, in Figure 5.2, illustrates how any 
change in demand has a direct impact on the generation costs due to the change in 
transmission costs 
Figure 5.5: Impact of Changes in Demand on Generation and Transmission Costs 
Case A: 
Loss =2 MI 
G= 
94 MW 
)2= 45 MW 
(Assumption: Line Resistance coefficient (r) =. 001) 
Loss = 
G= 
101.33 MW 
D2= 47.25 MW 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the impact of an increase in demand on line losses. This impact is a 
direct result of the quadratic relationship between line losses and the power flows on the 
line. Assuming that the line resistance is 0.001 per unit (p. u. ), the increase in demand at DI 
by 10 per cent (or 4.5 MW) causes the losses on the transmission line to increase by a 
higher rate of 20 per cent. Since both nodes are the same distance from the generation 
source (G), the impact on the transmission losses is due only to the rise in the demand. In 
this case, the increase in the demand at D2 by 5 per cent (or 2.25 MW) causes the losses on 
the transmission line to increase by 9 per cent. So, on average the increase in demand by 
7.5 per cent leads to a 14.5 per cent increase in losses. Hence, generation has to increase by 
7.8 per cent, which is more than the increase in demand. 
5.3.2 THE RESULTS FOR LOADS 
5.3.2.1 ALLOCATION OF LINE FLOWS AND LOSSES 
The share of a generator (or load) in the flows over each line in the transmission network is 
the basis for determining the share of this generator (or load) in the cost of the line. Thus, 
the share of the user in the total system 
flows is the sum over its share in all the flows over 
the network lines, as determined 
by the tracing method. Two of the largest demand centres, 
D5 and D 126, are chosen here to 
illustrate how the tracing method is able to apportion, for 
each load, the line 
flows and the losses over these lines. These allocations are presented in 
Case B: 
Dl= 45 MW Dl= 49.5 MW 
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Table 5.2 and Figure 5.6, below, and in Table 5.3, for each load respectively. 
Table 5.2: D5's Share in Transmission Flows and Losses 
Flows over Lines D5 share in line flows Line Loss D5 share in line loss 
Line (MW) (MW) N (MW) (MW) N 
L21 19.21 11.027 57.4 0.01 0.0057 57.4 
L22 32.3 18-54 57.4 0 0 57.4 
L24 168.07 14.93 8.89 1.8 0.1599 8.89 
1 25 163.16 14.49 8.89 1.64 0.1457 8.89 
ITotal 382.74 1 58.987 15.41 1 3.45 1 0.3113 
In accordance with the tracing method, Table 5.2 shows that the share of D5 in line flows 
and line losses are the same. The table also shows that D5 has about 9 percent of the total 
losses on these lines, despite the fact that D5's share in the total flows on the same lines is 
15.4 percent. The reason for this difference is that allocated losses from each line are not 
necessarily equal when the shares in the line flows are the same. For example, D5 shares 
the same percentage of the flows on both lines L24 and L25 but it has a different share of 
the losses. This indicates the advantage of the method in allocating directly the losses over 
the lines which produces more accurate allocation. Figure 5.6, below, demonstrates how 
this load has low losses despite its being the largest of the demand centres. 
Figure 5.6: D5's Usage of the Transmission Network (in MW) 
T 11 Ic 
Where 
D5 share in Ime now 
D5 share in line loss 
i 
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Figure 5.6 shows that Kirchhoff's current law is satisfied where the nodal inflows and 
outflows are equal. For example, at node D5, the inflows of 360.5 MW (including 
generation from G5 and flows on lines L21 and L22) are equal to the outflows which are 
also 360.5 (including the load of D5 and flows on lines L26, L27 and L304). Figure 5.6 
also shows that the low losses allocated to D5 are a direct result of its usage of nearby 
generators including the generation at the same node, G5. Even though the load at this 
node (135) is 207 MW, which is less than the generation level of 309 MW at G5, the 
method is able to show that only 177.4 MW are supplied from G5,15 MW from G12 and 
14.6 MW from G 13. 
Table 5.3 confirms that the share of a generator in total losses on the transmission lines is 
not necessarily equal to the share in the total flows on these lines although the relative 
share in losses and flows over a particular line is the same. For example, what makes the 
case of D126 different from the case of D5 is that the share in losses is higher, rather than 
lower, than the share in the flows. This again illustrates the need to allocate the losses 
directly, as the share in total flows does not necessarily reflect the share in the total losses. 
Table 5.3: D126's Share in Transmission Costs 
Flows over Lines D5 share in line flows Line Loss D5 share in line loss 
Line (MW) (MW) N (MW) (MW) N 
L72 178.25 167.9645 94.22 0.78 0.734992 94.22 
Ll 87 642.6 167.4927 26.06 6.44 1.678576 26.06 
Ll 89 384.04 168.332 43.83 0 0 43.83 
L217 523.41 135.6823 25-92 3.54 0.917666 25.92 
L222 91.925 6.800604 7.39 0.67 0.049567 7.39 
L223 92.63 6.85276 7.39 0.68 0.050306 7.39 
1224 124.18 32.19088 25.92 0 0 25.92 
L225 175.37 12.95567 7.39 0.26 0.019208 7.39 
L227 125.53 9.273154 7.39 0 0 7.39 
L228 950.52 9.251935 0.97 4.36 0.042438 0.97 
L236 62.335 9.656354 1.5.49 0.15 0.023237 15.49 
L237 9.96 9.385283 94.23 0.6 0.565379 94.23 
Total 3360.75 735.83831 21.89 17.48 4.0813681 23.35 
Table 5.3 shows that D126 has been allocated about 4.08 MW in losses, which is 2.29 per 
cent of this load or 4.16 per cent of the total network 
losses. The inspection of Figure 
5.7, below, for the network in A4 shows that this node meets all of its demand from 
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generators which are located in Al and A2. As a result, it has to use some of the tie-lines 
linking these areas together and thus has a large share in the losses. Although D 126 uses 12 
lines, most of the losses (63.5 per cent ) on these lines come from the tie-lines, L 187 and 
L217. This indicates that tracing allocations are reflective the usage extent of the network. 
Figure 5.7: Topology of Transmission Network in Area 4 
(A2) 
5.3.2.2 DEMAND CENTRES'USAGE OF THE NETWORK LINES 
Table 5.4 compares the largest 10 loads in the system, which account for 34 per cent of the 
total load of the network. The table shows that the allocation of transmission costs should 
not be based on the size of the load (or the generator for that matter) but rather on the 
extent of usage of the network. This is reflected in the tracing charges 
in the fourth column 
in Table 5.4 which are the represented in the loss per MW of load for each one of the 
largest ten demand centres. 
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Table 5.4: The Largest Ten Dermqnd Cpntrp-z 
Demand 
Centre 
Load Size 
(in MW) 
Losses 
(in MW) 
Tracing Charge 
(loss per MW) 
Number of 
Used lines 
A B C= B/A 
D5 207 0.311321 0.001503966 4 
D17 182 2.44 0.013406593 17 
D20 202 3.828028 0.018950634 22 
D22 175 0.382684 0.002186766 6 
D24 167 0.522071 0.003126174 15 
D25 187 1.004307 0.005370626 26 
D28 205 6.815117 0.033244473 29 
D41 171 1.981734 0.011589088 21 
D68 189 2.291936 0.012126646 33 
D1 26 178 4.081368 0.022929034 12 
ITotal 1863 23-6 
1 
0.013 
1 
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It could be said that the number of lines used does not give an indication of usage of the 
transmission network. For example, as shown in Table 5.4, D25 has low losses and ranks 
seventh among the ten nodes in terms of losses but third in terms of lines used. It uses 26 
lines and the line with the maximum loss is only 0.4 MW, which indicates that this load 
relies on the nearby generator (G6) and other generators through short lines. The usage of a 
large number of lines does not imply large losses as shown in the case of D68, which uses 
thirty-three lines even though it does not have a large amount of losses. 
D5 has the largest demand with 207 MW, but it has only 0.31 MW, or 0.15 per cent of its 
load in losses. This low ratio is an indication of low usage of the transmission network, as 
this load depends heavily (about 85.5 per cent) on generation at the same node, G5 (see 
Table 5.8 in section 5.4.1.3). On the other hand, D28 has the second largest demand with 
205 MW but it has the highest losses at 6.8 MW or 3.3 per cent of its load. This demand 
centre relies on the transmission network to receive its load, which results in its sharing a 
larger portion of transmission losses, especially those on tie-lines. The important 
observation from these examples is that tracing allocations are reflective of a 
load's usage 
of the network which is determined by its share in line 
flows and losses on the lines rather 
than the number of lines used or even the size of the user. 
This obse-rvation is confirmed by Figure 5.8, below, which 
demonstrates that the allocated 
losses for a demand centre are not based on the size of its 
load but rather on the extent of 
usage of the transmission network, which 
depends on its position on the network. 
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Figure 5.8: Demand Centres' Usage of the Transmission Network 
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The declining line, in Figure 5.8, represents the ranking of demand centres sizes from the 
largest to the smallest (i. e. in terms of its percentage in total network load). The tracing 
charge for each demand centre, as expressed in terms of allocated losses per MW of its 
demand (i. e. a percentage of load at each demand centre), is represented by the fluctuating 
line. The comparison of these two lines indicates that any two loads may have different 
charges despite having the same size. This reflects the ability of the tracing method to 
factor the geographical element into these charges in contrast to the charges of the postage 
stamp method. This figure indicates that higher charges are for the demand centres with 
small loads and mostly located in remote rural areas. 
The above observation would have a direct implication for the policies of subsidising those 
consumers in rural areas who are mostly in the lower income bracket. Although the 
intention is to remove the industry completely from government subsidisation, this 
observation indicates a need for continuous subsidisation for these areas and less 
developed (and poorer) regions. This subsidisation could continue at least in the short term, 
as full benefits from competition could take a while to reach such consumers. The market 
distortion of this subsidisation could be minimised as the basis for it becomes much 
clearer. This would be in contrast to the situation 
in the past when a considerable number 
of consumers, regardless of their 
location, benefited from a subsidised nation-wide tariff 
system. 
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5.4 ALLOCATION OF TRANSMISSION COSTS TO GENERATORS 
The common justification for allocating transmission costs to generators is that generators 
need the transmission network to reach their potential consumers. This justification used to 
prevail because the achievement of economies of scale, on the plant level, required that 
electricity systems to be designed in such a way that large central stations could supply 
dispersed and distant loads. 
However, changing generation technologies and the unbundling of the industry have 
highlighted the necessity to charge generators for transmission costs. The objectives are to 
maintain the least-cost dispatching of generators, as in an integrated structure, and to 
produce efficient decisions regarding long-term generation and transmission investments. 
The following sections present the allocation of transmission costs to the 16 generators in 
this network. 
5.4.1 THE RESULTS FOR GENERATORS 
This section presents the main results of using the tracing method to allocate losses to the 
16 generators of this network. The method was also used to allocate the losses on the tie- 
lines, which are used by some of the generators and have a considerable amount of flows 
and losses on them. Finally, the section shows the contribution of each generator to the 
loads of the largest 10 demand centres in the network or conversely it shows where the 
load of each demand centre comes from. 
5.4.1.1 THE TRACING PATH 
The following figure provides an example of how to trace the power transmitted between 
two generators (G12 and G13) and some of the supplied 
demand centres. This example is 
also useful in highlighting the main 
difference between the tracing method and the contract 
path method in terms of how much these two paths are 
in accordance with the actual 
operation of the system. 
152 
Figure 5.9: The Tracing of Electricity Flows 
v ný 
L79 
In considering the numbered lines in this example, it is clear which generator is supplying 
which line and by what percentage as each line is supplied by only one generator. 
However, the exception to this is line L31, which is shared by both generators because D22 
operates as a perfect mixer of their flows. The proportionality rule makes it possible to 
apportion the flows on this line between the two generators. It is calculated that G 12 shares 
70 percent of the flows (and losses) while G13 is responsible for the remaining 30 per cent. 
Thus, it becomes possible to determine the lines which are supplied by each generator and 
to be able to allocate the line costs accordingly. This same rule can also be applied to 
determine the usage and the costs for the demand centres in the network. 
As a result, the tracing charges takes into consideration as much as possible the actual 
flows over the transmission system. This is clearly different from the method of the 
contract path where the path of the transaction is determined by the contracting parties with 
no reference to the actual power flows. For example, in a contract path arrangement, 
D55 
can purchase electricity from G12 and pay the transmission costs associated with the 
direct 
link along the two lines, L29 and L3 1. This, 
however, ignores the important fact that part 
of this electricity is transmitted over many other 
lines as well. Also, this contract path 
ignores the fact that the electricity generated not only by G12, but also G13 is supplied to 
Line 31 (as explained above). As the contract path normally uses the postage stamp 
method to allocate the transmission cost of 
the transaction between the contracting parties, 
the criticism of the postage stamp 
(i. e. that it ignores spatial signalling) is similarly valid 
here. 
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Another important observation is that the tracing charges for transmitting electricity from 
G12 or G13 to any one of the loads could involve either positive or zero charges. This 
obviously results in less efficient outcomes in comparison with marginal pricing which 
could also include negative charges. The siting of more generation near loads reduces line 
flows (and losses) and consequently has a positive effect on competition. However, the 
tracing outcomes remain preferable over those of postage stamp charges, which are always 
positive regardless of the user's location or the direction of the contracted power flows. 
5.4.1.2 ALLOCATION OF LOSSES TO GENERATORS 
The procedure for allocating transmission losses to the demand centres is repeated here for 
the allocation of these costs to the network generators, as shown in Table 5.5. The tracing 
charges in the fourth column in Table 5.5 are the represented in the loss per MW of 
generation output for the network 16 generators. 
Table 5.5: Comparison of the Network's Generators 
Generators Output 
(in MW) 
Losses 
(in MW) 
Tracing Charge 
(loss per MW) 
Number of 
used lines 
Share in 
Total Output 
Share in 
Total losses 
A B C= B/A (%) M 
G1 249.9 7.162 0.028659 
_1 
38 3.89 6.96 
G2 goo . 1217 0.357 0.035736 140 0.16 0.35 
G3 49.98 1.8604 0.037223 141 0.78 1.84 
G4 1477.87 41.5347 0.028104 145 23 42.23 
G5 309 0.0548 0.000177 6 4.8 0.07 
G6 511 1.4884 0.002913 19 7.96 1.54 
G7 50 0 0 None 0.78 0 
G8 378 3.4703 0.009181 20 5.9 3.52 
G9 378 1.7703 0.004683 9 5.9 1.82 
G10 759 10.9116 0.014376 89 11.8 10.99 
G11 543.99 8.2452 0.015157 118 8.5 8.38 
G12 543 5.8223 0.010722 40 8.46 5.93 
G13 523 5.9754 0.011425 36 8.15 6.08 
G14 44.99 8.0316 0.018049 13 6.93 8.19 
G15 go 0.7998 0.008887 9 1.4 0.81 
G16 1011 1.271 0.012574 7 1 1.6 11 
- Total 6418.721 98-11 930 11 oo ý 100 
The largest generator in this system is G4 with 23 per cent of total generation and it shares 
over 42 per cent of the transmission 
losses in this network. Having the same level of output 
does not necessarily imply the same share 
in losses; for example, G8 and G9 have the same 
output but share different amounts of 
losses because G8 uses more of the grid by 
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transporting power over a longer distance. This shows the aspect of fairness in the tracing 
allocation where transmission charges are set according to the extent of grid usage by each 
generator. 
The number of lines used by a generator is not the factor which determines how much this 
generator is using the grid. For example, G3 uses 141 lines (67.5 per cent) but it is among 
the lowest of the generators in terms of the grid usage because this ranking depends on the 
size of the losses allocated to this generator. This is a direct outcome of the symmetric way 
in which a unit (i. e. I MW) of power flow is treated in the tracing method regardless of 
who produces it. Also, a generator such as G7 has no losses because its generation does not 
go to the grid lines but directly supplies the demand at the same node. The interesting point 
is that the tracing charge (i. e. the losses-generation ratio) gives a very useful spatial signal 
to generator G2 that it is very costly to be at its current location. This is because G2 is 
located in the eastern region but supplies distant loads mainly in the central region. 
5.4.1.3 GENERATORS' USAGE OF TRANSMISSION LINES 
The tracing method allocates the losses on each line to the generators that have used the 
line. The losses allocated depend on the losses on the particular line. It is expected that 
tie-lines would a have high volume of power and thus large losses. This means that 
generators which use these lines are expected to have most of their losses attributed to 
theselines. 
As explained in section 5.3.2.1 (for allocating line losses to demand centres), the tracing 
method can apportion the flows and the losses over each 
line to the user. This allocation is 
presented again here for the 16 generators with more 
details of the usage of the tie-lines 
which interconnect the different areas of the network. 
The usage of these lines is an 
indication of the magnitude of power exchange between these areas. 
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Table 5.6: Losses over Lineq., suininlied hv Cleneiratong 
Generators Loss per 
generator 
(MW) 
Max loss 
over a line 
(MW) 
Min loss 
over a line 
(MW) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Coeff icient 
of variation 
G1 6.83 2.52 2.64E-06 0.288 0.04947 5.821768 
G2 0.3452 0.10042 1.05E-07 0.01223 0.002466 4.960224 
G3 1.801 0.5024 5.26E-07 0.0613 0.012774 4.798805 
G4 1.45 12.84 9.47E-05 1.39 0.285853 4.862646 
G5 0.069 0.0343 0.00857 0.0105 0.011428 0.918778 
G6 1.506 0.54 0.00125 0.131 0.079286 1.65225 
G7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G8 3.458 1.0154 0.00113 0.273 0.172905 1.578901 
G9 1.78 1.530086 0.00722 0.522 0.198153 2.634328 
G10 10.78 3.201 0.00031 0.412 0.121172 3.400118 
G11 8.22 3.313 8.98E-05 0.355 0.069648 5.09706 
1 
G12 5.82 1.64 0.00054 0.377 0.145414 2.592592 
G13 5.97 1.8 0.00073 0.419 0.165837 2.526574 
G14 8.036 3.333 0.021095 0.939 0.618118 1.519127 
G15 0.797 0.248 0.0049 0.0778 0.088526 
1 
0.878837 
IG16 1.27 1 0.68 1 0.02 1 0.2465 1 0.181429 1.3586 
Table 5.6 illustrates how line losses are allocated among the sixteen generators. It shows 
the maximum and minimum losses on a line and the level of loss dispersion on these lines 
for each generator. The generator with the highest allocated losses is G4, which is the 
largest power plant (with steam turbines) in the eastern province. The distance and the high 
power transmitted over the interconnecting lines are expected to result in a high 
transmission loss. The generators from A2 have high dispersion; for example, the 
dispersion between G4's maximum and minimum line losses is a result of supplying 145 
lines or 70 per cent of the network total lines. The next generators are those in Al where 
G10 has a loss of 10.78 MW, but the line's maximum losses of 3.2 MW are slightly lower 
than the maximum losses for similar generators such as G 11 and G14. 
In considering the losses allocated to generators on an area by area 
basis, it is clear that the 
generators located in A2 have the largest share of losses 
(51 per cent or 50.43 MW). These 
losses result from transmitting the power from the eastern region 
(i. e. generators in A2), 
including G4, to the central province. The generators located in Al have 37.6 MW or 38 
per cent of the losses, which could 
be higher if these generators were not located in the 
vicinity of the demand centres. 
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In addition, a number of generators in this area, such as G8, GIO and GI 1, supply other 
areas with power, which makes them share part of the losses over the interconnecting lines. 
Generator G14 in area A3 has higher losses than G15 because it is the major power plant in 
that area and therefor has to use a larger number of the lines with a higher power flow to 
supply loads. As Table 5.7 illustrates, G14 is not among those generators which use 
interconnection lines, confirming the observation that this generator's losses are due to the 
fact that it supplies all of its output to its own area. 
Table 5.7: Interconnection Losses, 
Area Generators Share in Interconnection Losses 
N mw 
Al G6 0.7 0.23 
G8 3.1 1.01 
G10 15.6 5.065 
G11 1.4 0.46 
G13 3.1 1.01 
A2 G1 5.4 1.76 
G2 0.2 0.072 
G3 1.1 0.35 
IG4 69.3 22.465 
Total 1001 32.42' 
Table 5.7 indicates that only nine of the sixteen generators have their output transmitted 
over interconnection lines in the network. It is important to distinguish between the 
generators that supply only their own vicinity and those generators that provide power to 
remote areas. Generators can be categorised into three groups: the first group consists of 
generators which have no demand at their node, such as generator G4; the second comprise 
generators which supply only the demand at their node, such as G7; the last group contains 
those generators which supply demand in their own area as well as demands in other areas. 
Table 5.7 also illustrates that the generators in A2 are the dominant source of power for all 
areas, which makes them to share 76 per cent of the 
interconnection losses. The other 
generators using the interconnection 
lines are those from Al and they share only 24 per 
cent of these losses. Determining the generator shares of the 
losses over interconnection 
lines is relevant when these areas are under different franchised 
distribution companies. 
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5.4.1.4 THE CONTRIBUTION OF GENERATORS TO LOADS 
Any network may have nodes where generation and load are balanced, but when a node 
needs to import or export power it could be described as 'resource deficient' or 'resource 
concentrated' (Hassnik and Jones, 1996). In the last two cases there is an explicit impact 
on the grid which requires a pricing mechanism to reflect the efficient charges for using the 
system by generators and/or loads. Table 5.8, below, shows the contribution of each one of 
the 16 generators of the network to the loads of the highest 10 demand centres. 
Table 5.8 The Contribution of Generators to the Large-, t Ten Lonck, 
Generators Demand Centers 
D5 D17 D20 D22 D24 D25 D28 D41 D68 D126 
Gl 0.028 0.02 1.088 0.67 52-87 2.21 0.038 18.49 
G2 0.001 0.001 0.044 0.027 2.1 0.088 0.001 0.74 
G3 0.006 0.004 0.217 0.14 10-56 1 0.442 0.008 3.69 
G4 83.25 60.9 14.19 9.26 26.92 77.32 68-51 145.4 
G5 177.4 
G6 75.72 84.78 99-56 
G7 I 
G8 113.1 68.15 1.49 
G9 0.406 
G10 29.88 18.56 18.99 
Gll 23 16.8 8.53 5.42 48.21 160.28 
G12 15 63.06 1121.1 32.6 30.66 
G13 14.6 61.19 53.93 31.69 9.67 
G14 
G15 
G16 
Total Load (MW) 207 182 202 175 167 187 205 171 189 178 
This table shows the contribution of generators to the nodes with the highest loads, which 
are located in the first area (Al). Besides the provision of the information on how much 
each generator is contributing to these loads, the table is more useful for calculating how 
much it would cost each generator to supply these loads with power. For example, 
G12 
contributes 15 MW (or 7.25 per cent) to the load at D5 but this costs 
G12 about 1.81 MW 
as transnussion losses. These costs are calculated by identifying the 
lines through which 
G12 supplies D5 and the amount of these losses which is allocated to this generator. 
A 
similar calculation for G13 shows that this generator 
is responsible for 1.65 MW In losses 
which makes the total power supplied to 
D5 cost 3.45 MW- On the other hand, its nodal 
generation, which is 
G5, does not need to use the transmission grid and consequently has 
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no transmission costs in this case. Similarly, the cost for supplying the other demands can 
be calculated, but due to the complexity of the network the above example is sufficient to 
explain the point for the purpose of this chapter. 
Table 5.8 indicates that the node D126 imports 145.41 MW or 82 per cent of its load from 
G4 (located at A2). It also imports the reminder not from the generator (G16) in its area but 
from G13, which is located in Al. The dependency of D126 on generation sources from 
other areas suggests, that A4 needs an additional generation capacity. The above figure and 
table show that the demand centre with the third highest losses is D20, which happens to 
be also the third in terms of load level. However, it has been established that it is not the 
load level that causes a node to have large losses, but rather its extent of usage of the 
transmission grid. This means that D20 has a loss of 3.83 MW or 1.89 per cent of its load 
as a result of being dependent on power transmitted from six generators from two different 
areas. 
Table 5.8 shows that nine out of the highest ten loads are located in Al, the capital city of 
Riyadh. This indicates the concentration of the demand in this area, which accounts for 70 
per cent of the total network demand. With more power imported from the eastern 
province, this concentration imposes additional transmission losses on the system. The 
magnitude of transmission losses is related not only to the level of demand but also to the 
density of the demand itself (Dansby, 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
Viewing electricity as a commodity requires the costs of its different stages to be 
accounted for. This is more critical for transmission segment of the 
industry, where there is 
an issue of joint cost allocation 
between different and usually competing users. However, 
ignoring transmission losses leads to inefficiency in the allocation of resources and 
increases unnecessary consumption. In addition, society may 
find it desirable to subsidise 
some consumers, such as rural consumers, 
(or even some generators) with minimal 
distortion to market prices. This would require that the government's subsidisation policy 
be guided by the actual econonuc costs. 
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Thus, the importance of the transmission segment of electricity goes beyond the mere 
linking of generators with loads to induce efficiency and promote competition in the 
industry. These advantages are difficult to materialise if there is no agreed transmission 
pricing rule which is simple, transparent and also economically efficient. This chapter 
contributes to this discussion by applying the tracing method to the available real data. 
Despite some limitations of these data, such as the relatively small number of generators, 
from which to generalise the results, it could be concluded that the tracing charges have the 
advantage of being simple, fair and transparent. 
The main finding of these results is that the tracing charges confirm that the extent of usage 
rather than the size of the generator (or the demand centre) should be the determining 
factor for transmission prices. This is clearly different from the postage stamp charges 
which ignore locational. factors and consider the user's size as the only factor in setting 
transmission charges. 
This chapter has also demonstrated that the tracing path is reflective of the actual power 
flows in the system, indicating a major advantage over the contract path method, which is 
based only on the financial agreement of the contracting parties. Although this chapter has 
been able to show the simplicity and transparency of the tracing charges, there is no 
guarantee that these charges are of relevance to economic efficiency. For this objective, the 
following chapter aims at examining how these charges compare with the ideal charges of 
the marginal cost pricing of transmission. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Marginal Cost Pricing of Transmission Losses 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The privatisation debate usually emphasises the issue of productive efficiency, because 
privatisation is expected to improve performance and thus lead to production at the lowest 
costs possible. However, less attention has been directed to the issue of allocative 
efficiency, which is more concerned with how far the price of a good is actually reflective 
of its marginal costs. Two practical factors could explain this. Firstly, it is widely believed 
that the long-term gains from privatisation are significant enough to miinimise the short- 
term loss in allocative efficiency that is caused by the departure from marginal costs prices. 
Secondly, the production and sale decisions for most commodities are usually based on 
average costs rather than on marginal costs, as in any case they are considered impractical 
if not almost impossible to measure. 
The production and transmission (and distribution) of electricity is much better suited as an 
illustrative example for marginal analysis than any other commodity. The electricity 
system must be managed to reflect minute-by-minute changes in the operating conditions, 
using very sophisticated technologies. Obviously, this requires an extensive set of 
information that has to be available for the system operator to run the system economically 
and reliably. The system is operated by engineers who apply optimisation techniques 
which are familiar to economists, such as the concepts of minimization of total costs or 
maximisation of profit (or net social welfare). Thus, the theory evolved by economists, 
with the development of marginal analysis in the late nineteenth century has been put into 
practice by electrical engineers since the first half of the twentieth century. 
The recent deregulation of the electricity industry and the parallel separation between the 
financial and operational sides of the industry has revived this common issue between 
economists and engineers. This is especially true in the area of transmission pricing, which 
is currently subject to an unsettled debate which aims at providing a solution that 
is 
economically efficient but also acceptable 
by competing parties. The preference is for the 
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prices which are based on the marginal costs of transmission due to the obvious advantages 
of this method on the grounds of economic efficiency. However, as discussed in Chapter 
Four, there are serious difficulties, which have been reviewed in the literature, regarding 
the implementation of this method in an unbundled industry structure. 
The following section of this chapter aims at presenting an empirical illustration of the 
main features of the marginal cost pricing method. The focus is on the transmission losses, 
as they are the major variable costs of electricity transmission especially if we consider that 
the network data used in this research do not exhibit line congestion. The subsequent 
sections draw important comparisons between the first-best situation, presented by the 
marginal method, and the tracing and postage stamp methods as alternatives. This 
comparison was helped enormously by access to some generation data, such as that of 
marginal generating costs, which were very useful in examining the effects on economic 
efficiency of the departure from the marginal pricing of transmission. 
6.2 AN EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION 
The results throughout this section are obtained from the Optimal Power Flow (OPF) 
computations. Wood and Wollenberg (1996) show that this program is an algorithm of 
optimisation (economic dispatching) which can calculate the marginal cost of power 
(generation and transmission) at any node in the network. It tells us which generator is 
supposed to be chosen to supply the additional increase in load. When the marginal 
generation cost is the same for each generator, the generator which 
has the lowest impact 
on transmission losses is dispatched. 
The data necessary for obtaining the marginal losses 
from the output of this program are 
gathered from the electricity company 
(SCECO-Central). These data include node data, 
which include demand and generation 
level at each node, and the transmission network per 
unit line parameters (resistance and reactance). 
The results give us the marginal losses for 
each node when the chosen marginal generator 
can be any one of the sixteen generators in 
this network. The Marginal 
Loss Factor (MILF) is used to express how much the change in 
generation (or load) 
by 1 MW at a particular node affects the total losses. Thus, the MLF 
indicates the marginal loss per unit 
(i. e. pu) of generation (or load) at this node. 
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6.2.1 TBE INFLUENCE OF THE MARGINAL GENERATOR 
As shown in Equation 4.9 (in Chapter Four), additional demand may increase, decrease or 
have no effect on the line net flows, which affect the losses associated with these flows. 
This impact is linked to the location of the additional source of generation, which depends 
on the location of the marginal generator. The impact of each generator (or demand centre) 
on total losses depends on the choice of the marginal generator. This, however, does not 
alter the relative ranking of each generator (or demand centre), as changing the marginal 
generator causes the curves to shift vertically upward or downward. 
In Figure 6.1, four marginal generators (G6, G 14, GII and G4) are selected to show how 
the marginal losses for each generator in the network vary according to where the marginal 
generator is located. It is very clear that the value and sign of marginal losses change with 
a different marginal generator. For example, G 11 could have positive, zero or negative 
marginal losses, depending on which generator among the four generators is chosen to be 
the marginal one. The MLFs are shown in the Figure 6.1, below. 
Figure 6.1: The Impact of Marginal Generator on Marginal Losses 
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Figure 6.1 reveals that regardless of which generator is designated as the marginal 
generator, G14 always has the 
lowest marginal losses. This means that it is the most 
efficient generator in terms of 
its impact on total transmission losses and that G4 is the 
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least efficient. The rest of the sixteen generators are ranked in between the two, from the 
least efficient on the left-hand end of the x-axis to the most efficient on the right-hand end. 
Being the most efficient in terms of losses is an important factor in economic dispatching 
where both generation costs and transmission costs are incorporated in the decision of 
which generator will meet the additional increase in demand. However, in decentralised 
structure some generators have an incentive to prevent the pricing of transmission losses at 
the margin when there is very large differences in charges. For example, this figure 
illustrates that while G14 has zero charges, G4 pays 0.077 (pu) and this difference could be 
even higher for a network which is spread over larger area. Thus, in such situations, what 
is considered economically desirable is not necessarily can be implemented especially 
when powerful players find it disadvantageous to them. 
Figure 6.1, above, and the associated table illustrates how the choice of the marginal 
generator clearly influences the marginal losses for each one of the sixteen generators. The 
upward and downward shifts in marginal losses will naturally result, as can be seen in 
Figure 6.2, below, in very high volatility in nodal prices. This again will not alter the 
relative ranking of the different generators, as shown by the vertical and identical shift in 
prices. 
Figure 6.2: The Impact of Marginal Generator on Nodal Prices 
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This figure shows the shifts in the nodal prices as a result of 
the fluctuations in marginal 
losses. For example, the nodal prices 
for each generator increase, on average, by about 8.4 
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percent as the marginal generator changes from G14 to G4. On the other hand, if G14 is 
the marginal generator instead of G4, the nodal prices for the generators decline, on 
average, by about 7.7 percent. 
The choice of the marginal generator not only has impact on generators in the network, 
but, as Figures 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show, it also affects the other users (i. e. the demand 
centres). In these figures, the nodes are arranged starting with the marginal generator, to be 
followed by the generators without demand centres at the same bus, then by generators 
with demand centres and finally by demand centres without genertion as ranked in charges 
from the lowest to the highest. The objective of this figure is to illustrate how the 
generators and the demand centres are affected as a separate group by the choice of the 
marginal generator. 
Figure 6.3: Marginal Losses for all Nodes (G4 as Marginal) 
0- 0.16 
0.11 
(0 U- 
0.06 
-a 0.01 
cö 
cm 1- 
-0.04 
-0.09 
Gs -Ds 
Nodes 
Figure 6.4: Marginal Losses for all Nodes (G14 as Marginal) 
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These two figures show how the choice of marginal generator 
influences the value and the 
sign of marginal 
losses for both the generators and the demand centres. For example, 
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choosing G4 makes all generators contribute negatively (i. e. reducing) to total losses while 
it makes all demand centres contribute positively (i. e. increasing losses). This is a natural 
outcome since G4 is the least efficient generator, which means that any one of the other 
generators would reduce the net flows and losses. On the other hand, choosing G14 will 
give completely different charges where all generators contribute positively to the losses 
and most of the demand centres contribute negatively. This reflects the impact of the 
marginal generator on the direction of the line net flow, which results in a different 
allocation of losses to the generators (or the demand centres). Thus, the charge levied on 
any generator (or any demand centre) is not a result of the increase in its generation (or 
demand) but rather because of the location of the designated marginal generator. 
This shows the high volatility feature associated with this method as marginal losses (and 
consequently prices) vary with changing marginal generator. The volatility of these prices 
is further exacerbated by the nature of electricity, which is non-storable in large quantity. 
This requires that generation continuously must keep-up with the instant changes in 
demand. As shown above, a relatively small network of sixteen generators has a 
considerable degree of uncertainty, which can be considerably higher for larger networks 
or for a system consisting of interconnected networks. 
Obviously when the trading arrangements are made on the basis of ex post prices, there is 
only one set of prices to consider and there is no room for guess work. The main advantage 
of these prices is that they are economically efficient, as they should reflect the actual 
optimal dispatching of the system. However, the price volatility, which results from 
changing the marginal generator, introduces risk and hedging costs into the process. In 
addition, trading in electricity as a commodity makes it necessary, especially in a pool- 
based structure, to make use of ex ante prices. The parties to the contracts have to agree on 
the strike price based on certain assumptions about future dispatching conditions. 
Consequently, the choice of a generator as the marginal generator makes the contract 
(exercise) price predictable but not necessarily unique. The main disadvantage of such 
prices are that these assumptions can be open to dispute and the prices are 
less efficient as 
they are not based on the actual operation of the system. This uncertainty introduced with 
unbundling may reduce the potential 
for further trade and restructuring of electricity 
166 
industry, particularly in developing countries with newly developed financial markets. This 
requires to limit such sources of uncertainty and to provide more predictable environment 
to encourage more private participation in the industry. 
6.2.2 THE TRANSMISSION COMPANY NET INCOME 
As shown in Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4, above, the groups of participants in the system, 
such as generators and distribution companies, are affected by the choice of the marginal 
generator. Table 6.1, below, illustrates how the contribution of each one of these two 
groups to the transmission losses can vary with the location of the marginal generator. 
Table 6.1: Contribution of Generators and Demand Centres to Losses 
Gs Output Marginal (G4) Marginal (G14) 
(MW) M. losses 
(P. U. ) 
Value 
(MW) 
M. losses 
(P. U. ) 
Value 
(MW) 
G4 1477.87 0 0 0.0771 113-9438 fl 
G3 49.98 -0.0073 -0.364854 0.0704 3.51859 
G2 9.99 -0.0092 -0.091908 0.0686 0.685314 
G1 249.9 -0.0165 -4.12335 0.0618 15.44382 
G16 101 -0.0176 -1.7776 0.0609 6.1509 
G11 543.99 -0.0401 -21.814 0.0401 21.814 
G9 378 -0.0458 -17.3124 0.0348 13.1544 
G8 378 -0.0459 -17.3502 0.0347 13.1166 
G10 759 -0.0459 -34.8381 0.0347 26.3373 
G6 511 -0.0494 -25.2434 0.0314 16.0454 
G13 543 -0.0624 -33.8832 0.0195 10.5885 
G12 523 -0.0627 -32.7921 0.0192 10.0416 
G15 90 -0.0709 -6.381 0.0116 1.044 
G5 309 -0.0777 -24.0093 0.0053 1.6377 
G7 50 -0.0783 -3.915 0.0048 0.24 
G14 444.99 1 -0.0834 -37.11217 0 0 
Contribution of Gs to Losses -261.0086 253.7619 
Contribution of Ds to Losses 446.3293 -75.0738 
INet Contribution 185.3207 17806881 
This table shows that the choice of the least efficient generator (G4), in terms of losses, 
makes generators, as a group, contribute negatively to the transmission losses of the system 
by reducing them. On the other hand, it makes the other group, the demand centres or 
distribution companies, contribute positively by increasing the losses. The opposite case is 
true when the most efficient generator (G14) is the marginal generator. Also, as the table 
shows, the net contribution of the two groups taken together produces additional revenues 
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to the transnussion company which is a net income for this company. The difference 
between revenues collected by generators from the transmission company and payments 
from the demand centres to the transrmssion company is called the Network Revenue or 
Merchandise Surplus (MS). This company pays the generators for their output, including 
transmission losses, at the nodal price of the injection (production) point and receives 
payment from the demand centres at the nodal price of the delivery (consumption) point. 
Table 6.2: Transmission ComDanv's Net Income 
Gs Output G4(A2) G1 4(A3) 
(MW) *NodalPrice Revenues *NodalPrice Revenue; - 
G4 1477.87 1 1477.87 0.9229 1363.927 
G3 49.98 1.0073 50.34485 0.9296 46.46141 
G2 9.99 1.0092 10.08191 0.9314 9.304686 
G1 249.9 1.0165 254.0234 0.9382 234.4562 
G16 101 1.0176 102.7776 0.9391 94.8491 
G11 543.99 1.0401 565.804 0.9599 522.176 
G9 378 1.0458 395.3124 0.9652 364.8456 
G8 378 1.0459 395.3502 0.9653 364.8834 
G10 759 1.0459 793.8381 0.9653 732.6627 
G6 511 1.0494 536.2434 0.9686 494.9546 
G13 543 1.0624 576.8832 0.9805 532.4115 
G12 523 1.0627 555.7921 0.9808 512.9584 
G15 90 1.0709 96.381 0.9884 88.956 
G5 309 1.0777 333.0093 0.9947 307.3623 
G7 50 1.0783 53.915 0.9952 49.76 
G14 444.99 1.0834 482.1022 1 444.99 
Total Generators' Revenues 6679.729 6164.958 
Total Loads' Payments 6766.709 6245.306 
Merchandise Surplus 86.98073 80.34814 
* Assuming, for simplification, marginal operating cost (A) equals one SIR 
This table shows the revenue received by each generator in the cases of two designated 
marginal generators: G4 and G14. These two generators represent (in terms of transmission 
losses) the least efficient generator (G4) and the most efficient generator (G14) of all 
sixteen generators. Since G4 is the marginal generator, its nodal price is SR1, while the 
other fifteen generators have nodal prices greater than SRI as they reduce transmission 
losses and, hence, should be rewarded. This means the dispatching of the least efficient 
generator will give higher nodal prices (for generators) than the 
dispatching of the most 
efficient generator. As a result, the generators' total revenues are 
higher (SR6679.7) than if 
G14 were the marginal generator, with total revenues of 
SR6164.958. Similarly, as the 
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marginal generator is the least efficient one, the total payments by the demand centres 
increase from SR6,245.3 to SR6,766.7. 
Table 6.2, above, raises three important issues which need to be considered when the 
marginal cost pricing method is used. Firstly, The positive difference between the 
generators' revenues and the demand centres' payments is the net income collected by the 
transmission company, which is almost equal to the actual losses. This means that the 
transmission company has a disincentive to operate the system efficiently, as higher losses 
mean higher revenues. Dealing with this problem requires the income of this company to 
be regulated to reflect its actual costs and to guarantee fair return on its investments either 
using price cap or rate-of-return regulations. In addition, the over-recovered revenues can 
be used to remunerate and finance, albeit partially, the transmission network's fixed costs, 
as refunding the loads is not economically efficient. 
Secondly, regardless of the type of ownership of this company (i. e. private or public), the 
separation between ownership and operation may become necessary. This is especially 
warranted when the transmission company is owned partially or completely by generation 
or distribution companies. This would minirnise the potential for self-dealing and conflict 
of interests, which could make operating the system done on merely costs grounds. 
Thirdly, this table focuses only on transmission costs by assuming that the marginal costs 
of both generators have the value of SRI. The data for this network (see Table 6.6) show 
that G4 and G14 have marginal generating costs of SR3.75 and SR53.7, respectively. 
Since, the marginal generating costs of the marginal generator give the transmission losses 
(and MS) their monetary values, the unregulated transmission company has an interest in 
the choice of which of the two costs is used. This is an important issue to consider as 
using the average of marginal losses for allocation entails a choice between the different 
values for the system marginal generating cost, A, (further discussion in Chapter Seven, 
Section 7.5). 
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6.3 THE COMPARISON OF THE MARGINAL AND TRACING 
METHODS 
6.3.1 CHARGING FOR TRANSMISSION LOSSES 
The importance of the comparison between the two methods is that it shows if there is any 
similarity or pattern in the charges of these two methods. 
Figure 6.5: Marginal and Tracing Charges for Generators (Nodal) 
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Figure 6.6: Marginal and Tracing Charges for Loads (Nodal) 
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Figures 6.5 and 6.6, above, show how losses are allocated to generators and demand centres 
according to the marginal and the tracing methods. 
It seems, from an inspection of these 
figures that the two methods show a similar pattern, but not the same charges. The value 
and the sign of the marginal losses vary with the choice of 
the marginal generator while, 
the allocation of the traced losses is independent of this choice. 
So, the comparison 
Tracing ý Marginal 
170 
between the two methods should focuses on the pattern (which reflects the ranking) of the 
charges rather than on their respective values. 
One observation from Figure 6.5 is that the differences in charges between the most 
efficient and the least efficient generator are larger using the marginal method, which 
shows the advantage of this method in giving a stronger spatial message. However, this 
large differential in charges would make the marginal method more difficult to implement 
as some of the generation and distribution companies may find it disadvantageous and 
unacceptable. 
Figure 6.6 gives more confirmation of the similarity in pattern between the two methods. It 
shows that the marginal and the traced losses are very similar for those demand centres 
with very high and those with very low losses. Also, it shows that the demand centres with 
very low charges according to the marginal method have been given even lower charges 
according to the tracing method. The possible explanation is that the tracing method has a 
very strong local effect, where demand centres (generators) which are located near 
generators (demand centres) would have lower charges than what economically warranted. 
In addition, Figure 6.6 shows that the dissimilarity between the two methods is for those 
demand centres with moderate charges according to the marginal method. The marginal 
method is able to reflect the small geographical differences between nodes, while the 
tracing method needs a larger distance between the nodes to give a significant difference in 
charges. Thus, the tracing method gives a strong spatial message when the network is 
spread over a relatively large geographical area and it has relatively low load density, as 
measured in MW/square miles (Scherer, 1977). When there is high load density, it is 
expected that many demand centres and generators will be relatively close to each other 
within the same area. In such a case, it is more fitting that the marginal rather than the 
tracing method is used for the purpose of nodal pricing. Figures 6.11 and 6.12 showing 
zonal charges (in section 6.5) illustrate further how the tracing method may give very 
similar results to those obtained from the marginal method. Therefore, the usefulness of the 
tracing method could be greater for zonal rather than for nodal pricing. 
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6.3.2 MEASUREMENT OF SIMILARITY BETVVEEN THE METHODS 
The above discussion shows that there is a reasonable degree of similarity between the 
prices using the marginal and the tracing methods. To quantify these similarities, or their 
lack, we can utilise the concept of the simple correlation coefficient (r). This coefficient 
can have a range of values: r=+1, r= -I or any value in between (including r=0, i. e. no 
correlation exists). According to Thiessen (1997), a high positive correlation exists 
between two variables when r=+0.9 and a low positive correlation exists when r=+0.6. 
In general, this correlation coefficient is a useful tool for testing the cause-and-effect 
relationship or measuring the degree of linear association between any two variables. The 
latter usage is more relevant to the present objective of this research, for which we need to 
examine the extent to which the tracing charges resemble (or depart from) the ideal, 
efficient marginal charges. The following two figures, Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8, aim at 
demonstrating the pattern which might exist between the marginal and tracing charges, by 
plotting the co-ordinate points of these charges, as shown below. 
Figure 6.7: Comparison of Marginal and Tracing Charges for Generators (p. u. ) 
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Figure 6.8: Comparison of Marginal and Tracing Charges for Loads (p. u. ) 
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Using R-square values is helpful in examining the best-fit line for the plotted marginal and 
tracing co-ordinated points in Figure 6.7. The degree of association between the marginal 
and tracing charges indicates that the linear relationship is a reasonable approximation, 
especially if the latter do not include local effect or are used for charging zones rather than 
individual nodes. The R-square value for generators shows that the linear line has a value 
of 0.59, which is slightly lower than the quadratic line with 0.594. This could be 
considered an insignificant difference, especially in the light of the fact that the nodal 
charges of the tracing method undercharge generators that are located near demand centres 
(see section 6.6 and Chapter Seven (section 7.3.2) for the problem of local effect). 
Similarly, the R-square value for loads, in Figure 6.8, shows that the linear line has a value 
of 0.564, which is slightly lower than the quadratic line with 0.568. However, ignoring the 
charges for most of the loads, which benefit from the local effect, increases these values to 
0.662 and 0.664, respectively, which reduces the difference. Using the zonal charges 
instead of the nodal charges increases the correlation coefficient to 0.825 and 0.833 for 
both the linear and the quadratic lines. This implies an R-square value of 0.681 and 0.694, 
respectively, which means that the difference is decreasing further. This indicates that the 
degree of association between the tracing and the marginal charges are the highest when 
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the tracing zonal charges are used. While the small number of generators has been 
acknowledge as a limitation, even these results for the demand centres cannot be broadly 
generalised unless a much larger network is used. 
In Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8, above, the 45-degree line, as well as the vertical line for 
postage stamp charges, provides helpful reference points for the purpose of comparison. 
The line (T) represents the linear line, which could describe the relationship between the 
charges according to the tracing and the marginal methods for each generator (or demand 
centre) in the network. The positive slope of this line provides a support for the conclusion 
that both methods give similar spatial charges for transmission. The position of the tracing 
line to the left of the 45-degree line indicates that the tracing charges are lower than the 
marginal charges. The vertical line for postage stamp charges reflects the fact that this 
method is not suitable for spatial signalling as it treats all the generators and all the demand 
centres as if they were located at the same point on the network. Table 6.3, below, 
summarises the correlation coefficients between the marginal, the tracing and the postage 
stamp charges. 
Table 6.3: Correlation Coefficients for Loss Charges 
Correlation Nodal Zonal 
Coefficients Demands Generators Demands Generators 
r (T, M) 0.751203 0.768396 0.8247992 0.616087 
r (T, PS) - . 2E-17 -4.9E-1 7 2.077E-17 4.95E-1 
7 
r (M, PS) I -4.5E-16 I 1.77E-16 -4.65 E- 16 2.37E-16 I 
where 
T is the tracing charges, 
M is the marginal charges, and 
PS is the postage stamp (pro rata) charges. 
The above table presents the results for the correlation coefficients that measure the 
strength and the direction of the linear relationship between the charges of any 
combination of the three sets of charges. These results for the tracing and the marginal 
combination shows that on average the coefficient value is 0.74, which indicates a 
reasonably strong and positive relationship between these two charges. The very low 
(almost zero) value for the correlation coefficient in the case of postage stamp charges, 
with either marginal or tracing charges, highlights the lack of any spatial s1grial that the 
postage stamp method can provide. 
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The correlation coefficients for nodal charges in the case of tracing and marginal charges 
are not different for demand centres (0.75 1) and generators (0.768). This is obviously not 
the case for the zonal charges where the coefficients are 0.825 and 0.62 for the demand 
centres and generators, respectively. Thus, it could be concluded that the two methods give 
similar zonal charges as confirmed by the relatively high correlation coefficient of 0.825, 
for the demand centres. 
The unexpected result is that zonal charges for generators dropped below the average with 
a correlation coefficient value of only 0.62. This could be explained arithmetically, where a 
discrepancy for one co-ordinate point has more influence on the value of the correlation 
coefficient for a set of points consisting, for example, of two rather than ten points. This 
means that the coefficient value is very sensitive when the number of co-ordinate points is 
small, which in turn means that the results for the demand centres (in this case only) can be 
more useful for generalisation than the results for the generators. In short, the limitations 
associated with the data used in this research may not make it possible to reach a definite 
conclusion, but the results so far point to the potential of the tracing method. 
- 6.4 A LEAST-COST ECONOMIC DISPATCHING 
6.4.1 THE PENALTY FACTORS 
Figure 9 illustrates the penalty factors as calculated for the sixteen generators. As shown in 
Chapter Four, equation 4.11, these factors are related to the marginal losses for each 
generator. The importance of these factors is in ranking generators in terms of their 
generation and transmission costs, which is a major requirement for a least-cost economic 
dispatching. 
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Figure 6.9: Penalty Factors under the Marginal and Tracing Methods 
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According to the marginal method, G14 always has the lowest penalty factor regardless of 
the designated marginal generator. This is expected because, as shown previously, it is the 
most efficient generator due to its lowest impact on total losses (i. e. no losses). On the 
other hand, G4 is the least efficient generator because it has the highest increase in total 
losses. The other generators are ranked in between G14 and G4 from left to right on the x- 
axis. The lowest line represents the penalty factors when G4 is designated as the marginal 
generator, which gives the lowest values to these factors, because in this case the nodal 
prices are the highest. The highest line represents the penalty factors when G14 is 
designated as the marginal generator, which gives the lowest values, because in this case 
the nodal prices are the lowest. These two cases represent the minimum and maximum 
cases; the other fourteen sets of penalty factors are not presented here for simplification. 
The bold line in the figure, which is positioned approximately at the middle point between 
the two (minimum and maximum) cases, shows the average for the sixteen sets of penalty 
factors. The least efficient generators, or five (including G4) out of the sixteen generators, 
are distant generators which means that designating any one of them as marginal generator 
would result in penalty factors under the bold line. On the other hand, designating any one 
of the other eleven (more efficient) generators would result in penalty factors that are 
above the average. It is worth mentioning that the penalty factors given by the tracing 
method tend to be closer to those which result from dispatching the efficient generators 
rather than from dispatching the less efficient ones. 
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6.4.2 SHORT RUN MARKET-CLEARING PRICE 
6.4.2.1 THE SYSTEM NLARGINAL PRICE (SMP) 
Economic dispatching modifies generation costs by taking into account the penalty factors. 
Table 6.4, below, shows how the merit order of generators is adjusted to reflect the 
transmission cost allocated to them using marginal and tracing method. 
Table 6.4: Adjusted Merit Order usinLy Mar2inal and TracinL), Methods (in SR/MWh) 
Merit Order Curve Marginal (G16) Marginal (G14) Tracing 
Generators Operating Cost Gs Adjusted OC Gs Adjusted OC Gs Adjusted OC 
G4 3.79 G4 3.821 G4 4.063 G4 3.856 
G1 5.63 G1 5.644 G1 6.001 G1 5.787 
G2 5.63 G2 5.685 G2 6.044 G2 5.831 
G3 5.63 G3 5.696 G3 6.056 G3 5.84 
G10U1 37.17 G10-Ul 36.221 G10-Ul 38.506 G10-Ul 37.681 
G12U1 38.02 G12-Ul 36.463 G12-Ul 38.764 G12-Ul 38.491 
G11 38.13 G5-U1 36.618 G5-U1 38-926 G1 1 38.698 
G5U1 38.72 G 11 37-364 G 11 39.722 G5-U1 38.725 
G8 42.11 G10-U2 41.035 G1 O-U2 43.623 G9 42.315 
G9 42.11 G8 41.035 G8 43.623 G8 42.504 
G10U2 42.11 G9 41.038 G9 43.628 G10-U2 42.689 
G6 42.67 G6 41.439 G6 44.053 G6 42.795 
G12U2 44.03 G12-U2 42.226 G1 2-U2 44.891 G12-U2 44.575 
G13 44.03 G 13 42.239 G 13 44.905 G 13 44.578 
G5U2 44.75 G5-U2 42.321 G5-U2 44.988 G5-U2 44.756 
G15 46.24 G 15 44.004 G 15 46.782 G 15 46.64 
G5U3 53.43 G 14 50-517 G14 53.7 G5-U3 53.437 
G14 53.7 G5-U3 50.529 G5-U3 53.714 G 14 54.62 
G7 55.16 G7 52.136 G7 55.426 G7 55-16 
IG16 56.79 IG 16 56.79 1G 16 60.472 1G 16 1 57.501 
The merit order column, in Table 6.4, is based on the merit order data which obtained from 
both electricity companies: SCECO-Eastern (for G1, G2, G3, and G4); and SCECO- 
Central for the other generators. This data show that the highest operating (generation) cost 
for the eastern region is only SR5.63/NM while the lowest for the central region is 
SR37.17/MWh. The significant difference in generation costs between the two regions can 
be explained by two factors. Firstly, the generators in the eastern region use thermal 
(steam) turbines while those in the central region use gas turbines. Secondly, the dominant 
fuel in the eastern region is natural gas while the generators in the central region rely on 
crude oil and/or diesel, which are transported from the eastern region. The System 
Marginal Price (SMP), the market-cleanng price, is set by the operating cost of the most 
expensive generator, G 16, as shown in Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11, 
below. 
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Figure 6.10: Short-Run Electricity Market 
Price 
(SR/MWh) 
SNT =, A =56. 
Figure 6.11: Nodal Spot Prices 
Price 
(SR/MWh) 
SNIP =A= 56-79 
In economic dispatching the generator with the lowest marginal production (generation and 
transmission) cost is dispatched first. The generator with the next lowest cost is then 
dispatched, and this continues until the total demand (including losses) is met. In Figure 
6.10, each generator has a constant marginal operating cost, and the horizontal summation 
of these marginal costs results in the short-run supply curve for the system. Hence, the 
marginal generator determines the market price, which is the System Marginal Price 
(SMP). 
6419 Quantity 
(MW) 
6419 Quantity 
(MW) 
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According to Hogan (1998), the outcome of economic dispatching and the competitive 
market for electricity are the same at any given level of demand. This analysis obviously 
assumes that the generators bid their marginal operating cost. In practice, however, the 
generators' bids should reflect the cost of losses. This means that the generators must know 
the loss charge ex ante because they bid the marginal generating cost modified by the 
marginal (or tracing) loss charge in order to recover their costs. In an ideal situation, the 
marginal generator G16 should receive a nodal price of SR56.79/MWh, which is equal to 
its marginal generating costs plus zero marginal losses. Under ex ante charging, however, 
loss charges are determined by assuming any generator to be the marginal generator which 
means that the nodal price might be different from the actual one. 
Instead of G16, choosing G14 (see Table 6.4) causes an upward shift for the supply curve 
as indicated by the dotted line in Figure 6.10. This shift does not change the economic 
dispatching outcomes, as the ranking of the generators in terms of losses remains the same. 
However, including loss charges results in lower nodal prices than the SMIP, as indicated 
by the dotted line in Figure 6.11. This means that due to positive marginal losses (Figure 
6.4) the generators' revenues are reduced which leads to lower producer surplus. On the 
other side of the market, due to negative marginal losses (Figure 6.4) the loads' payments 
are reduced which leads to higher consumers' surplus. Since at any particular node the 
price is the same for the generator and load, the reduction in generators' revenues (ie. 
reduction in producers' surplus) equals the reduction in loads' payments. Thus, these 
transfers offset each other which keeps the net welfare unchanged. 
In the case of tracing charges, the positive loss charges shift the supply curve upward (see 
Figure 6.10) which result in lower nodal prices as shown in Figure 6.11. The reduction in 
generators' revenues result in lower producer surplus, but the consumer surplus and loads' 
payments remain unchanged which reduces the net social welfare. Regardless of which 
generator is assumed as the marginal generator, ex ante marginal charges preserve the 
efficient dispatching but the serious effects of such allocations on both generators' 
revenues and loads' payments can be disputed. Although the tracing charges would slightly 
reduce economic efficiency, its independence from the marginal node and lower charging 
differentials would make it much acceptable for competing users. 
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6.4.2.2 ADJUSTED SYSTEM MARGINAL PRICE 
The last two columns of Table 6.4 illustrates how the adjustment of generation costs by 
transmission costs would result in similar ranking of generators using the marginal and 
tracing methods. As SMP dependes on the cost of the most expensive generator, the 
difference in ranking for low cost generators is less significant than that for high cost 
generators. Even for high cost generators, generation costs have more influence over the 
generators ranking than transmission cots do. For this reason, any dissimilarity between the 
marginal and tracing methods is likely to have a very limited impact on the overall ranking 
of the generators. 
An important question to raise is how much a change in the ranking of expensive 
generators can influence the SUIP. For this purpose we consider two cases: in the first case 
the generators operate with some of the capacity kept as a reserve; and in the second case 
lowest cost generators are operated at full capacity until the total demand is met. The actual 
data obtained for our system in the first case show that it operates below full capacity with 
an average 5% in reserve. Meeting the system load and losses requires 6419 MW of 
generation, which makes it necessary to have all sixteen generators (or twenty units) 
operating. Table 6.4 shows that, in this case, generator G16 sets the System Marginal Price 
(SMP) at SR56.79/MVVH for the marginal method and SR 57.50/M)VH for the tracing 
method. However, if G14 is chosen to determine charges ex ante, the SMP is set at 
SR60.5/MV; H. This case indicates that even the marginal method can give charges that are 
different from the actual (ex post) charges. 
In the second case, the operator of this system dispatches cheaper generators at their full 
capacity (i. e. no reserve) to meet the same generation level of 6419 MW. In this case, the 
calculation indicates that this target is met at the point where G14 is the most expensive 
generator for both methods. Consequently, generator G14 sets the adjusted SNT at 
SR53.7/MV; IH for the marginal and at SR54.62/MV; IH for the tracing method. An 
important conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that the generator which sets the 
adjusted SMIP remains the same according to the marginal and tracing methods with some 
slight difference in ex ante charges. In short, these examples imply that tracing charges for 
transmission do not cause a significant distortion to the actual marginal charges and 
consequently have small impact on economic efficiency. 
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Table 6.5: Adiusted SMP usine Differeint Pricimy Me. thniiq 
Methods Case 1 (with reserves) 
- 
Case 2 (without reserves) 
Td justed SMP Adjusted SMP 
Marginal G16 56.79 
G14 60.47 53.7 
G4 55.81 49.56 
M. Average 58.26 51.75 
Tracing 57.5 54.62 
Postage Stamp 57.65 54.5 
The previous discussion shows that there is a trade-off between the objective of cost 
minimisation and that of system reliability. Also, Table 6.5 shows that the SMIP is lower in 
the second case (no reserve) across all the different methods. This means that the SMP is 
not only influenced by the actual costs of generators but also by the priority given by the 
system operator to these two objectives. 
More importantly, the table shows the deviation of the adjusted SMP, using the different 
methods, from the optimal SNIP as determined by the marginal method (i. e. when G14 is 
the marginal generator). This deviation even occurs with the marginal method when one of 
the generators other than G16 is designed as the marginal generator. Thus, the issue is not 
which method to follow, but rather which method can be useful with the least departure 
from the ideal situation. Table 6.5 shows that both tracing (SR 57.50/MWH) and postage 
stamp (SR 57.65/M)VH) method give values closer to the ideal situation (SR 
60.47/MV; H) 
than the other marginal cases. The lack of any spatial message of the postage stamp 
method gives the tracing method an edge over the former when a comparison 
is drawn 
between them. This leads us to focus not on the departure from the ideal situation per se 
but rather on whether there is a net gain would arise from such a 
departure. 
6.4.3 THE COST OF DEPARTING FROM MARGINAL PRICING 
At the outset, it is important to emphasise that the following 
discussion does not attempt to 
justify using the tracing method (or any other method 
for that matter) instead of the 
marginal method in the actual dispatching. Rather, the analysis 
is concerned with 'what if' 
the marginal method is replaced by the tracing method. 
The objective is to investigate how 
much it costs to depart from the optimal marginal pricing of 
transmission losses. 
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Economic theory stipulates that net social welfare is maximised using marginal pricing. 
However, in reality there is a departure from such an ideal solution. Then the important 
issue is how much society would loses from such a departure. According to Green (1998b), 
paying uniform price (i. e SMP), while transmission losses are charged postage stamp rates, 
leads to a minimal loss in economic efficiency. He estimated that such a departure from 
optimal marginal pricing will reduce the net social welfare, as measured by the sum of 
consumers and producers' surpluses, by only 0.6 per cent. As previously shown in section 
6.3.2 that tracing prices have an advantage over postage stamp prices in terms of providing 
the necessary spatial signals making it more desirable from the social point of view. 
Table 6.4 illustrates how the tracing method gives a similar short-run economic incentive 
as reflected in the dispatching of generators. The issue, then, is how much extra costs 
would results when the tracing method alters the ranking of generators from the ideal. To 
investigate this situation, an extreme case is used where the tracing charges do not lead to 
having the most efficient (in term of losses) generator dispatched. Table 6.6 is usefully 
illustrates the operating costs for each generation unit and at different levels of output. 
Table 6.6: Generators' OT)eratinLy Costs (in SR/MWh) 
Generators Generation Cost 
(SR) 
Output 
(M ) 
Total Generation Cost 
(SR 
G4 3.75 1478 5542.5 
G1 5.63 250 1407.5 
G2 5.63 10 56.3 
G3 5.63 50 281.5 
G10-Ul 37.17 570.5 21205.485 
G12-Ul 38.02 345 13116.9 
G11 38.13 578.2 22046.766 
G5-U1 38.72 215 8324.8 
G10-U2 42.11 208 8758.88 
G9 42.11 416 17517.76 
G8 42.11 416 17517.76 
G6 42.67 588 25089.96 
G12-U2 44.03 200 8806 
G13 44.03 600 26418 
G5-U2 44.75 30 1342.5 
G15 46.24 90 4161.6 
Sub-Total 6044.7 181594.211 
Case One: G 14 53.7 
Total 
104 
6149 
5584.8 
187179.011 
Case Two: G5-U3 53.43 
Total 
104 
6149 
5556.72 
187150.9311 
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This scenario is feasible when the assumption is that the total generation, which includes 
losses, is 6,148.7MW. The first 6,044.7 MW will be supplied by generators G4 through to 
G15 inclusive using either the tracing or the marginal method. The additional 104 MW can 
be supplied by either G5-U3 or G14 depending on whether the tracing or the marginal 
method is used. Table 6.4, in section 6.4.2.1, shows that with the marginal method G 14 
would have to be dispatched immediately following G15, while the tracing method would 
dispatch G5-U3 instead. Table 6.7, below, demonstrates in numbers the comparison 
between these two cases. 
Table 6.7: Increase in Total Production Costs due to Tracing (in SR/MWh) 
Case Generation Cost Transmission Cost * Total Costs 
One (Marginal) 187179.011 6658.8 193837.811 
Two (Tracing) 187150.931 7593.18 194744.111 
Difference -28-08 1 934.38 1 906.3 
* Using the operating cost of G14 (SR53.7) to price losses 
In case one, the ideal, G14 is the marginal generator with an operating cost of SR53.7. The 
total system's losses in this case is 124MW which is the lowest level of losses, as G14 is 
the most efficient generator in term of losses. The total transmission cost is SR6,658.8, 
which is the value of these losses. Adding the operating cost of producing 104MW by G14 
(i. e. SR5,584.8) to the operating costs of the first 6,044.7mw which is SR181,594.2, gives 
a total operating cost of SR 187,179.011. Therefore, the total production cost, which is the 
sum of total operating cost and total transmission costs, is SR193,837.81 1. 
A similar procedure can be calculated for the second case, where the total transmission 
cost increases to SR7,593.2 due to the increase in losses to 141.3MW. Table 6.7 shows that 
this increase in transmission costs outweighs the reduction in generation costs. Three 
important findings can be drawn from this table. Firstly, it confirms the advantage of 
marginal pricing in cost minimisation and attaining economic efficiency. Secondly, the 
tracing method deviation from this ideal case is very small accounting for only an increase 
of SR906.3 MW/h, which is 0.47 % of total production costs. Thirdly, the minimisation of 
costs should simultaneously include both the generation and transmission costs. 
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6.5 THE PROBLEM OF FREE RIDING 
Section 6.3.2 gives a presentation of the general similarity in pattern between the marginal 
and tracing methods. These results provide a chance to compare how losses are allocated 
for individual generators (or demand centres). This is especially useful in investigating the 
issue of local effect which creates free riding problem, as explained in Chapter Five. 
The ranking of generators (from the most efficient to the least efficient, in term of losses) 
is as follows: 
* for the marginal method: 
G14, G7, G5, G15, G12, G13, G6, G8, G10, G9, Gll, G16, GI, G2, G3, G4 
* for the tracing method: 
G7, G5, G6, G9, G15, G8, G12, G13, G16, G10, GI 1, G14, GI, G4, G2, G3 
It is worth noting that G7 (and to some extent G5) is identified, in Chapter Six, as a free 
rider under the tracing method. The reason is that it is located at the same bus as D7. The 
ranking of G7 and G5 shows that both are considered efficient generators according to the 
marginal and the tracing methods. The location of a generator near a demand centre (or 
vice versa) would give low charges according to both methods. However, the fact that G7 
has no charges is a confirmation of the conclusion reached in Chapter Five (Section 4.1.1) 
that the tracing method has a very strong local effect. This means that the problem of free 
riding is a direct result of this effect. Consequently, the solution to the problem of free 
riding is in fact to minimise the local effect of the method. One way of doing this is to use 
zonal charges and by taking into consideration the relative size of each generator (or 
demand centre) in setting the charges. 
The most notable difference in the ranking of the two methods is that G 14 dropped from 
being the most efficient under the marginal method to be ranked as number twelve (out of 
the sixteen) under the tracing method. The generator is the central generator in area A3 
where it supplies most of the power to the demand centres, including some remote rural 
towns and locations. This would naturally allocate, under the tracing method, higher losses 
to this generator. The central role of this generator in supplying the area's demand centres 
reduces the flow of electricity from areas Al and A2 which are located to the south of area 
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A3. Ironically, the same reason which placed this generator at the top of the ranking for the 
marginal method placed it in a lower position for the tracing method. 
The reason for this conflicting result is probably related to the fact that the marginal 
method considers the impact on losses rather than the share of the generator (or demand 
centre) in total losses. This fundamental difference between the two methods gives further 
support to the suggestion that the tracing method is suited better for zonal rather than nodal 
charging. In this case, nodes at similar locations are grouped under one zone which makes 
each zone represent a super node. The above ranking provides an illustration of the role of 
zonal pricing in reducing the differences between the two methods. The following two 
figures show the comparison of the zonal charges. 
Figure 6.12: Marginal and Tracing Charges for Generators (Zonal) 
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Figure 6.13: Marginal and Tracing Charges for Demand Centres (Zonal) 
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The grouping of generators is easier than that of demand centres. The researcher benefited 
from the company's own division of the network, in Particular the demand centres, into 
zones. These figures show the similarity between the two methods, especially for the 
generators located at the extreme ends of the network. For example, the distant generators 
(Gl, G2, G3, and G4) are grouped under zone Zl, and generators G5 and G7 under zone 
Z2. The two methods differ for the other zones and this is a confirmation of the ability of 
the marginal method to reflect small distances between nodes or zones. This grouping has 
also been done for the other generators (as well as for the demand centres). The 
comparison of the two methods on the basis of zonal charges gives further similar charges. 
This is more so in the case of demand centres than that of generators for the same reason 
that was mentioned in section 6.3.2. The following two figures, Figure 6.14 and Figure 
6.15, illustrate an approximate topology of the generation and load zones of the network. 
Figure 6.14 Topology of the Generators Zones 
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Figure 6.15: Topology of the Demand Centres Zones 
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CONCLUSION 
The restructuring of the electricity industry and the separation of generation from 
transmission and distribution has made transmission pricing vital to the functioning of 
wholesale power markets, in either a bilateral or pool mechanism. There are different 
methods of transmission pricing that range from the ideal in the form of marginal cost 
pricing to the very simple in the form of average or postage stamp pricing. This chapter has 
reviewed the marginal method and has provided an empirical presentation of its main 
features as well as its limitations. Also, it has contributed to the debate on the issue of 
transmission pricing by conducting, for the first time, a comparison between this method 
and both the postage stamp and the new method of electricity tracing. 
The chapter has demonstrated graphically and statistically the inability of the pro rata 
charges to allocate the transmission costs in a manner which incorporate the spatial 
dimension of transporting electricity between generation sources and consumption centres. 
This severe disadvantage of the postage stamp method can lead to inefficient decisions 
about electricity consumption, generation and transmission capacity expansion as well as 
the siting of new generators. 
The comparison of the tracing charges with the marginal charges are based on a network 
which is not large enough to allow generalisation of the results. What is more certain, 
however, is that the tracing method is more suited for zonal rather than nodal charges and 
for a large system that is spread over a large geographical area. For example, this chapter 
illustrated that the tracing charges are very similar to the marginal charges when the 
comparison is for the zonal charges for demand centres. This observation implies a 
potential for the tracing method in the light of the present trend of integrating networks of 
different regions of the same country and even between networks from different countries. 
The important point is that this research study considers that marginal cost pricing is 
preferable even in a modified form, which could be possible for a restructuring process that 
is in its initial stages. However, some caution is warranted as the simplicity and the 
practicability of the postage stamp method may prove to be too attractive to resist by the 
electricity authority or the regulator. Thus, the tracing method could provide a reasonable 
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alternative, which is worth consideration especially if its distortion to optimal prices is 
confirmed to be minimal. 
The departure of the tracing prices from the first-best outcome is not significant enough to 
disregard it, but on the contrary these charges could introduce some stability and fairness 
into this vexing issue. This advantage is very much needed for developing countries which 
are in the process of privatising their electricity industries. This is relevant to the electricity 
industry in Saudi Arabia where further regional (and international) interconnection of grids 
and more reliance on distant sources of generation would increase the uncertainty of 
electricity trading. 
The minimisation of risks is an essential element in speeding up the move toward 
privatisation and competition in the electricity industry. The decisions regarding private 
investments in the industry are based, among other factors, on the expected future cash 
flows of participants. The following chapter examines the advantage of the tracing method 
in introducing some predictability into the price volatility of electricity bulk markets. 
Although this stability might come with some loss of economic efficiency, this loss is 
expected to be small as more competition and cheaper sources of generation can create 
sufficient benefits to offset any efficiency loss that would come from the departure from 
marginal prices. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
The Impact of Demand Variations on Transmission Charges 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The production of electricity has to match instantly the change in demand, otherwise the 
system will have blackouts. Each level of demand is associated with a different set of 
generators with various generation and transmission costs. As a result, the system marginal 
generation cost (/k) is expected to be different at every market-clearing price for every hour 
of the day. The changes in the loading conditions of the electricity system are caused by 
the continuous fluctuations in electricity demand, which impact the power flows and losses 
over the transmission network. Thus, the demand side of the electricity market has 
complementary influence, over the outcomes and the full functioning of the market, to that 
of the supply side. 
The marginal pricing of transmission losses is able to reflect accurately the variations in 
demand but produces volatile charges. From an economic efficiency point of view, this 
volatility is desirable and also necessary to reflect the instant changes in the generation and 
transmission costs. The challenge, then, is to have a transmission pricing scheme which 
minimises this volatility and provides stable charges that reflect the actual hourly 
operations of the system. The crucial point is that stability should not be the sole objective 
desirable by itself, as it is possible to have transmission charges that are very stable but 
have no relation whatsoever to economic efficiency. This chapter illustrates, with real data, 
how the allocations of transmission costs are influenced by the changes in the system 
demand. The aim is to examine how the tracing, postage stamp and the marginal pricing 
methods are able to accommodate these two desirable objectives. For this purpose, the 
chapter uses the demand levels of an off-peak hour as the initial case and the peak 
hour as 
the case when the system is at its maximum loading condition. 
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7.2 THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN DEMAND 
The results for the tracing (and postage stamp) charges are calculated on the basis of the 
data output from the Load Flow Program (LFP) of SCECO-Central for off-peak and peak 
hours. The off-peak hour occurred at 6 a. m. on lst June 1998 while the peak hour occurred 
at 3: 15 p. m. on 9ffi Junel. 998. The results for the marginal charges are calculated from the 
Optimal Power Flow (OPF), which is based on the data obtained from the same company 
for the same hours. Table 7.1, below, presents these two loading conditions at these two 
hours. 
Table 7.1: Network Generation and T)P. mqnti 
Off-peak Peak Change 
MW MW MW % 
Generation 4298.11 6418.72 2120.61 49.34 
Demand 4252.95 6320.5 2067.55 48.6 
Losses 45.16 98.22 53.06 117.5 
, 
(% of Generation) 1.05 
L- 
1.53, 
, )ource: , juhuu-Uentral, Load Flow Program 
This table shows that generation had to increase by a higher rate than the increase in 
demand in order to take account of the increase in losses. The increase of 49.34 per cent in 
generation came with a 117.5 per cent increase in losses, which demonstrates the 
(approximate) quadratic relationship between power flow and losses on the network lines. 
This indicates that the peak demand imposed additional costs on the system through an 
increase in losses of more than 53 MW. 
The increase in demand has additional transmission costs resulting from this relationship 
between the power transmitted and the losses associated with it. This resulted in an 
increase in the ratio of losses to generation from 1.05 per cent to 1.53 per cent. Figure 7.1 
shows the breakdown of the network into its six areas, which are set in the UP and 
represent very clearly defined geographical areas (i. e. sub-regions). The figure also shows 
each area's generation and demand at the off-peak and the peak hour. 
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Figure 7.1: Generation and Demand of the Network Areas 
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Figure 7.1, above, clearly shows that the concentration of the generation and demand of 
this network is in area Al which is the capital city, Riyadh, and its suburbs. The generation 
of the net exporting area, A2, is important to this network even at the off-peak hour with 
31 per cent share in total generation. The slight decline in the share of this area (as well as 
of A 1) in total generation at the peak hour was due to the relative increase in generation of 
the areas; A3 and A4. 
Obviously, this increase in generation in these two areas was necessary to meet the 
increase in their demand. This is useful in reducing the pressure on the transinission 
network, especially for the tie lines with the net exporting area (A2), which is the eastern 
region. However, as the industry moves into a market-based structure, most of the new 
generators are expected to locate in A2. This means that more demand centres in these 
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areas, and in most of the regions of the country, will become increasingly dependent on 
imported power from the eastem region. 
However, a national security consideration, such as avoiding a concentration of the 
country's energy sources in one region, would require incentives through subsidisation to 
encourage some generators to locate elsewhere. This would be a clear distortion to market 
prices, but it could be minimised if the subsidies were limited in scope and have some link 
with efficient prices. Similarly, environmental considerations, such as the negative impact 
of locating generators near demand centres, especially residential areas, could involve 
similar measures. 
Another important issue to be considered, in the broader context of pursuing a balanced 
regional development, is that of the advantages from having regional variations in peak 
hours across the country (see Chapter Two, section 2.3.3). For example, it is not very 
helpful that the largest area in this network, Al, has the highest population growth in the 
country with an annual growth of 8 per cent, most of which (5 per cent) is due to internal 
migration. This, naturally, increases the demand on the services, including electricity, and 
limits the advantage of reserve sharing between interconnected areas with their different 
peak hours. 
7.3 THE TRACING CHARGES 
This section investigates the impact of changes in demand from the off-peak to peak hour 
on transrrussion losses and, hence, charges. It is expected that changes in magnitude and/or 
the direction of line flows would result in different transmission charges. Table 7.2, below, 
presents the tracing charge, which is per unit (i. e. MW) or the ratio of losses allocated to 
each generator (or demand centre) to its generation output (or load). 
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Table 7.2: Charaes for Generators at Off-Peak and Peak Hours 
Generators Output Losses Tracing Charges (pu) 
Off Peak Peak Off Peak Peak Off Peak Peak 
G1 249.9 249.9 4.604784 7.162 0.018427 0.028659 
G2 9.99 9.99 0.2481 0.357 0.024835 0.035736 
G3 49.98 49.98 1.2866 1.8604 0.025742 0.03722 
G4 1025.24 1477.87 19.7185 41.5347 0.019233 0.028104 
G5 185 309 0.0226 
_0.0548 
0.000122 0.000177 
G6 511 511 1.299951 1.4884 0.002544 0.002913 
G7 0 50 0 0 0 0 
G8 180 378 0.8184 3.4703 0.004547 0.009181 
G9 180 378 0.32 1.7703 0.001778 0.004683 
G10 490 759 3.6031 10.9116 0.007353 0.014376 
G11 184 543.99 1.7749 8.2452 0.009646 0.015157 
G12 498 543 4.8165 5.8223 0.009672 0.010722 
G13 465 523 4.5186 5.9754 0.009717 0.011425 
G14 180 444.99 1.3065 8.0316 0.007258 0.018049 
G15 40 90 0.2453 0.7998 0.006133 0.008887 
G16 50 101 0.2563 1.27 0.005126 0.012574 
Total 4298.11 6418.72 1 45.16 98.22 1 1 
This table shows the comparison of the charges for the sixteen generators at the off-peak 
and peak hours. Some generators had no change in generation but their losses have 
increased, which in turn increased their charges. It is worth noting that despite the fact that 
the output of G1, G2, G3 and G6 did not change, their transmission charges increased at 
peak hour by 55 per cent, 44 per cent, 45 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively. This might 
indicate that externalities, which usually exist during peak hour, are reflected in these 
charges. 
As usage of the existing capacity is expected to increase more at the peak hour than at the 
off-peak hour, it is reasonable to have an increase in the transmission cost of one MW 
from 
the same generator. This confirm the ability of the tracing charges to reflect network 
externalities. In addition, the generators G 11 and G12 had the same charges at the off-peak 
hour but had different charges at the peak hour and these charges increased at different 
rates, by 57 per cent and 11 per cent respectively. Since both generators 
had the same 
output at the peak hour, it could be concluded that the generator size 
has no direct link to 
its transmission charges using this method. 
193 
7.3.1 THE STABILITY OF TRACING CHARGES 
It is very important to introduce stability and predictability into transmission pricing 
without losing sight of locational factors. This is especially true for investments in future 
generation and transmission capacity, which require predictable spatial signals. The results 
in Table 7.2 can be represented more clearly in Figure 7.2, below. 
Figure 7.2: Tracing Charges for Generators at Off-Peak and Peak Hours 
0.04 
c 0 0.035 
cö 
0.03 
0.025 
0.02 
CL 
U) 
0 0.015 cm 
0.01 
cö 0.005 
0 
T rcdng (Off-P eck) -T rcdng (P eck) 
- _\\\_ 
G3 G2 Gl G4 G14 Gll G10 G16 G12 G13 G8 G15 G9 G6 G5 G7 
In Figure 7.2, the generators are ranked from the highest to the lowest in accordance with 
charges at the peak hour; this is represented by a steadily declining line. The figure shows 
that distant generators, such as G1, G2, G3 and G4, had a similar pattern of charges at both 
the off-peak and peak hours. This was also the case for generators with the lowest charges, 
including G9, G6, G5 and G7. The charges for the eight remaining generators had some 
fluctuation, which could become less subject to controversy if zonal charges were used 
instead. Although the peak charges increased the price differential between the distant 
generators and the other generators, this differential remains acceptable because it is much 
lower it would be than if the marginal charges were used. 
It is clear from these examples that the charges at the two demand levels have a very 
similar pattern especially for distant generators in the eastern region. This confirms the 
conclusion that the tracing charges are able to better reflect the actual transmission costs 
when the system is spread over large geographical areas. In addition, the high correlation 
coefficient of r=0.981 indicates a large degree of association between the charges at 
different levels of demand. 
194 
The tracing charges are also consistent with the actual operation of the system where the 
standard deviation of these charges is higher for peak (0-014) than that for off-peak 
(0.0079) hours. This indicates that the relative usage of some of the distant generators 
becomes higher than that of the much nearer generators, which implies an uneven increase 
in the extent of network usage by individual generators. These observations indicate that 
the stability of the tracing charges does not preclude charging for actual usage of the 
network by generators. 
Figure 7.3, below, shows the tracing charges for the 109 demand centers of this network. 
The overall pattern of the charges, in this figure, illustrates that demand centres with high 
and moderate charges during the off-peak hour continue to pay high charges at the peak 
hour. Also, the charges at these two hours remain reasonably stable where the correlation 
coefficient of these charges is 0.95 and is reflective of fluctuations of the charges, where 
the standard deviation has increased from 0.008 at the off peak to the 0.014 at the peak 
hour. However, it is worth noting that although most of these loads pay higher charges at 
the peak hour, some are actually benefiting at this hour. This is reflected in the line for off- 
peak charges, which rises above the peak charges line. The following section will examine 
this observation in more details. 
Figure 7.3: Tracing Charges for Demand Centres at Off Peak and Peak Hours 
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7.3.2 THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL EFFECT 
The above discussion has pointed out that some of the nine demand centres have higher 
charges at the off-peak hour than at the peak hour. This is a surprising result and could be 
explained by the increase in the loads of these demand centres, which is higher than the 
increase in losses, leading to lower peak charges. However, this explanation is not 
completely satisfactory, as Table 7.3 illustrates that some of these demand centres (with 
higher charges at the off-peak hour) have lower transmission losses (costs) even though 
their loads have increased. 
Table 7.3: Demand Centre with Lower Charges at Peak Hour 
Demand 
Centres 
Load 
(MW) 
Losses 
(MW) 
Tracing Charges 
(loss per MW of Load) 
Off Peak Peak Off Peak Peak Off Peak Peak 
D5 186.3 207 1.0387 0.3154 0.0055 0.0015 
D7 77.4 128 0.452 0.1503 0.0058 0.0012 
D14 43.81 86 0.1718 0.0935 0.0039 0.001 
D33 52.2 82 0.1524 0.1724 0.0029 0.0021 
D45 34.2 38 0.0391 0.0428 0.0011 0.0011 
D47 40.5 45 0.1305 0.0781 0.0032 0.0017 
D56 22.5 25 0.1309 0.0439 0.0058 0.0018 
D74 10.8 19 0.1387 0.1891 0.0128 0.0099 
D77 87.3 1 97 0.2882 1 0.1802 0.0033 1 0.0018 
Table 7.3 shows that all the nine demand centers pay lower charges at the peak hour than at 
the off-peak hour, which means that the increase in demand results in lower tracing 
charges. The tracing charges for the demand centres at D33, D45 and D74 declined at the 
peak hour despite the increase in their allocated losses. The reason for this is that the loads 
at these demand centres increased at a higher rate than in their traced losses. 
As regards the remaining six demand centres (D5, D7, D14, D47, D56 and D77), the 
increase in their loads came with a reduction in their losses, which caused charges to 
decline. This reduction in the peak charges for both groups could be explained by the fact 
that these demand centres benefit from being located at, or at least very close to, generation 
sources. However, this reduction is inconsistent with the loss allocation under the marginal 
cost pricing method, which confirms the local effect problem associated with the tracing 
method. 
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So far the discussion has considered transmission losses in MW units rather than in 
monetary value which is given by the system marginal genertion cost, X. As the marginal 
generation cost at the peak hour is higher than the marginal generation cost at the off-peak 
hour, the value of the allocated losses is expected to be higher during the peak hour. 
However, Table 7.4, below, illustrates that this is not the case with most of the nine 
demand centres discussed, where very high value for kis required to make the peak 
charges higher than the off-peak charges. This clearly highlights the significance of the 
local effect and the free riding problem associated with it. Thus, there is a need for some 
remedies, such as using zonal-based charges to overcome these discrepancies in nodal 
tracing charges. 
Table 7.4: Tracing CharRes at Different Values for Svstem MarOnal Price 
Demand Off -Peak Peak 
Centers for k 
100 
for k 
110 
for k 
150 
for k 
200 
for X 
300 
for X 
350 
for X 
400 
for k 
Soo 
D5 0.5575 0.16764 0.2286 0.3048 0.4572 0.5334 60 0.762 
D7 0.584 0.12914 0.1761 0.2348 0.3522 0.4109 0.4696 0.587 
D14 0.3921 0.11957 0.16305 0.2174 0.3261 0.28045 0.4348 0.5435 
D33 0.292 0.23122 0.3153 0.4204 0.6306 0.7357. 0.8408 1.051 
D45 0.1143 0.12386 0.1689 0.2252 0.3378 0.3941 0.4504 0.563, 
D47 0.3222 0.19096 0.2604 0.3472 0.5208 0.6076 0.6944 0.868 
D56 0.5818 0.19316 0.2634 0.3512 0.5268 0.6146 0.7024 0.878 
D74 1.28 1.09483 [ý. 1.49295 1.9906 2.9859 3.48355 3.9812 4.9765 
D77 0.3301 1 0.20438 1 0.2787 0.3716 0.5574 0.6503 0.7432 0.929'-: 
where X is the system marginal generation cost (in SR), 
SRI 00 = $27 
Table 7.4 uses the marginal cost of generation to give a monetary value to the transmission 
losses. For a system with no line congestion, the marginal cost of producing an additional 
MW is expected to be lower at the off-peak hour than at the peak hour. So it is reasonable 
to assume that the transmission cost of delivering one MW to a demand centre has a much 
higher value at the peak hour. The above table shows that this is not the case for these nine 
demand centres, with the exception of D45 and to some extent D33 and D74, which 
happen to be the loads allocated higher losses at the peak hour. 
The table shows that if the price at the peak hour is assumed to be SR 110, only 
D45 pays 
higher charges than at the off-peak hour. So the shaded area shows the assumed value of 
X 
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at which each centre is paying higher charges at the peak hour. It is clear that D5, D7 and 
D14 require very high X to reach that point. It is worth noting that these three demand 
centres are located at the same generation nodes of G5, G7 and G14, respectively. An 
inspection of the position of the other demand centres on the actual network indicates that 
they are located very near generation sources and in areas with more available generation 
capacity at peak than at off-peak hours. 
7.3.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LOCAL EFFECT PROBLEM 
The above discussion, as well as the analysis in Chapter Six, highlights the problem of free 
riding and its occurrence in both the generation and the demand side of the system. Table 
7.2, section 7.3, for example, shows that G7, which supplies all of its output to D7, has the 
same (zero) charge whether it produces or not. However, this is unfair as G7 benefits from 
just being connected to the transmission grid without even having to use it directly which 
provides some kind of insurance. 
This generator has the advantage of using the available transmission capacity at any 
moment in time, which is a benefit that must be paid for. In addition, the homogeneous 
nature of electricity makes it possible that some of the power produced by this generator 
uses the network and consequently impact other users. This usage is confirmed by the fact 
that G7 has positive marginal charges, indicating its impact when the marginal generator is 
located in the same area, Al, or G14 (as in Figure 7.6 in section 7.5). Thus, it is reasonable 
to consider that the tracing allocation of these variable costs makes G7 a free rider in this 
system. Consequently, it is necessary to eliminate the cross-subsidisation among 
generators by addressing this problem without altering the locational signaling. 
In short, the problem of local effect, and the free riding problem that results from it, could 
be more easily avoided if the system transmission costs were allocated on the basis of the 
zonal rather than the nodal prices. This also confirms the suitability of the tracing method 
for systems with low demand density. This is obviously is in the case of Saudi Arabia 
where the geographical nature of the country shows dispersed urban centres containing 
almost 90 per cent of the population. As a result, it becomes easier to 
identify the zones 
clearly (for both generators as well as for demand centres). 
In addition, the sheer length of 
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distances between zones makes the ranking of charges more accurate and thus more 
acceptable. 
7.3.4 TRACING CHARGES FOR THE NETWORK AREAS 
In the previous sections, the discussion was focused on individual charges for either 
generators or demand centres. Now it turns to charges based on area, as shown in Table 
7.5, below. 
Table 7.5: The CharLyes for Generation (bv Area) 
Area Percentage Increase in Tracing Charges (loss per MW of generation) 
Generation Losses Off -peak Peak Increase (%) 
Al 48.4 120 0.05-64 0.0094 46.8 
A2 33.9 97 0.0194 0.0285 46.9 
A3 143 470 0.0071 
' 
0.0165 1 132 
A4 102 395 0.00 51 0.0126 1 147 
This table shows that the increase in losses allocated for each area is larger than the 
increase in generation, which means that the increase in transmission charges might be 
influenced by the location of the generators. For example, the generation in Al increased 
by 48.8 per cent and the losses by 120 per cent even though its demand increased by only 
37 per cent. This indicates that this area exports part of its power to other areas, especially 
A5 and A6 that do not have their own local generation sources. This means that power 
flows have increased on the lines supplying Al as well as those supplying these two areas 
from Al, which results in higher losses over the lines. 
Table 7.5 shows in the second and third columns that the relative increase in losses for 
each area is similar to the relative increase in generation. However, the increase in 
generation comes with an increase in losses, but not necessarily with an increase 
in charges 
by the same percentages, as shown in the last column. For example, area A3 
has the 
highest increase in generation by 143 per cent and the highest increase in losses by 470 per 
cent, but the tracing charge increased by 132 per cent. 
These examples illustrate that the tracing charges are 
flow-based and are quite closely 
related to the system operations, which is an advantage over 
the postage stamp method 
(and the contract path method for that matter). 
This is not the case with respect to the 
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marginal cost pricing method but, as shown in Chapter Six, the tracing charges are not 
considerably dissimilar to the marginal charges. Table 7.8, below, shows the case when 
charges are levied on the loads of the areas in this network. 
Table 7.6: The Charaes for Demand (bv Area) 
Area Percentage Increase in Tracing Charges (Loss per MW of Load) 
Load Losses Off -peak Peak Increase (%) 
Al 37 79 0.0088 0.0115 31 
A2 0 49 0.0162 0.0241 48.8 
A3 96 214 0.0151 0.0242 60.3 
A4 107 221 0.0159 0.0246 54.7 
A5 68.8 191 0.0151 0.026 72.2 
IA6 71 1 193 
1 
0.0197 0.034 1 72.6 
This table shows that the change in transmission charges are not necessarily proportional to 
the change in the size of load. For example, the demand at area A2 did not change but its 
losses and charges increased by an equal percentage of 49 per cent. The table also shows 
that area A4, which has the highest increase in demand, has the highest increase in losses 
but not necessarily the highest increase in charges. The importance of these findings is that 
they confirm the ability of the tracing allocation to reflect in a stable and transparent 
manner the principle that it is more expensive to deliver one MW at peak rather than at off- 
peak time. As a result, it is reasonable to assume that charges at peak times to be higher. 
7.4 THE STABILITY OF POSTAGE STAMP CHARGES 
The advantage of the postage stamp method over the other methods is in its very stable 
charges, which for a certain level of transmission losses are calculated on the basis of the 
userý s size. For example, at the off-peak hour, every generator pays 1.05 per cent of its 
generation for losses and 1.53 per cent at the peak hour. This advantage of stability, 
however, does not eliminate the criticism directed at this method that its charges do not 
incorporate locational differences. 
Obviously, ignoring these costs has direct negative implications for aspects of both 
productive as well as allocative efficiency. Thus, the choice is whether the priority should 
be given to the advantage of stability at the expense of economic efficiency considerations. 
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Figure 7.4 provides a comparison between the charges using the tracing method and the 
postage stamp method at the off-peak and peak hours. 
Figure 7.4: Postage Stamp and Tracing Charges for Generators 
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This figure illustrates that different generators would have different preferences for the two 
methods. While distant generators prefer postage stamp charges, some generators which 
are located near demand centres, such as G5 and G7, may have enough reasons to object to 
these charges. The acceptance of these methods by any one of the other generators depends 
on how much their charges are reflective of the changes in the load level. For example, 
GI I can be indifferent to a choice between the two methods as it pays the same charges 
regardless which one of the methods is used in this example at least. 
Figure 7.4, above, shows that the postage stamp makes distant generators, such as G I, G2, 
G3 and G4, pay the same charges as the generators that are located near consumption 
centres. This clearly distorts the necessary spatial message that a good transmission pricing 
method should provide. The negative implication of adopting a non-spatial transmission 
pricing method is that the opportunity to provide a level playing-field for the competing 
generators would be lost. 
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Figure 7.5: Postage Stamp and Tracing Charges for Demand Centres 
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Figure 7.5 gives similar results to those of the generators in Figure 7.4, which confirms the 
comparison points raised in the above discussion. It could be argued, however, that 
allocating transmission costs between demand centres instead of generators will 
counterbalance the disadvantages of the postage stamp charges. The basis for this 
argument is that the demand for electricity is insensitive to spatially differentiated prices. 
However, the counter-argument to this reasoning is that this is true for small consumers but 
not necessarily for large ones, such as industrial consumers. Also, small consumers do not 
usually change their location in response to change in retail prices, but they can shift part 
of their consumption from peak to off peak periods. Thus, the adoption of real time prices, 
or at least time-of-use prices, that include the generation and delivery costs could alter this 
consumption pattern in line with their willingness to pay. 
7.5 THE VOLATILITY OF MARGINAL CHARGES 
The marginal cost pricing of transmission losses has the advantage of reflecting accurately 
the actual operation of the system at different levels of demand. However, the choice of the 
marginal generator introduces volatility and, hence, the difficulty of predicting the 
transmission charges that vary with fluctuations in demand. This is caused by the fact that 
the marginal charges depend directly on the choice of the marginal generator at each level 
of demand and also on the changes in the pattern of the power flows over the transmission 
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network. 
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One of the solutions for dealing with this issue is to fix a particular generator as a reference 
point. This generator is usually chosen from the generation sources that are more likely to 
be located in the area where most of demand centres are concentrated. Figure 7.6 shows the 
marginal charges for losses at the off-peak and peak levels of demand. These charges are 
based on the assumption that the marginal generator is fixed at the node where G14 is 
located, which is the most efficient generator in terms of transmission losses. 
Figure 7-6: Marginal Charges at Off-Peak and Peak Hours (Assuming G14 as the Marginal 
Generator) 
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This figure illustrates that marginal charges at both levels of demand have a similar pattern 
of charges. This is confirmed with a correlation coefficient of 0.98 between the two sets of 
charges, which indicates the identical ranking of generators in both loading conditions. The 
standard deviation for the off-peak and peak hours are 0.015 and 0.24 respectively, which 
shows that at the peak hour some generators use the transmission network more 
extensively than others. This also confirms the similar results in section 7.3.1 for the 
tracing charges, indicating the similar ability of this method to reflect the changes between 
the two loading conditions. 
Figure 7.6 also shows that the charges for the distant generators G1, G2, G3 and G4 are 
more predictable than those for the other generators which are mostly located In areas of 
demand concentration. This observation points to the potential for the latter generators to 
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reject the calculation of their charges on the basis of the fixed generator. This rejection 
could occur if some generators in these areas considered such charges higher than they 
would be with no fixed generator. This would be particularly so if other competing 
generators within the same areas had much lower charges. As Figure 7.6 illustrates, this is 
possible where the designation of the same generator as the marginal alters the ranking of 
generators in these areas. Obviously, this rejection may be less likely if the charges are set 
for zones rather than nodes even when the marginal cost pricing method is used. 
Another similar solution is that of using the annual average of marginal losses. This 
solution aims at preserving the spatial signal of the marginal charges without having to 
choose a particular generator. However, this solution raises two problems that could 
prevent its implementation. Firstly, some generators are dispatched only at peak hour, as is 
the case with G7 (see Figure 7.6). Also, this is the case for generators which are gas-fired 
and those that are built for meeting peak demand. Such generators may consider these 
charges disadvantageous if the ex ante charges are considered lower when the ex post 
marginal generator is used at the peak hour. 
The second problem facing this solution comes from the fact that the monetary value of 
transmission losses depends on the marginal generation costs of the last generator that 
makes it to the merit order schedule at a particular hour. Thus, the critical question is 
which X to choose, especially as there is very likely to be a different X for each hour of the 
day. Obviously, the success of allocating transmission losses either on this basis or using 
the concept of a fixed generator depends mainly on the acceptance by all participants of 
these modifications prior to implementation. 
These problems highlights the likelihood that an electricity industry which is in the process 
of developing its wholesale market would find it easier to introduce such modifications 
than an industry with an already established market. In the latter case, some of the players 
have reason to object to or even block the implementation of any changes which they 
consider disadvantageous. The lesson for the electricity industry of Saudi Arabian is that 
the attempt to introduce marginal cost pricing of transmission requires clarification of 
these issues before the introduction of the wholesale power market. This is very important 
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for potential generators who need transparent rules to guide their decisions with regard to 
plant siting and the choice of generation technology. 
CONCLUSION 
What is relevant to the cost of producing and transmitting (and distributing) electricity are 
the issues of not only where but also when electricity is delivered (consumed). The 
electricity system as a whole is designed to ensure that sufficient generation, transmission 
and distribution capacity is available for meeting the peak demand when it occurs. Thus, 
economic efficiency requires that end users face the retail prices that reflect the actual cost 
components. This is possible in a decentralised industry structure if the wholesale market 
prices incorporate the spatial and temporal factors influencing these prices. 
This chapter has demonstrated that the transmission losses are generally higher in absolute 
and in relative terms at the peak hour than at the off-peak hour. However, the allocation of 
these costs runs into some difficulties because the charges for any individual user are 
influenced directly by the variations in demand and changing power flows over the whole 
network. Thus, the challenge is to have a good transmission pricing scheme that can reflect 
the spatial costs associated with different loading conditions in a predictable and stable 
manner. The important point, though, is that stability of charges should not be sought for 
its own sake when the resulting transmission prices have no relation to economic 
efficiency. 
The charges of the postage stamp method are very stable, in the sense that a pro rata charge 
for each generator (or each load) is always higher at peak than in the off-peak hours. 
However, this high degree of stability comes with complete disregard for locational 
signaling at both time periods. At the other end are the marginal charges, which accurately 
reflect the costs associated with both the time and the location of use. The volatility and the 
large differentials of these charges can obstruct their adoption unless some modifications 
are introduced early enough in the restructuring process to ensure acceptance by the 
participants. The tracing charges do not have exactly the same advantages as the marginal 
charges, especially for nodal charges. Nevertheless, the independence of tracing charges 
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from the choice of marginal generator facilitates transmission costs' allocation with a 
higher degree of predictability. 
In summary, this chapter has illustrated the additional difficulty facing the selection among 
the different transmission pricing methods. There is a need for the selected method to 
reflect efficiently the impact of demand changes on transmission costs. Although the 
marginal method is preferable, even in a modified form, the tracing method is worth 
consideration if more extensive research shows that its departure from the first best 
situation is minimal. Having the correct transmission charges helps not only in the siting of 
generators and the technologies used but also in guiding investment decisions regarding 
generation and transmission capacity. 
Another important implication is that benefits from the wholesale market cannot 
materialise if wholesale prices do not feed into retail prices. The decisions of final 
consumers should be based on the actual costs associated with their consumption. Thus, 
consumers need to be able to observe and react to changes in prices by using real-time 
pricing. This implies that the demand side of the market is directly involved and should be 
considered as an essential part of designing a successful electricity market. However, this 
could lead to direct exposure of consumers to price fluctuations which cannot be politically 
feasible unless significant competition as well as choice is introduced. Real competition in 
generation, and even in supply, can help in keeping wholesale and retail prices as low as 
possible. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Potential Applications of Tracing Pricing 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Saudi Arabia, like many countries around the world, is going into the process of 
liberalising its electricity industry. In addition, the country is involved in another process 
of integrating its national transmission network with that of the GCC countries and, at a 
later stage, with other regional interconnections. These developments make transmission 
pricing a critical issue, which needs to be addressed at an early stage in the creation of 
markets for electricity. Although there are different methods for pricing transmission, 
agreement on a unified method between different participants with conflicting interests is 
difficult to achieve. 
Chapters Six and Seven provided a comparison of the new method of electricity tracing 
with the marginal and average (in the form of postage stamp) pricing methods. This 
chapter has the aim of presenting two potential applications of the tracing method. These 
applications are essential in facilitating successful market liberalisation of electricity 
industries both nationally and internationally. The first application deals with the issue of 
international trade in electricity where the complexity of the process requires transmission 
pricing which is transparent and easy to implement with a minimum distortion of economic 
efficiency. The second application deals with the issue of designing access charges to the 
transmission network. This is very necessary for cost recovery in electricity transmission 
which is characterised by economies of scale due to its large fixed (sunk) costs. The 
usefulness of this chapter, and this thesis in general, is that its relevance is not limited to 
the network of a certain country or geographical region, but can be applicable to any 
network or region which has embarked on market liberalisation. 
207 
8.2 APPLICATION ONE: CROSS-BORDER TRADE IN 
ELECTRICITY 
The first international power interconnection was that between the United States and 
Canada at the beginning of the twentieth century. The European experience of international 
interconnections began in the early 1930s. Since then many regions in the developed and 
the developing world have realised the advantages of interconnection and begun to 
welcome power exchange between countries. If the twentieth century was the century of 
interconnection and electricity exchange between countries, the twenty-first century may 
become the century of integration and trade between networks. The new century may bring 
with it innovations and some technological advancements which would change existing 
arrangements of trading in electricity over transmission networks 4. However, new 
arrangements resulting from new technologies would, in turn, raise new and unexpected 
issues. 
8.2.1 BENEFITS AND PROBLEMS OF INTERCONNECTIONS 
The justifications for interconnection between countries are not dissimilar to those for 
interconnecting utilities and regions of the same country. There is a broad agreement in the 
literature such as Joskow and Schmalensee (1985), Pechman (1993), Andrews (1995) and 
Badawi (1997) on the main benefits (and problems) that can arise from interconnection. 
The benefits of interconnecting of different electricity networks could be summarised as 
follows. 
(1) The interconnection lines (tie-lines) between different networks function as additional 
sources of generation. The advantage of the interconnection is not only in the reduction 
in the substantial generation investments, but also in the increase in the system's 
reliability. 
(2) Interconnection reduces the spinning reserve, which is the capacity that has to be 
maintained to keep the system functional. In this case, all interconnected networks 
would share the available reserve without jeopardising the security of the system. 
4 The Financial Times (6-9-2000) reported the development of a new technology (called Regensys) for 
storing large quantities of electricity. If this technology 
is feasible, the belief in the natural monopoly of 
electricity transmission will require rethinking. 
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(3) Interconnection makes it possible to take advantage of the differences in the marginal 
generation costs between generation units, which induces more efficient utilisation of 
the available capacity. 
(4) Interconnection of generation plants to the same grid would result in considerable 
economies from maintenance co-ordination. The costs of planned outages would be 
lower than the case when isolated plant requires maintenance and consequently higher 
cost replacement power is needed. 
(5) Interconnection makes it possible to take advantage of the variations in seasonal, 
weekly and even daily load peaks between the different networks. This would reduce 
the generation costs by allowing the most efficient generation unit to be chosen to meet 
the increase in demand. 
(6) Power generation stations may be optimally located in areas with excess cheap fuel 
sources. Once transportation costs are considered, it might be more economical to 
transmit electricity rather than transporting fuel in its original form. 
(7) In a deregulated market, the transmission grid will become the physical market where 
electricity is traded. Hence, more interconnections would increase the market size and 
provide more alternatives to buyers (such as distribution companies) and sellers (such 
as generators). This notion of the electricity market means that higher trade would 
result in better utilisation of the grid. 
Despite the above advantages, the integration of separate networks into one complex 
system is not expected to function without some problems, although the international 
experiences indicate that the overall economic argument for grid interconnections is very 
strong. The potential problems could include the following. 
(1) The interconnection of a number of networks can make system control a formidable 
task. This can be more so when the stability of the whole system is affected by an 
accident at one of the networks. 
(2) There can be higher costs for the construction of tie-lines between two. networks when 
these lines are too long in comparison with the internal lines of one or both networks. 
This means that the economics of interconnection should consider the electricity 
consumption density within each network, as the geographical proximity of countries 
does not necessarily imply that major centres of consumption are close to each other. 
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(3) If the usage of the tie-lines is limited, the operational (transmission losses) and capital 
costs will be high in relation to the volume of the transferred power. Thus, it may 
become more difficult to reach a favourable cost/benefit ratio from interconnection. 
(4) Viability studies of grid interconnection should consider the transmission losses which 
can be very high for a distance over 1500-2000 km even with lines of high voltage as 
high as 700 kV level (MacKillop, 1989). 
8.2.2 THE CASE OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES 
In this section, which is partially based on the work of Badawi (1997), Marconato (1999) 
and McKie (1999), a review of the Arab world experience of electricity interconnection is 
presented. The aim is to explore how far the region is from establishing the infrastructure 
which is necessary for creating a interregional market for electricity in the future. This 
experience started in 1952 with the building of a transmission line between Tunisia and 
Algeria. However, the real interest in interconnection began in the 1980s when the Arab 
Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) was given the responsibility of 
studying and financing interconnections between the Arab countries. Subsequently, the 
Fund provided sixteen countries with over $3.3bn in loans, until 1998, with the objective 
of promoting such projects across the region. 
This effort was considerably enhanced after the creation, in 1987, of the Arab Union of 
Producers, Transmitters and Distributors of Electricity (AUPTDE). AUPTDE has the 
responsibility of implementing interconnection projects and harmonising the existing 
systems to facilitate the establishment of a unified grid across the Arab world. Although 
many pan-Arab political and economic projects have, in the past, failed to materialise, it 
seems that this project may have a better chance of succeeding. For this reason, the official 
objective is to have all 22 Arab countries linked by the grid by 2015. This optimistic 
scenario clearly assumes that the weak networks of the Sudan and Djibouti are also 
included, which is not feasible unless the project to link Egypt and Congo becomes a 
reality. 
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8.2.2.1 ARAB COUNTRIES OF THE MASHREQ AND MAGHREB REGIONS 
The Arab world's experience of power interconnections can be divided into two main 
groups according to region. The first group comprises the Maghreb which are North 
African countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. The second group 
comprises the Mashreq, that is, those countries in the eastern Mediterranean and Arabian 
Peninsula including Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen and the GCC countries (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Qatar). Table 8.1 shows the different existing 
interconnections in these two regions as of 1999, although some are not commissioned yet. 
Table 8.1 Power Interconnections in the Arab World as of 1999 
Regions Interconnection Capacity (kv) Status 
Maghreb Morcco-Spain 400 Operational 
Morcco-Algeria 225 Operational 
Alegeria-Tunis 225 Operational 
Tunis-Libya 225 Operational 
j Libya-Egypt 220 Operational (400kV Underconstruction) 
Mashreq Jordan-Egypt 400 Operational 
Jordan-Syria 230 Operational (400kV Underconstruction) 
Syria-Lebanon 230 Operational 
Syria-Turkey 400 Underconstruction 
Iraq-Turkey 400 Built but not Commercially Operational 
GCC (phase 1) 
1400 
Scheduled to be Operational in 2001 
Sources: Badawl (1997), MaKie (1999), Marconato (1999) and Cieorge (2UUU). 
The interconnection between countries in the Arab Mashreq came later than that between 
countries in the Arab Maghreb. This delay may have been useful, as interconnecting well- 
developed networks with sufficient generation capacities and using advanced technologies 
would create an efficient and robust system in the long term. On the other hand, the case of 
some Maghreb countries shows that most of the recent investments were directed toward 
upgrading previously-established links and the completion of internal networks. The 
interconnection of Egypt and Jordan has made it possible to link the two groups together, 
which makes possible the aim of having a unified grid across the Arab world. 
Interconnection between Syria and Turkey would make the Mediterranean Power Ring 
project, which aims to link Spain to Turkey via North Affica and the Nfiddle East, 
achievable if the political will is there to implement it. The completion of this project 
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would make the existence of a trans -continental electricity grid possible, even if the 
Turkish section does not materialise. The long distance of 50OOkm between Morocco in 
the west and the Arabian Gulf in the east, the seasonal differences between the countries 
involved and some differences in their weekend holidays present a considerable advantage. 
The average growth rate of electricity load in most Arab countries is expected to exceed 6 
per cent for the next decade, which according to AFESD will require over $73bn in new 
generation capacity. Table 8.2 shows that 26 per cent of the installed generation capacity of 
these countries is held as a reserve. This percentage is the capacity that has to be kept in 
reserve for unexpected outages. Assuming a 50 per cent saving on this reserve, a unified 
grid would reduce the installed capacity by 10,206 MW or an equivalent saving of about 
$9bn (or $900,000 per MW as assumed in a similar estimation by the GCC (see section 
8.2.2.2)). This is the only benefit factored into the equation, which means that other 
advantages of electricity exchange would clearly increase these benefits. 
Table 8.2 Installed Reserves in Arab Countries in 1996 
Country Installed Capacity Peak Load Installed R eserves 
(MW) (MW) (MW) N 
Jordan 1,266 928 338 27 
UAE 7,004 4,996 2,008 29 
Bahrain 1,307 1,023 284 22 
Tunis 1,624 1,184 440 27 
Algeria 5,602 3,760 1,842 33 
Djibouti 90 64 26 29 
Saudi Arabia 21,895 18,506 3,389 15 
Sudan 518 428 90 17 
Syria 4,784 2,970 1,814 38 
Somalia 60 57 3 5 
Oman 1,613 1,508 105 7 
Qatar 1,347 1,327 20 1.5 
Kuwait 6,898 5,312 1,586 23 
Lebanon 1,670 1,662 8 0.4 
Libya 4,204 1,983 2,221 53 
Egypt 13,346 8,333 5,013 38 
Morocco 3,137 2,193 944 30 
Mauritania 180 114 66 37 
Yemen 810 555 255 31 
Total 77,335 56,923 20,412 26.4 
Maghreb 14,897 9,356 5,541 37 
Mashreq 62,438 47,567 14,871 24 
- 
Total 7-7 77,335 56,923 
7 1 20,412 2 
S ource: Calculated trom B aclawi k 199 /) 
212 
Since the GCC interconnection is not currently linked with either the Jordanian or the 
Egyptian networks, the objective of having one Arab grid needs a few more years to 
become a reality. The linking of Yemen with Saudi Arabia via the southern region of Saudi 
Arabia is in effect linking the GCC with Yemen. This is more likely to occur than a link 
between Oman and Yemen, as the great distance between consumption centres in these 
latter countries could make a link between them less economically viable. The large size of 
Saudi Arabia makes it possible to link the GCC and Yemen with the already operational 
link between the Maghreb and the rest of the Mashreq region. 
The above points show that these interconnections would create a suitable infrastructure 
for the development of international markets for electricity in the region. As this would 
include many networks, the benefits from having such markets are expected to be higher in 
this case than in the case where the links between countries are used only for power 
exchange. As most of the countries in the region have embarked on liberalising and 
privatising their electricity industries, the dynamics of the electricity industry would make 
the establishment of such markets a possibility in the Nfiddle East. 
8.2.2.2 THE GCC INTERCONNECTION PROJECT 
Although the accomplishments of the GCC have been so far below expectations, Kopper 
(1995) indicated that establishing joint projects such as the GCC grid interconnection 
might reflect a commitment on the part of member governments. This commitment could 
be viewed as manifested in the payment of these governments of their share of the project 
despite the constraints on their budgets during the 1990s. This project, which costs more 
than $2bn, was approved in 1997. The first phase of the project is to link Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia and was scheduled to be commissioned by 2001, while the second 
phase will include linking Oman and UAE by 2003. The GCC grid is owned by Gulf States 
Interconnection Authority (GSIA) with its headquarter in Saudi Arabia but its stocks will 
be floated in all stocks markets of the GCC countries. The authorised capital of this entity 
is $L Ibn, which has been shared between member governments who have paid $385m 
(35%) with $715m (65%) still to be raised from private sources. 
213 
The idea of the GCC interconnection started in the 1980s, with the objective being limited 
to the sharing of generation reserves among the six members of the GCC. However, the 
1990s witnessed a rethinking of the long-term objectives of the project. The new 
perspectives of the role of the electricity market has shifted the focus toward economic and 
commercial objectives. According to McKie (1999), running this project on a commercial 
basis includes the objective of creating an electricity market with pool mechanism fully 
functioning by 2010. 
The GCC study of the interconnection project estimated that the project will reduce the 
generation reserves of all six countries by 3,027 MW before the year 2010, which is an 
equivalent saving of over $2.7bn (or $900,000 per MW) during the same period. The intra- 
GCC trade in electricity may be one of the benefits from the GCC interconnection, but 
these benefits will be even greater when the region is linked with the other Mashreq 
countries and Turkey. The obvious benefit lies in taking advantage of the significant 
differences in their load profiles. While the peak loads in the GCC countries occur usually 
during the summer months of June to August, the peak loads in Egypt, Syria and Turkey 
occur in the winter months of December to January. Hence, these differences will benefit 
both groups by increasing the load factors and higher utilisation of their generation 
capacities. 
8.2.2.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERCONNECTION 
There are some structural implications of the interconnection of the different regions of the 
Middle East. The interconnection of the GCC with the rest of the Arab countries would 
make the Gulf region a net exporter of thermal-generated electricity in addition to being a 
net exporter of oil (and natural gas). This development would increase the diversification 
of the generation mix for the unified grid where the systems of Egypt and Syria, which 
rely on hydroelectric sources, can be complemented by thermal sources from the Arabian 
Gulf. This may become even more relevant during times of natural drought or other 
shortages or of other kinds of water problems which could be caused by 'hydro-politics'. 
In the GCC countries, power generation accounts for 50 per cent of the demand for natural 
gas which is expected to grow even further in the coming years (MEES 43: 22 8thMay 
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2000 and MEES 43: 22 29"' May 2000). Also gas-fired generation is becoming a new 
option in other neighbouring countries, such as Egypt. However, the study by Abdallah 
(1999) asserts that Egypt has reached its potential for hydroelectricity production and, 
given the country's population growth and other factors, domestic natural gas sources will 
not suffice for future energy load. The study even predicts that these factors will make 
Egypt a net importer of energy by 2012 or 2017 at the latest. The implication of this 
prediction is that Egypt would become a good market for electricity as well as gas 
produced in the Gulf, especially if the Egypt-Congo link fails to materialise. 
The linking of the GCC by another grid for natural gas and the potential for the region to 
export both primary energy sources and electricity would highlight the importance of the 
costs of transportation for future generation sites. In addition, the interest in combined 
cycle generation technologies, because of their technical and environmental advantages, as 
well as the interest in utilising gas sources, would make the inter-link between the 
electricity and gas industries more significant than ever before. For instance, transportation 
cost is an important factor to consider in the comparison between gas and electricity as 
alternatives. Some countries may find it more beneficial to export electricity rather than 
export natural gas. Such a preference has been justified on two grounds: firstly, producing 
and the exporting electricity may have higher value-added than exporting natural gas and, 
secondly, there is a considerable growth in domestic demand for gas especially for 
industrial purposes and as fuel for power generation. 
The long-term benefits of interconnecting countries should also be taken into consideration 
in the appraisal of the economic viability of interconnection projects. Amundsen et al. 
(1999) investigated the impact of interconnection on competition in electricity markets and 
found that cross-border trade would enhance the prospect of competition not only between 
countries but also between firms within each country. Their study also found that the 
integration of electricity markets would equalise prices across national borders. Such an 
outcome could be of relevance in the case of the GCC countries. In addition to the 
introduction of competition, the similarity in their generation costs may induce more gains 
in productive efficiency and could result in lower prices for consumers. 
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8.2.3 THE ROLE OF THE TRACING METHOD IN CROSS-BORDER TRADE 
8.2.3.1 PRICING ISSUES 
Charpentier and Schenk (1995) argue that the liberalisation and privatisation of the 
electricity industry in many countries have introduced two new elements into the operation 
of international interconnections. Firstly, private distribution companies that aim at 
minimising their costs will look for the cheapest generation sources regardless of their 
national origin. The same rationale can apply to generators who have the incentive and the 
means to supply customers in other countries. Secondly, transforming the process from a 
power exchange to trade will make market prices based on marginal costs, profit-sharing, 
or avoided costs difficult to use. The reasons for this are that pricing and cost information 
become more commercially sensitive in trade-based systems than in exchange-based 
systems. Hence, electricity pricing in international competitive markets needs to be based 
on market bids in a similar way to that of trade in electricity in national power pools. 
Therefore, transmission pricing of electricity becomes a vexing issue, which could hinder 
trade if there is no agreement upon a unified transmission pricing method. 
There are considerable difficulties facing the implementation of marginal pricing of 
transmission, not least due to its extensive data requirements. These limitations would 
make the method even more difficult to adopt in a system which integrates different 
networks from different countries. The use of average pricing in the form of pro rata (i. e. 
postage stamp) is a very practical solution considering the complexity of the process and 
the need to facilitate more trade across national borders. 
However, this solution would have its drawback for economic efficiency, as international 
interconnections extend over long distances, which means that ignoring transmission losses 
would result in sub-optimal decisions regarding location of generators. The use of postage 
stamp rates, in effect, ignores the opportunity cost of transmitting electricity, by neglecting 
the relevant comparison with the transportation cost of other sources of energy such as gas. 
Hence, the practicality of average pricing may come with a large loss in economic 
efficiency as it ignores completely the spatial factor in electricity trade. 
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8.2.3.2 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE TRACING METHOD 
As shown in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, transmission pricing by the tracing method 
preserves significantly the practicality advantage of average pricing together with a 
reasonable reflection of spatial signals as in marginal pricing. The shortcomings of tracing, 
such as its inability to reflect small differences in distance and the problem of free-riding 
by some of the system users, does not diminish its usefulness for international trade in 
electricity. 
On the contrary, the first point may become irrelevant considering that short distances 
must be reflected when nodal rather than zonal pricing is used. The long distances involved 
in international interconnections would make this shortcoming immaterial. Also, this 
argument could be supported by the claim put forward by Hunt and Shuttleworth (1997) 
that having price at each node (nodal prices) may be considered redundant. Consequently, 
the issue of free-riding would not be likely to become a problem considering that in cross- 
border trade the charges would be allocated between national networks (i. e. large zones) 
and each network would have its own method of allocating charges between its members. 
The remainder of this section gives an example of how these charges are determined using 
the tracing pricing. This will be done in two stages. The first stage deals with allocating 
losses over interconnection lines (tie-lines) while the second stage deals with determining 
the charges for using the system by the different networks. 
8.2.3.2.1 Stage One: Allocation of Interconnection Losses 
For the objective of illustrating how transmission costs 5 (losses) are allocated between 
different networks that belong to separate countries, the original network of this research 
has been used. To simplify the calculation with no effect on the integrity of the outcomes, 
two of the six sub-networks of the original network were incorporated with the others 
according to their actual geographical proximity. As a result, the original network is 
transformed into four sub-networks which will be used in this section (Figure 8.1, below) 
to resemble an interconnection system consisting of four networks which belong to four 
separate countries. 
5 Here the focus is on variable costs, but fixed costs can be dealt with in a similar fashion as in Application 
Two: Access Charges, in Section 8.3. 
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The calculation of the following results is based on a similar procedure used in Bialek 
(1999) and Bialek and Kattuman (1999). However, the calculations in this section provide 
more realistic results as it is based on actual power flows data. 
Figure 8.1: Interconnected Networks (numbers in MW) 
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*= 535 
*= 1093.58 
Ex. =0 
Im. = 578.17 
NIL = 19.5 8 
IIL = 19.58 
EL =0 
578.2 L6 583.9z 
(5.77) 
254.2 
L5 
255.35 
Country 1 
G--3995 
D= 4609.8 
Ex. =603.61 
h-n- =1249.69 
NL =32.304 
IL = 28.56 
EL = 3.74 
185.02 Ll 
4 
(1.12) 
810 
19.67 
(0.635) 
(1.015) U 
.. 18.7 
Country 4 639.4 
G =101 
D= 499.2 
Ex. = 255.35 
hn. = 658.04 
NIL = 4.5 
IIL =3 
EL = 1.5 
L2 822. 
(12.84) 
L3 
(6.43) 
NOTES: 
1) Kirchhoff s Current Law (nodal inflows = nodal outflows) is satisfied. 
2) Network Losses = Generation - Demand - Export + Import 
3) Losses on interconnection lines are in parentheses 
645. 
186.14 
Country 2 
* =1787.8 
* =117.8 
Ex. =1654.8 
im. =0 
NIL = 15.23 
IIL = 2.83 
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Figure 8.1, above, shows for each network the relevant information regarding generation 
(G), load (D), exports (EX), imports (IM). Losses over each network (NIL) are calculated 
by subtracting load and net exports from generation. By using the Proportional Sharing 
Rule, the determination of the share of outgoing 6 flows (exports) in NL gives us the value 
of external losses (EQ, and the share of flows supplied to load centres within the network 
in NL gives us the value of internal losses (IL). 
' This could easily be done for incoming flows (imports), but for simplicity we have limited our case to only 
outgoing flows (exports). 
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The method used to allocate network losses between internal and external losses is a matter 
to be decided by the Transmission System Operator (TSO) of each network. This would 
make the tracing method more politically acceptable, as it takes into consideration the issue 
of sovereignty, allowing each country to choose the method it wishes. For example, in the 
interconnected system of Figure 8.1 we assumed that networks of countries I and 4 use the 
postage stamp method while the networks of countries 2 and 3 use the tracing method. 
However, for the tracing method to work for cross-border allocation it has to be accepted 
by all networks involved as the only method of allocating the over the six tie-lines of the 
interconnected system. 
For the purpose of allocating the cost of trade over these lines, it is necessary to transform 
this system into a network with four supernodes, by netting out inflows from outflows at 
each network. In this way, each network becomes a net exporter, a net importer or a 
balanced node. The charges will not be levied on users of a network with balance 
generation and load (plus losses) as it is unfair to charge a load for losses on tie-lines while 
this load is supplied by internal generation. In addition, some of the losses over lines in this 
network are partially caused by power flows from other networks. However, our case does 
not contain a balanced network, which means that we have one net exporter network 
(Country 2) and three net importer networks (Country 1,3 and 4) as shown in the following 
figure, Figure 8.2. 
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Figure 8.2: Networks as net exporters or net importers (numbers in MW) 
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3) For Net Importer: D (net) =D-G+ 11- 
Applying the tracing method assumes that the four networks agree, at least, on who should 
pay the charges for cross-border trade: the loads (and exports) or generators (and imports). 
In our case, we assumed that it has been agreed that loads (and exports) would pay these 
charges. For this reason, the flow at the sending end of each one of the six tie-lines 
increased, causing the losses over these lines to increase, as shown in Figure 8.2. This 
means that external losses are incorporated into the flows involved in the cross-border 
trade and not in the internal transactions within each network. Hence, the total losses on 
tie-lines increased from 27.9 MW in Figure 8.1 to 45.26 MW in Figure 8.2. 
The allocation of these losses arising from using the tracing method results in 14.6 MW (or 
0.0226 pu), 22.7 MW (or 0.0393 pu) and 7.3 MW (or 0.0 179 pu) for D 1, D3 and D4, 
respectively. However, the allocation of the losses from using the Postage Stamp results in 
0.0275 pu for each load. The implication of using the latter method is that distant load D3 
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is allocated 15.89 MW while D4 is allocated 11.03 MW, which reconfirms the 
shortcoming of the postage stamp method in its lack of any spatial signalling. This means 
that the benefits induced by the simplicity of average pricing should be weighted against 
its distortion to economic efficiency. On the other hand, the ability of the tracing method to 
reflect the locational differences indicates that it has less distortion to economic efficiency 
than that of the postage stamp method. 
8.2.3.2.2 Stage Two: Calculation of Charges 
As we have seen from Chapter Four, Equation (4.28) shows how the nodal power, Pi, is 
distributed between all the loads in the system. In this section, the same concept can be 
used for interconnected system where Pi becomes a network (i. e. a supernode). 
n 
Pi [Adl 
lik PDk 
k=l 
for i=1,2,..., n (Equation 4.28) 
This equation is very helpful in computing how much each load should pay for cross- 
border transmission. These charges should equal the sum over all the i networks for the 
contribution to load k multiplied by the transfer price Ti of each networký as follows: 
Allocation to load k= 
n [Ad' IkP, 
)kTi =Pj)k 
[Ad' JkTi (Equation 8.1) 
Similarly the revenues collected by the TSO in network i are the sum of k loads which are 
supplied through network i multiplied by the transfer price Ti, as follows: 
Revenues for transits in network i 
nn IA [JA 
(11 
Ik 
PEAT' 
= 
T' 
Ij 
d-I 
Ik 
PDk 
k=l k=l 
(Equation 8.2) 
Substituting (Equation. 4.28) into (Equation. 8.2) shows that revenues collected by TSOi is 
equal to 
Pi Ti, which assures the recovery of costs in each network. 
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The following tables (Table 8.3 and Table 8.4) present the calculation results, which are 
based on the data in Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2, and provide the charges for cross-boarder 
and internal transmission of electricity over the system. To make our case even more 
realistic, we can reasonably assume that each network charges different transfer prices for 
using its lines for transmitting electricity. It is expected that the Transmission System 
Operator (TSO) of a modem and well-developed network will charge higher transfer fees 
than the TSO of an old and poorly maintained network. In the following example, the 
assumption is that the TSOs in N 1, N2, N3 and N4 charge 4,5,2 and 3 SR/MW, 
respectively. 
Table 8.3 Charges due to Cross-Border Trade 
Network Loads Total 
D1 D2 D3 D4 (SR) 
N1 (643x 4=) 2573 0 (587x 4=) 2350 (1 9.79x 4=) 79.16 5003 
N2* (658x 5=) 3287.7 0 (601)x 5=) 3005.3 (408.4x 5=) 2041.8 8335 
N3 0 0 (578x 2=) 1156 0 1156 
N4 (257x 3) 770 0 0 (401 x 3=) 1204 1974 
Total 6631 0 6512 3325 16468 
Per MW 
1 
(6631/643=) 10.2 1(6512/ 578 =) 11.3 1 (3325/ 401 =) 8.3 
* Collected charges include the payments of Ds for load and cross-border losses. 
Table 8.3 shows how much each load in Figure 8.2 pays the different networks for using 
their lines in order to receive this amount of load. For example, D1 pays SR2,573 to N 1, 
which is the transfer fee 4 SR/MW multiplied by the size of the load (643.36 MW). As the 
same load (plus 15MW for the share of D1 in cross-border losses) came from network N2, 
then DI pays N2 658MW multiplied by 5 SR/MW (the transfer fee in N2), which is 
SR3290. A similar explanation applies to the payment of D1 to N4 where the former 
imports 257 MW which is transmitted over the lines of the latter. Thus, Table 8.3 shows 
how much each TSO collects in revenue from the transfer of power over its lines due to 
cross-border trade. Also, the table shows how much each load pays (per MW) for using tie- 
lines. Obviously D3 pays the highest charges per MW, which is expected for two reasons: 
firstly, it is the furthest geographically from the sources of generation and, secondly the 
power received by D3 has travelled over the lines of the other three upstream networks (i. e. 
a pancaking effect). 
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Table 8.4 Total Revenues Collected b-Y TSOs (in Million SR) 
TSO in 
Network 
Transfer Price 
(A) 
Internal 
Transfer Fees 
Cross-border 
Transfer Fees 
TSO's Revenues 
(B) = (C) x (A) 
Total Flows (MW) 
(C) 
N1 4 15977 5003 20980 5245 
N2 5 603 8335 8938 1787.6 
N3 2 1070 1156 2226 1113 
N4 3 303 1974 2277 759 
ITotal 1 117953 116468 134421 
Table 8.4 shows the total amount collected by the TSOs not only from cross-border trade 
(total in Table 8.3), but also the amounts collected from internal trade from loads (or 
generators). Hence, the table shows that the total revenues of a particular TSO are equal to 
the transfer price multiplied by the power transmitted over its network, which means that 
each TSO recovers exactly its revenues as indicated in equation 8.2, above. 
Table 9-5 Average Transi)ort Charges for Demand Centres 
Charges Loads Total 
D1 D2 D3 D4 Payments 
Internal transfer fees 15,977 603 1,070 303 17,953 
Per MW 3.47 5.12 0.98 0.6 
Cross-border transfer fees 6,631 0 6,512 3,325 16,468 
Per MW 1.43 0 5.95 6.67 
Total 22,611 608-12 7,583 3,628 34,43 1 
Per MW 4.9 15.12 16.93 17.27 
1 
Table 8.5 looks at these revenues from the point view of demand centres as per MW 
charge. It shows that, with no exception, all loads pay internal charges because each 
network has internal transactions. However, while D 1, D3 and D4 pay both internal and 
cross-border charges, D2 does not pay any cross-border charge as it is completely supplied 
from internal generation. This table shows the per MW transfer charge for the loads in this 
system. This charge is clearly influenced by all the following three factors: the dependency 
of the load on external sources, the extent of using the system (due to its geographical 
position in the network), and the internal transfer price of the used networks. For example, 
although D2 receives its entire load from local generation, it pays slightly more than D1 
in 
per MW because the transfer price charged by TSO in N2 is very high. On the other 
hand, 
most of the payments from D3 and D4 are due for their dependency on power which is 
imported from abroad. 
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The above illustration shows the suitability of the tracing method for international trade in 
electricity. As international markets naturally would use loose pool (i. e. where no central 
dispatcher is needed) rather than tight pool mechanisms, the limited information 
requirement of the tracing method makes it suitable for such arrangements. This also 
would make the tracing method a practical alternative to marginal pricing which is 
complex and requires very detailed information, some of which is commercially sensitive. 
However, the above discussion has to take into consideration that there is a potential for 
some objections when tracing is used in cross-border trade. For example, in figure 8.2, 
how external losses are allocated between the tie-lines Ll, L2 and L3 depends on which 
pricing method is used by N2. Hence, the charges that calculated in table 8.5 would be 
different, albeit only slightly, depending on which pricing method is used in N2. However, 
since cross-border trading is usually small in comparison with the trade volume within 
each country, the choice of the pricing method is not likely determined by cross-border 
trade considerations alone. In addition, the implementation of the tracing method assumes 
a prior agreement among the networks, which implies some acceptance of such possibility. 
This is based on the assumption that networks are joining the interconnection with the 
objective of maximising the benefits from the electricity trade. 
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8.3 APPLICATION TWO: ACCESS CHARGES 
The ideal transmission pricing method must achieve some important objectives including 
economic efficiency, adequacy of revenues, transparency, easy implementation and 
fairness. However, in practice there is no single method which could satisfy this 
requirement, as there are some inherent contradictions between these objectives. This 
makes it necessary to compromise, and a trade-off between these objectives is usually 
accepted depending on the priority given to each one individually. 
The first two objectives are clearly impossible to reconcile for industries with significant 
economies of scale. This could be demonstrated by the case of the electricity transmission 
which involves high fixed (sunk) costs, low marginal costs and excess capacity. As pricing 
based on marginal transmission costs alone fails to recoup the total revenues, other pricing 
methods have been suggested (and some used) to deal with recovering the fixed costs. This 
section provides a brief review of some of these methods, followed by a presentation of 
how the tracing method would contribute to the recovery of the fixed costs of electricity 
transmission. 
8.3.1 THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 
8.3.1.1 ECONOMIES OF SCALE 
In economic theory, the concept of natural monopoly refers to an industry where the 
technological advantages of large-scale production preclude efficient competition among 
smaller companies. Thus, one of the major topics in the economics of public utility is how 
to deal with the problems resulting from the existence of economies of scale. As illustrated 
by Figure 8.3, the marginal cost price fails, in the case of increasing return to scale, to raise 
sufficient revenues to keep the firm operational in the long run. The challenge, therefore, is 
how to recover the total costs with the least distortion to economic efficiency. 
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Figure 8.3: The Problem of Natural Monopoly 
Price 
Pm 
Pz 
F 
P* 
Qm Qz Q* Quantity 
This figure illustrates the position of a natural monopoly where the average cost is falling 
throughout the relevant range of output. As the demand is always less than the minimum 
efficient scale (MIES), which is the lowest point on the long-run average cost (LAC) curve, 
only one firm can efficiently serve the market. In the case of unregulated monopoly, the 
firm maximises its profit at point (A) where marginal costs equal marginal revenues. This 
solution is socially undesirable as it results in too low an output and too high a price in 
comparison with the ideal output (Q*), where the LMC intercepts the demand curve at 
point G. However, at this point marginal cost is lower than average cost which means that 
the firm encounters a loss equal to the rectangular FCGP*. Thus, marginal cost price does 
not satisfy the necessary condition for economic efficiency, which is the recovery of total 
costs. 
It is usually suggested that the firm may need a subsidy from the government which can be 
raised through a lump-sum tax. Viscusi et al. (1998) object to this subsidy on the following 
grounds. Firstly, this loss reflects the fact that consumer expenditures (and benefits) are 
lower than the total costs, which may indicate that the products should not be produced at 
all. Secondly, such subsidies would create a disincentive for the firm to be efficient. 
226 
Thirdly, this lump-sum tax is not necessarily collected from people who benefit from the 
subsidy, which makes such a suggestion unacceptable on a distributional basis. 
Another suggestion is that the firm could be privately operated and regulated in such a way 
that it earns a normal rate of return on its investment. Thus, total costs equal total revenues 
which, geometrically, occur at point (B) where the long-run average cost curve (LAC) 
intercepts the demand curve (AR). This solution leads to insufficient output and increases 
the price above the marginal cost, which results in the deadweight loss (see Appendix A). 
This loss comes from the reduction in consumer and producer surplus by the amount which 
is equal to the area of the shaded triangle in Figure 8.3. Thus, the acceptance of this 
solution depends on the size of the deadweight loss. Braeutigam (1989) argues that this 
loss is very high and unacceptable if there are large fixed costs and the demand for the 
product is elastic. 
8.3.1.2 DEALING WITH FIXED COSTS 
The following is a review of the pricing schemes from the literature, which are suggested 
for dealing with the issue of allocating the fixed costs in the context of a natural monopoly. 
8.3.1.2.1 Linear Prices 
a) Marginal Cost Prices 
These prices guarantee efficiency and satisfy the revenue requirement when the firm is 
operating in the region where there is a decreasing return to scale. However, as we have 
seen in Figure 8.3, this form of pricing fails to produce sufficient revenues when 
economies of scale exist or when the market demand is smaller than the minimum efficient 
scale. Thus, this method of pricing needs to be complemented by supplementary charges. 
b) Ramsey Prices 
These are based on the mark-up of price over marginal cost in inverse proportion to the 
elasticity of demand. These prices are considered the second best 
linear prices as they 
satisfy the revenue requirement with the least distortion to marginal price. 
Although the 
Ramsey rule was originally designed for pricing final goods, Laffont and Tirole 
(1996) 
argue that the same principle could be extended to include intermediate goods such as 
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network access. The main criticisms of Ramsey prices are that they discriminate between 
classes of consumers and that the calculation of these prices is very information-intensive. 
In addition, some writers such as Church and Ware (2000) emphasise the point that these 
prices are optimal only if there are no price distortions anywhere else in the economy. 
c) Simple Average Price 
In this case, every user pays the same average cost per unit. This method has no or, at least, 
only very small, transaction costs as the computations are simple and straightforward. 
However, the presence of large fixed costs causes marginal users to find the average price 
to be too high and to stop buying the product. This distortion to the optimal price makes 
intra-marginal users postpone buying the product when they find that they have to pay a 
higher price than they were willing to pay initially. 
8.3.1.2.2 Non-linear Prices 
a) Price Discrimination 
The monopolist can depart from linear pricing by charging different prices for each 
consumer based on his/her willingness to pay. As the price of the last unit sold is equal to 
its marginal cost, this form of non-linear pricing is considered efficient. However, such a 
pricing scheme is inequitable due to the fact that there is a complete transfer of consumers' 
surplus to producers. 
b) Two-parts Tariffs 
This is the most common form of multi-part pricing and occurs when the enterprise 
charges two different prices to a single customer. The tariff consists of a usage charge 
based on the marginal cost of the last unit consumed and a fixed (access) fee per unit, for 
some specific period, during which the consumer has the right to use the product. This fee 
is normally expected to be independent of the amount used by the consumer and is 
intended to cover his share in the fixed (capital) costs through a lump-sum charge. 
The main concerns with two-part prices are that they would weaken the efficient message 
of the usage charge, and that the marginal users may be driven away if they perceive the 
access fee is too high in comparison with what they are willing to pay at the margin. The 
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solution to the latter concern could be to make marginal users pay only the marginal cost 
price while less price-sensitive consumers pay a higher access fee in addition to the 
variable charge. However, this solution implies a cross-subsidisation between the different 
classes of users. 
8.3.2 THE CASE OF ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION 
Investments in electricity transmission are usually characterised as being very specific and 
indivisible (lumpy) which causes a large proportion of total transmission costs to be sunk. 
This section is concerned with how access fees would recover these costs in the context of 
electricity transmission. 
8.3.2.1 IMPORTANCE OF ACCESS FEES 
Nodal spot prices, which are based on marginal cost prices, make the revenues collected 
from operating the network insufficient to cover current investments and reinforcement of 
the system. The transmission company collects the net marginal cost income (merchandise 
surplus), which is the difference in marginal cost prices at the different points over the 
network. Rudnick et al. (1995) state that this income varies between systems but usually 
covers only 15 per cent of the required revenues of a typical transmission system with no 
line constraints. Bratonn(1997) reported that the presence of line constraints would 
increase this percentage to 25-30 per cent of the total required revenues for the 
transmission company. 
As a result, the main problem in financing the provision of transmission services is in 
dealing with the allocation of capital costs between generation and distribution companies. 
The literature contains a broad array of recommendations and practices, which are 
employed by many transmission systems for the designing of access fees. The most widely 
used is the simple method of the postage stamp where the fixed cost is averaged per unit of 
capacity for each user. However, this method ignores the optimal economic signal of the 
marginal cost price and its charges do not relate to the actual use of the transmission 
network. 
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The other alternative is to use the MW-Nfile method for determining transaction-related 
power flows. This method considers the impact of a certain transaction on the network 
flows by taking account of the magnitude, the path and the distance travelled by the 
transacted power. Lima (1996) indicates that the main criticism of this method is that it 
could be considered as 'a base case' where it does not account for the transmission reserve, 
which is the difference between the network capacity and the maximum (peak) power 
flows. 
The advantage of the MW-Nlile method in reflecting the transmission effects of a 
transaction is diminished by the limitation on its usefulness and practicality for systems 
with a large number of transactions. Some countries such as Argentina, Bolivia and Chile 
have adopted a toll charge based on the concept of 'area of influence' which corresponds 
to the lines and substations that are directly affected by the generator's output (or demand's 
load). Rudink et al. (1995) point out that this concept has a vague definition and the 
implementation of the charges has created a free-riding problem, as some companies do 
not pay any access charge while benefiting from being connected to the network. Also, the 
authors point out that generators in Chile have refused in the past to supply distant 
distribution companies as that would involve paying very high access charges. 
8.3.2.2 ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ACCESS FEES 
8.3.2.2.1 Distortion to Marginal Cost Price 
Regardless of which method is used, the optimal economic signal of nodal spot prices is 
weakened by the inclusion of access fees as part of the payments of network users. The 
concern then is not whether the access fees would distort economic efficiency but rather 
whether the magnitude of this distortion is acceptable. As indicated above, this obviously 
would depend on the method chosen for setting the access charges. The Ramsey prices are 
shown to have the least deadweight loss, but the considerable information requirement of 
this method and its apparent discrimination between different users prevent its 
acceptability by regulatory bodies. 
The two-part tariffs scheme is common practice by many transmission systems, where 
usually the fixed costs are recovered by the postage stamp charge on the 
basis of per unit 
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of capacity (or maximum demand). The immediate problem with recovering fixed costs by 
using this simple scheme is that it would affect marginal decisions. This form of charging 
may be acceptable in the regulation of public utilities, but in the case of a business with a 
spatial dimension, such as the provision of transmission services, fairness considerations 
may require that access charges be spatially differentiated. The average charge would 
clearly obscure the locational signal provided by the marginal cost price. On the other 
hand, spatially differentiated access fees may strengthen this signal if the method used for 
designing the access fees provides charges which give similar signals to those of marginal 
prices. 
8.3.2.2.2 Impact on Economic Decisions 
Whether or not the access fee is spatially differentiated, it would still impact on the 
economic decisions of the network users, especially those related to investment in 
generation. For example, large distortion may discourage a generator from investing in 
new capacity even if there is sufficient transmission capacity. Thus, the regulatory 
framework should address the important issue of who should pay the access fee. In this 
regard, there are two opposing points of views each with compelling arguments. 
The first argument, which is presented by Rudnick (1995), is that generators should pay 
the access fees, as the only way for them to reach consumers and compete is by using the 
transmission grid. This argument is also based on the reasoning that the combination of 
the generation and transmission segments of the industry has no economies of scale, which 
makes marginal cost price able to provide sufficient revenues for the combined two 
businesses. The second argument, which is presented by Green (1995), is that distribution 
companies and not generators should pay for access fees, especially if the charges are 
spatially differentiated. The reason is that generators are more responsive to spatial price 
signals and, as such, it is sufficient that they should face only the short-run marginal 
transmission costs (losses). As a result, distribution companies should pay the fixed 
charges as they are able to pass it on to final consumers, who are not expected to relocate. 
The minirnisation of distortion to efficient decisions would be related to econornIc usage of 
the network as measured by capacity and energy usage. According to Baldick (1998), the 
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charges for recovering capital costs could be levied on a variety of measurable quantities 
such as peak power generation (or demand) during a billing period, and the energy 
produced (or consumed) over a billing period. He considers peak power usage is more 
price elastic than energy usage because a user has flexibility in scheduling his peak 
demand but not in curtailing his demand over a period of time. Thus, he asserts that access 
fees based on the energy usage will produce less distortion than access fees for peak 
generation (or demand). Rudnick (1999) presented the counter argument that transmission 
assets are designed for peaking conditions, which make it reasonable to charge on the basis 
of capacity rather than energy usage. However, he also favours a scheme based on energy 
usage as a better reflective of economic use of the transmission network. 
8.3.2.2.3 Impact on Investments and Expansions 
The generation and transmission of electricity are very closely related segments of the 
electricity industry. In a vertically integrated industry, the co-ordination between the two 
segments is normally done as part of one integrated investment plan. These decisions are 
more difficult to achieve in a decentralised and unbundled environment. The capital 
expansion of generation and the location of new generation capacity depend on the 
(dis)incentives which are provided by the optimal transmission prices. 
According to Hunt and Shuttleworth (1993b), the (expected) short run marginal cost 
(SRMC), which includes losses and cost of constraints, would reflect the long run cost of 
marginal addition to the transmission capacity. Thus, in an ideal situation the 
SRMC 
equals the long run marginal cost (LRMC) at a level of output where the 
fixed cost choice 
associated with the SRMC is the optimal choice and the marginal cost pricing would 
produce investment and expansion decisions which are optimal. 
However, in practice this 
outcome may be complicated by the fact that the 
SRMC could be understated which means 
it would not necessarily equal the LRMC- 
In addition, the indivisibility Of transmission Investments would make setting access 
fees a 
source of friction between current and 
future users. Spiller (1995) points out that the 
economies of scale in transmission would make efficient expansion 
exceed the capacity 
which is required by the current users. 
It is, thus, possible that future users will free ride, 
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which may cause some of the current users, such as generators, to delay building new 
generation capacity until transmission expansion takes place. One of Spiller's suggestions, 
which is unlikely to be implemented in practice, is that future expansions be tailored to the 
needs of the current users. Assuming this suggestion is possible, it would result in 
investment which is sub-optimal. Thus, Spiller believes that the only way that fixed cost 
recovery to be de-coupled from investments is by making the expansion of the 
transmission network is fully pre-subscribed. 
8.3.3 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE TRACING METHOD 
The homogeneous nature of electricity makes it physically impossible to link a user to a 
particular transmission asset. Hence, it is difficult to determine the exact usage of each 
generator or distribution company for the purpose of allocating the capital costs of 
transmission system. According to Hogan (1997), the best application of the tracing 
method is in the allocation of fixed costs as a supplement to the marginal cost price 7. As 
shown in this section the tracing method contributes to the allocation of fixed costs by its 
ability to portion out, albeit in a notional manner, the flows on every line in the network. 
Thus, this flow-based approach would identify the usage of each generator or distribution 
company in the system's assets (i. e. transmission lines and associated overheads). 
8.3.3.1 STRATEGIES FOR SETTING ACCESS CHARGES 
Due to the presence of economies of scale in electricity transmission, the application of 
marginal cost pricing does not recover the total (variable and fixed) costs of transnuission. 
It is known that marginal pricing produces a surplus which is collected by the transmission 
company and used to cover part of its fixed costs. However, this surplus is insufficient and, 
as a result, the remaining fixed costs have to be paid for through access charges. Figure 
8.4, below, shows three possible strategies, similar to those in Bialek (1998), which the 
regulated transmission company can choose in setting these charges. The access charge 
could be based on postage stamp charges (strategy A), on tracing charges (strategy B), or 
on a combination of both (strategy Q. 
7 Although Hogan's comment referred to the tracing method as in Kirchen's approach, it is also valid for the 
more general approach of Bialek. 
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Figure 8.4: Strategies for Setting Access Charges 
Regulated Revenues of Transmission Company 
4( 
Marginal Cost Price Access Charge Strategies 
or 
Postage Stamp Tracing Tracing Postage Stamp 
(Individual) (Common) 
Strategy A is consistent with the argument that the access charge should be independent of 
the actual usage, but this strategy distorts the locational signal of the marginal cost price. 
Strategy B would preserve the locational signal (assuming tracing gives similar charges to 
those for marginal cost pricing), but this strategy implicitly assumes that spare capacity of 
the system should also be paid for through locational charges. Strategy C addresses this 
concern by dividing the access charge into two components: a tracing-based individual 
(locational) charge and a common charge, for spare capacity, based on the postage stamp. 
The tracing charge (in Strategies B and Q is based on the share of each generator in the 
peak power flows of each line. Since the capacity of all the lines is designed for peaking 
conditions, the individual charge would reflect the generators' maximum usage of the 
network assets. In addition, any transrnission system keeps spare capacity which benefits 
all users by preserving the security of the network and meeting demand increases without 
the need for continuous system expansion. Thus, paying for these common benefits would 
require charges for the spare capacity to be non-spatial and postage stamp based. As a 
result, in strategy C, the costs allocated to a generator could be divided into two 
components. The first component is an individual cost component, or the maximum usage 
or 
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of the lines by each generator, which is allocated on the basis of the tracing charge, and the 
second component is a common cost component which is allocated on the basis of the 
postage stamp charge. 
For strategy A (postage stamp charges), all the information that is required is the fixed 
cost, which needs to be allocated to the generators, and also the maximum generation 
capacity of each generator (i. e. the generator's size). Since this information is available to 
the transmission company, applying strategy A is straightforward where the network fixed 
costs are allocated between generators based on their relevant size. For strategies B (and 
Q, equation 8.3 implies that knowing the cost of each line is necessary for calculating the 
share of each generator in the cost of each line. In strategy B, the access charge for a 
generator is calculated according to equation 8.3, below, where this charge is equal: 
I Generator's share in a line peak power flow (in MW) 
X cost of the line (in SR), 
all lines Total peak power flow over the line (in MW) 
(Equation 8.3) 
In strategy C, the cost of each line is divided into used and unused (spare capacity) parts. 
The individual charge covers the share of the generator in the cost of the used part of the 
line. This charge can be calculated by applying equation 8.3 using, in this strategy, line 
cost which is proportional to the used part of the line instead of the total cost of the line, as 
in strategy B. The sum of the individual charges over all generators equals the costs of the 
used part of the network, which leaves the costs of the unused (spare capacity) part 
unrecovered. Recovering the costs of this part can be done in the same fashion as in 
strategy A by using postage stamp charges, which is based on the size of the generator. 
Since the transmission company is expected to have the information regarding the cost of 
each line and thus the fixed cost of the network, calculating the access charges for either 
one of the three strategies is, in practice, straightforward. In this research study, however, 
constructing Table 8.6 on the basis of actual data was impossible as the cost of each 
transmission line was not available. To overcome this difficulty, the researcher used the 
available data for line resistance as a proxy for the line cost. 
This is an acceptable solution 
because the cost of transmission line is proportional to both the line resistance and length 
(Bialek and Kattuman, 1999). 
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Using the coefficient for line resistance, instead of line cost, in equation 8.3, resulted in the 
number 2930 which is the sum over all lines as indicated by the equation. To make this 
number more relevant to the issue of cost allocation; this number can be thought of as a 
monetary value (i. e. 2,930bn SR) for the fixed costs. Assuming 2,930bn SR as a value for 
these costs is a reasonable assumption considering that the financial statement of SCECO- 
Central company in 1998 indicates that its combined transmission and distribution fixed 
assets were worth 8,802bn SR. 
It is important to emphasis that the figure 2,930bn SR is not intended to estimate the actual 
value for the transmission fixed cost of SCECO-Central company. The general objective 
here is to provide a realistic example of how the access charge could be calculated using 
the tracing and postage stamp schemes for a transmission network. Using each one of the 
three strategies outlined above, table 8.6 shows how 2,930bn SR is allocated between the 
sixteen generators. (The same calculation can be carried out for the 109 load centres. ) 
Table 8.6 Access CharRes for the Usan of the Network (in Million SR) 
Gs Maximum Strategy (A): Strategy (13): Strategy (C): 
Generation 
Output 
I(MW) 
Postage 
Stamp 
(SR) 
Tracing 
(SR) 
Individual 
(Tracing) 
(SR) 
Common 
(Postage Stamp) 
(SR) 
Total 
(SR) 
G1 250 107.94 
1 
56.42 12.13 84.72 96.85 
G2 10 4.31 2.43 0.52 3.38 3.91 
G3 50 21.58 12.41 2.66 16.94 19.61 
G4 1478 638.18 333.55 71.72 500.86 572.58 
G5 349 150.69 1.08 0.23 118.27 118.50 
G6 588 253.89 623.30 134.02 199.26 333.28 
G7 52 22.45 0 0 17.62 17.62 
G8 416 179.62 132.97 28.59 140.97 169.56 
G9 416 179.62 31.22 6.71 140.97 147.68 
G10 778 335.93 525.37 112.96 263.65 376.61, 
G11 578 249.57 223.93 48.14 195.87 244.02 
G12 r. A 9 235.32 45.23 9.72 184.69 194.41 
G13 600 259.07 43.85 9.43 203.32 212.76 
G14 486 209.84 586.45 126.09 164.69 290.79 
G15 90 38.86 166.27 35.75 30.49 66.25 
G16 101 43.61 146.03 31.40 34.22 65.62ý 
Total 6787 2930 2930 630 2300 2930 
%- F- 1001 100 22 78 1001 
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It is worth noting that obtaining the figure 2,930bn SR from applying equation 8.3 means 
that the construction of table 8.6 should begin with strategy B rather than strategy A. In 
strategy B (as well the individual charge in strategy Q, the relevant share of each generator 
in the flow on each line deterrnme how the cost of the line is allocated between the sixteen 
generators. In strategy A, dividing the fixed cost of 2,930bn SR by the total generation 
capacity of 6787 MW requires each generator to pay 431,708 SR per MW of capacity as an 
access fee. Multiplying this number by the generation capacity of each generator results in 
the total access charges (as shown in the third column of the table), which each generator is 
supposed to pay over the years it is remains connected to the grid. 
This access fee is usually paid on an annual basis, which makes it possible to adjust the 
charge depending on the increase or decrease in the existing total generation capacity. This 
means that the entry of a new generator may reduce the share of already connected 
generators, making it much easier to finance the investments in the network expansion 
with more generators rather than less. In addition, it enhances competition where the 
incumbent generators can benefit from the entry of new generators. 
Clearly, the access fee in the case of strategy A is based on the relative size of each 
generator, which means that two generators with the same generation capacity would pay 
the same access charge. This charge would ignore the generators' locations in the network 
and their actual use of the network, as their output may reach different loads at different 
points on the network. For example, G3 (located in the eastern region) and G7 (located in 
the central region) have similar generation capacity and pay similar access fees despite the 
fact that G3 uses the network more extensively to reach the load centres which are mostly 
located in the central region. The acceptability of these charges is based on the assumption 
that access charges should not be spatially differentiated, as such fees are intended to 
charge the generator only for having the right to access the network, regardless of location. 
Strategy B, in the fourth column of the Table 8.6, shows that the access charges are related 
to location rather than size. For example, G6 pays the highest access charge even though 
this generator is not the largest generator. Although this strategy provides a spatial signal, 
the allocation of the entire fixed costs based only on location 
ignores spare capacity as a 
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common benefit. Also, this strategy would benefit free riders such as G7, unless the 
regulatory rules require such users to pay a fee that is compatible with that paid by other 
generators within the same area or zone. So obviously this strategy is highly suitable for a 
system with very low spare capacity and no free riding problem. 
The advantage of strategy C is that the combination of individual and common charges 
would also require that a free-rider, such as G7, to pay at least for the benefits of being 
connected to the grid. The last column of the table indicates that charges in both strategies 
C and B are similar when common charges are included. This is obviously a direct result of 
the fact that this network is over-built (or under-utilised) with 78 per cent of the total 
capacity of the network being largely unused. This means that strategy C is useful for the 
more common case of having systems with a reasonably acceptable level of spare capacity. 
Thus, using this strategy will in effect transform the transmission pricing from two-part 
tariffs to three-part tariffs (i. e. variable charge, individual fixed charge and common fixed 
charge). 
The choice between the three strategies for setting the access charge could be partly 
influenced by the existence, or the lack, of large excess spare capacity. Although some 
generators may find these charges to be too high, having an over-built network has the 
advantage of providing some assurance to private generators that they will not be 
constrained-off due to line congestion. This would give private investors a higher degree of 
certainty in predicting their future cash flows, which means that the presence of an over- 
built network could be useful, especially during the early years of restructuring and 
privatisation. 
8.3.3.2 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION 
The important implication of the existence of large excess capacity in the transmission 
network is that the tracing method might be unsuitable for setting access charges. 
However, a qualification to this conclusion needs to be made by noting that the existence 
of large excess transmission capacity is the exception rather than the norm. 
In the case of 
this network, which represents most of the transmission networks in 
Saudi Arabia, such 
excess capacity is expected to be temporary. 
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The completion of these regional transmission networks is recent, taking place only from 
the mid 1980s onwards. These modem systems benefited greatly during the oil boom 
period from direct government funding, which is unlikely to reoccur. Notwithstanding the 
continuous growth in electricity demand, the pnvatisation of the electricity industry would 
cause future investment decisions to be based more on commercial considerations than 
before. Hence, whether the tracing method is chosen depends on how much of the existing 
capacity would be utilised. This would indicate that the postage stamp might become the 
preferable choice, especially in the early years of the industry's privatisation. 
The simplicity of the average (e. g. postage stamp) charges is clearly a very attractive 
advantage, but we should be wary of methods whose simplicity would come at the expense 
of economic efficiency. In the context of choosing cost allocation methods, Baumol and 
Willig (1983) caution that " one is driven to the suspicion that (apparent) ease of 
calculation threatens to become an over-riding consideration taking precedence over any 
consequences for social welfare and economic efficiency" (p. 21). This concern needs to 
be taken seriously when choosing simple charges such as those based on the postage stamp 
method in setting access fees, because such fees could have an adverse impact on the 
marginal users' willingness to pay. 
The marginal users' willingness to pay is expected to be affected by any cost allocation 
method. The issue is, then, whether the tracing method has a less distorting effect on users' 
decisions than the postage stamp. It is possible that some users, especially intra-marginal 
users, may find the charges based on the tracing method more acceptable as they reflect 
fairly the usage of the system. Hence, these charges would be considered higher, but fairer, 
by users who would otherwise either leave the market or, at least, bypass the transmission 
network 8. The tracing method is not immune from criticisms such as those raised by Ring 
and Read (1996b) against methods which recover fixed costs by using charges which are 
related to the operational (i. e. variable) usage of the network. 
8 As regards this latter choice, Rudnick and Raineri (1997) reported that some generators, 
in Chile, decided to 
bypass the transmission network through building their own transmission lines. 
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This criticism extends to tracing charges where such charges are clearly related to the day- 
to-day operation of the system. In this case, the access fees would be directly linked to the 
flow patterns over the network. This is in contradiction with the objective of setting access 
fees, which is to grant the user the right to use the grid regardless of whether he actually 
uses it or not. This would imply that the introduction of a two-part tariffs create two 
different and complementary types of product: usage and access. However, Laffont and 
Tirole (1996) believe that access charges which are related to the use that is made of the 
access, have the advantage of reflecting demand considerations. 
CONCLUSION 
Beyond the usefulness of the tracing method in the allocation of variable costs (losses) of 
electricity transmission, the method has two potential applications. The first application is 
related to trade in electricity between networks of different countries. The second is a 
contribution to the issue of allocation of fixed costs in electricity transmission. Some of the 
advantages of the method, such as transparency and practicality with limited distortion to 
economic efficiency, would make it an alternative worth serious consideration. 
The application to cross-border trade shows that the tracing method is very useful in 
presenting more unifying transmission pricing method among different international 
networks. The ideal marginal pricing method is impractical because of its information 
requirements, especially those which are commercially sensitive. Also, the method faces 
additional difficulty in facilitating international trade between countries due to national 
sovereignty considerations. The simple method of the postage stamp may serve the 
purpose of practicality, but it grossly ignores the concerns for allocative economic 
efficiency. 
The application of the tracing method to the design of access fees to recover fixed cost 
shows that the method is able to link the charges of users with a fair approximation of their 
usage of the transmission assets. However, the method faces two objections: firstly, its 
access charges are directly linked to the day-to-day operation of the system; and secondly, 
the method is less useful for a transmission system with very large excess capacity. These 
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objections and the inability of marginal cost pricing to recover capital cost of transmission 
would make it likely that in practice access fees will be based on postage stamp charges. 
In sum, the main rationale behind using tracing in transmission pricing is that its 
practicality would promote more trade, which offsets the m inimum loss in economic 
efficiency. The over-simplicity and practicality of average pricing (e. g. postage stamp) 
may still cause it to be preferred over the tracing method, and over the marginal method for 
that matter. The bottom line in passing judgement on which method to choose depends on 
which would result in the highest net benefits from more trade in electricity, that could 
offset any shortcoming it may have. 
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CRAPTER NINE 
Conclusions and Summary 
"Good economics is a balance of theory and abstraction on the one hand 
against hard reality on the other" (Christopher Huhne, 1990, p. 14). 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The philosophy of the free market is one of the official principles guiding Saudi Arabia's 
economic development strategies, but despite this there has been much emphasis on the 
need for economic planning. In addition to market failure rationale, the argument for 
economic planning has been based on the necessity to develop the country's human and 
physical capital. Planning has also been beneficial in redistributing oil revenues, which are 
the main source of national wealth, and prioritising the government's own spending 
conu, nitments. 
The reduction in the reliance on oil revenues and diversification of the economic-base, 
mainly through industrialisation, have become the cornerstones of the development plans. 
Paradoxically, achievement of these objectives remains dependent on the availability of 
revenues from oil itself, which are subject to fluctuation and long-term uncertainties. 
However, the developments in domestic and global economic conditions have led to 
serious reconsideration of the extent of the public sector role in the economy. 
In the face of high population growth and competing priorities, greater private sector 
participation could assist the country in allocating its resources more efficiently. Thus, it is 
not surprising that privatisation has become a government 'strategic option' in the move to 
increase the efficiency of the economy and reduce the size of the public sector. However, 
the success of the process depends not only on how seriously the private sector is in taking 
the initiative, but also on the official commitment to it. The recent government efforts 
which aim at introducing legal and institutional reforms, and the (so far) disciplined public 
spending, despite the upsurge in oil revenue seem very encouraging. 
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In the following sections, the focus is on the case of electricity industry, which is already 
undergoing the process of restructuring and privatisation. Particularly, these sections deal 
with electricity transmission pricing which is one of key issues that has to be addressed 
during the early stage of the process. The main section provides a comparison between 
three transmission pricing methods and evaluates their relevance to the Saudi Arabian 
electricity industry. The chapter ends with a discussion of policy issues and related 
recommendations that need to be considered in context of the restructuring process. 
Finally, the chapter suggests some important topics for further research. 
9.2 AN EVALUATION OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY CASE 
Saudi Arabia's experience of privatisation is limited and could be described, at best, as 
partial privatisation. What makes the electricity industry different from the other sectors is 
that it is the only sector which has been officially approved for full privatisation. Also the 
nature of government involvement in this industry has changed considerably over the 
decades from very limited supervision and regulation to extensive 'partnership' with the 
private sector. This was due to a sudden surge in electricity demand caused by energy- 
intensive industrialisation and rapid urbanisation. The reversal of this situation is the 
ultimate objective of the current restructuring plan, which aims at making the industry 
operates again as a profit-making enterprise. 
The choice between different paths to privatising an industry is a critical factor in the 
success of the whole process. The Saudi Arabian electricity industry has had to choose 
between two proposals. The first proposal was for privatising the vertically-integrated 
regional companies, SCECOs. The second proposal considered privatisation, initially in 
the generation segment, as part of a broad and multi-stage restructuring programme. 
Although the second proposal requires a longer time to achieve full privatisation, choosing 
this approach was a prudent decision for three reasons. Firstly, the ownership mix and the 
actual operation of the SCECOs make the privatisation of each one separately impractical. 
Hence, the second proposal is, in fact, a gradual privatisation of these regional companies 
on an activity-by-activity rather than on a region-by-region basis. Secondly, the first 
proposal makes the introduction of competition and choice more difficult, the contentious 
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issue of third party access being a case in point. Thirdly, the second proposal provides the 
necessary time to introduce the appropriate institutional and legal reforms, which are very 
much needed. 
Thus, the plan anticipates that the industry's new structure will include vertical separation 
of generation, transmission and distribution. The aim of the plan is to transform the 
industry from a single-buyer model to a power pool model, where electricity would be 
traded on an hourly basis in a spot market. This over-ambitious plan, especially for a 
developing country, is a formidable challenge, as its success would depend on many 
factors including the consistency and continuity of the implementation. 
Opening up the generation and distribution activities to private companies requires the 
introduction of fair and transparent rules for solving cost allocation problems. More 
specifically, the issue of transmission pricing increases in importance as the industry is 
further unbundled and moved closer to a market-based structure. Transmission pricing is 
essential for facilitating the emergence of competitive electricity markets as well as 
promoting efficient trade-offs between the expansion of the transmission network and the 
siting of new generation capacity. 
Thus, the correct transmission price not only encourages competition through the provision 
of a level playing field but also enhances productive and allocative efficiency. These are 
important factors especially for a vast country such as Saudi Arabia where most of the 
electricity demand is in regions which are far from primary energy sources. Also, the 
completion of a nation-wide natural gas network, in parallel to that of electricity, will 
highlight the significance of transportation costs for both power generators and industrial 
consumers. 
9.3 OBJECTIVES OF TRANSMISSION PRICING METHODS 
The recent increasing interest by theorists and practitioners alike in the issue of 
transmission pricing developed from the necessity to find an efficient and practicable way 
of allocating transmission costs. In contrast to the case of a vertically-integrated industry, 
these two objectives are difficult to reconcile in an unbundled structure, as transmission 
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9.3.1 Promotion of the efficient day-to-day operation of the bulk power market 
This objective implies that any proposed transmission pricing scheme should be judged not 
only by how much its charges reflect optimal dispatching, but also by how these charges 
are incorporated into the trading mechanism of the electricity market. Thus, the practical 
question in a liberalised structure is whether it is possible to create a competitive electricity 
market that induces optimal dispatching of generators. 
This research has illustrated how marginal cost pricing of transmission losses results in 
efficient dispatch where it modifies the generation cost of each generator to minimise total 
costs. Also, it has illustrated how the tracing and postage stamp charges impact on the 
merit order of the generators. The postage stamp charges are weak in incorporating 
transmission costs into economic dispatching as all generators are considered as if they 
were at the same location. 
The tracing method produces charges which are similar to those of the marginal pricing 
method, especially for zonal charges. Since transmission losses are small, in comparison 
with generation costs, the likelihood that the tracing charges would result in incorrect 
dispatching is very limited. In fact, this research has illustrated that even when the tracing 
charges have altered the optimal dispatch, the increase in total production costs was very 
small, amounting to only 0.47 per cent. This is equivalent to an increase of only 0.27 per 
cent in the cost of delivering one MW of electricity to consumption centres. 
Three important issues are relevant to this discussion. Firstly, the actual practices in 
electricity markets show that the dispatcher relies on generators bids which are not 
necessarily reflective of their real marginal operating costs. Secondly, when trading 
arrangements are made on an ex ante basis, both the marginal and tracing charges do not 
necessarily reflect the actual dispatch. Conversely, the ex post marginal charges reflect the 
actual operating conditions, but are volatile. Hence, it could be argued that the slight 
departure of tracing charges from the actual dispatch can be accepted as long as their 
stability induces higher trade liquidity in the market. Thirdly, in an ideal situation, 
competition is enhanced when generators are rewarded with negative marginal charges as a 
result of the reduction in power flows and consequent losses due to their trading with loads 
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in expensive areas. Although tracing charges are zero in this case, this is more preferable 
than the positive charges of postage stamp which do not provide any incentives for such 
generators. 
9.3.2 Signalling of locational advantages for investment in generation and demand 
Generation companies and energy-intensive customers have partially determine their long- 
term investments on the relative cost of transporting different energy sources including 
electricity itself. It is expected that transporting gas is cheaper than transmitting electricity 
(Newbery, 1999). However, incorrect accounting of these costs would lead to suboptimal 
decisions by both generators and large industrial consumers. 
Generators may locate near consumption centres as that would reduce their transmission 
costs, but this is not always economically efficient as the cost of the alternative, which is to 
locate near fuel sources and transmit electricity to consumption centres, must be 
considered. Assuming the cost of transporting these sources is efficiently priced, the 
appraisal of these decisions depends on the usage of correct transmission prices for 
electricity. 
Obviously, marginal cost pricing of transmission has the advantage of reflecting the exact 
differences in the transmission cost between locations. The postage stamp charges, on the 
other hand, fail to reflect any spatial signal and may even give the opposite signal. Thus, it 
is unfair that generators pay the same transmission charge regardless of their proximity to 
consumption centres. The tracing method may not give the exact signals as marginal 
pricing does, but as the research has shown, tracing gives similar signals. This is indicated 
by the average correlation coefficient, for marginal and tarcing charges, of 75 per cent. The 
research study shows that this similarity is even higher (82 per cent) for zonal charges for 
demand centres indicating that the tracing is more reflective of costs for a network which is 
spread over large geographical areas. This is obviously very relevant to the case of Saudi 
Arabia, especially as almost 90 per cent of the population are concentrated in cities and 
towns (i. e. zones) which are separated by relatively large distances. 
247 
From a regulatory point of view, there are two issues worth consideration in terms of 
transmission pricing. Firstly, while small generators are price-takers, large generators or 
generation companies with several stations have the incentives and the ability to impact on 
the power flows of the system which can give them favourable charges (Green, 1997). 
Thus, limited competition in generation gives a few companies the opportunity to game the 
market, which would diminish the usefulness of spatial signalling. Secondly, a location 
premium may become necessary to promote investment in distant generation. Remote and 
less developed regions with low-income populations may find it difficult to pay high retail 
prices that incorporate transmission charges. Conversely, generators may also find it costly 
to supply such regions without some kind of subsidy. Clearly such a subsidy will cause a 
distortion of the market signals. However, correct transmission prices will minimise this 
distortion as the value of the subsidy would have relevance to the actual costs and is based 
on a well-defined standard. 
9.3.3 Signalling of the need for investment in the transmission system 
The investments in generation and transmission need to be very closely co-ordinated as the 
available capacity of transmission influences directly the siting of new generation. 
Consequently, the vertical separation of transmission and generation places transmission 
pricing at the heart of this relationship. The presence of large differences in nodal prices 
would signal the need to reduce transmission losses and congestion through building 
additional transmission capacity. 
Marginal cost pricing is able to reflect well the very small locational differences which 
result in optimal investment in the network. The postage stamp charges entirely ignore 
transmission cost differentials, which leads to incorrect investment decisions. As the 
tracing method understates the charges for transmission losses, the tracing prices would 
give weaker spatial signals than the marginal prices would. This could lead to under- 
investment in the transmission network and suboptimal siting of generation, which could 
result in more than necessary generation in the eastern region. However, this research has 
shown that this signal becomes stronger for zonal than nodal charges. This would also 
make it more suitable for signalling the need for new links between different zones (or 
interconnected countries) rather than signalling the need for investment within each zone. 
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There are three observations worth mentioning in the context of this important objective. 
Firstly, in practice, decisions regarding transmission investments are guided but not 
necessarily decided by nodal prices. Secondly, as the transmission company is normally a 
regulated entity, the decisions on investment expansion are based mostly on regulatory 
considerations. Thirdly, even if the network expansion was optimally determined, 
transmission investment is indivisible (King, 1996). Consequently, network expansion is 
done in stepwise fashion which normally results in an overbuilt transmission system. 
9.3.4 Compensation of the owners of existing transmission assets 
This is a crucial objective that any transmission pricing should satisfy because revenue 
adequacy is a necessary condition for economic efficiency. The transmission network 
owners are not expected to invest in more capacity if their incurred costs are not 
guaranteed to be recovered. Hence, the choice of transmission pricing scheme must strike a 
delicate balance between this ob ective and the other equally desirable objectives. j 
This research shows that while marginal pricing of transmission leads to over-recovery of 
variable transmission costs (Chapter Six, Table 6.2), it is widely known to under-recover 
fixed (sunk) costs. This makes it necessary to rely on some form of multi-part tariff, which 
usually involves usage (variable) and access (fixed) charges. The drawback of this two-part 
tariff is that the efficient economic signal of marginal prices is weakened due to the 
presence of significant sunk costs, which are normally recovered through postage stamp 
charges. 
Postage stamp and tracing methods recover the exact total costs as both starts with the 
assumption that there is a well-defined way of allocating transmission costs (Hogan, 1997). 
The postage stamp allocates the total (variable and fixed) costs based on the size of the 
generator or distribution company. The tracing method is able to allocate the total costs 
based on 'the extent of use', which has the advantage of incorporating locational signals 
into cost recovery. This research has pointed out that the usefulness of the tracing method 
in recovering fixed costs is limited for an excessively overbuilt network. However, this is a 
temporary situation, especially in a developing country, and, hence, cannot be generalised. 
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9.3.5 Simplicity and transparency 
The acceptability of any transmission pricing depends on how much the users understand 
the assumption on which charges are based. Simplicity and transparency are not considered 
strong features of marginal charges, which are based on many assumptions and complex 
calculations. This research has illustrated how transmission charges can be positive, 
negative or zero depending on which generator is designated as the marginal generator. So 
the marginal prices optimally reflect transmission costs but they also produce volatile 
charges, which are not always understood by the participants. The usual suggestion is that 
using the average of marginal charges, over some specified period (e. g. one year), might 
simplify the charges. 
If the marginal method is known for its complexity, the postage stamp method is known 
for its simplicity. In addition to being straightforward, the calculation of averages has no or 
only a very small, transaction cost. The tracing method can also be considered simple, but 
it requires the initial construction of an algorithm, which takes only a very short time even 
for a large network. The logic behind the calculation of tracing charges is simple as it is 
based on the notion that nodal inflows are shared proportionally by the outflows. 
Nevertheless, the advantage of simplicity should not be the overriding factor above 
economic efficiency considerations. 
9.3.6 Political implementation 
The implementation of transmission pricing depends greatly on whether the pricing rules 
are in place prior to opening the market for competition. This may not necessarily 
guarantee successful implementation but it would minimise the potential for disputes. Any 
changes in an existing transmission pricing rule would result in winners and losers. So 
even if the new pricing rule is both simple and economically desirable, influential losers 
may succeed in blocking it (Green, 1998a). 
One of the difficulties facing the implementation of transmission charges on the basis of 
marginal cost pricing is that this method results in charges with very large differentials. 
Theoretically, this indicates the advantage of the marginal pricing as it reflects the impact 
of the user's actions on the system costs. In practice, however, distant generation and 
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distribution companies, which perceive charge differential as disadvantageous, usually 
raise objections. Thus, it is suggested that reducing these differences by a specific factor 
would make it less objectionable although it likely to weaken the economic signals of the 
charges. 
On the other hand, the postage stamp charging scheme is more politically acceptable as it 
is easier to enforce and more understandable. Although, this method produces uneconomic 
and also unfair charges, users normally do not object as the difference between what they 
expect to pay and what they are actually paying is relatively small. Whether the tracing 
method is politically implementable remains an open question. However, the fairness of 
the allocation of transmission costs and the low differentials in charges should make it 
more acceptable than the marginal. Nevertheless, it seems that charging on the basis of the 
postage stamp method will remain common practice unless the concern for losses in 
economic efficiency becomes more earnest. 
To summarise, these six objectives could be categorised into two main objectives: 
economic efficiency (the first three) and implementation (the remaining three). It is worth 
noting that the marginal and postage stamp methods give almost the opposite outcomes. 
While the marginal is very strong in meeting economic efficiency objectives, its weakness 
is in implementation. The postage stamp is very strong in terms of implementation, but it is 
very weak on the grounds of economic efficiency. The tracing method might prove, 
especially with more extensive data, to be a good compromise between the two, by 
satisfying the condition of implementation combined with a reasonable account of 
economic efficiency. 
The conclusion of this research is that marginal pricing should be given priority, especially 
as its implementation can be less difficult in a newly-restructured industry, such as that of 
Saudi Arabia. When transmission pricing rules are known at an early stage of the process, 
the system users would have less incentive to object when the electricity market is already 
established. As there is an inclination to choose simplicity and implementation, in the form 
of the postage stamp method, over complexity and economic efficiency, in the form of 
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marginal pricing, this research draws attention to the fact that compromise, in the form of 
the tracing method, could be possible. 
9.4 POLICY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
There follows a list of policy issues and recommendations which have arisen from this 
research study. 
1) There are currently major institutional and regulatory reforms proposed for the Saudi 
Arabian economy. The consistency and continuity of these reforms are necessary 
ingredients of a suitable climate for domestic and foreign investors, as well as for the 
long-term success of the reform itself. More importantly, the reform of a particular 
sector does not take place in isolation from the rest of the reforms in the economy. For 
instance, progress in restructuring the electricity industry is closely dependent on the 
presence of a well-developed financial market and a transparent regulatory system. 
2) Although privatisation has been a major reform objective for many years, the 
translation of this objective into reality has been less advanced than expected. Thus, 
privatisation initiatives need to include specific timetables, as that would establish 
accountability and distance the process from short-term government budgetary 
conditions. 
3) The electricity industry is a capital-intensive enterprise which requires highly skilled 
labour. Hence, privatisation can have a negative impact on the employment of Saudi 
Arabian nationals. This would create a potential for conflict between the objectives of 
Saudisation and privatisation. Incremental approach to hiring and firing of employees, 
especially in the initial years, and well-designed training programmes, would minimise 
such impacts. 
4) The restructuring and privatisation of the electricity industry should result in lower and 
cost-based prices through competition and choice in as many parts of the industry as 
possible. Privatisation with no credible competition may lead to higher prices which 
not only hinder the objective of industrialisation but also have a negative distributional 
effect. 
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5) Restructuring of the electricity industry requires regulatory involvement, as there are 
high incentives for rent seeking behaviour and monopolistic power in such an industry. 
Also, the opportunity given to large consumers to choose their suppliers should be 
extended as soon as possible to small consumers, who as captive consumers may end 
up subsidising those large consumers. 
6) Although there is no shortage of domestic private wealth, foreign investment would 
bring to the Saudi electricity industry not only finance but also know-how, managerial 
skills and expertise. This investment comes in the form of IPP and variants of BOOT 
power projects, which have the advantage of raising cheaper sources of finance than 
the government or even local commercial banks would. However, these schemes are 
associated with high prices due mainly to their high sensitivity to the foreign exchange 
risk and to the uncertainty about rules for setting electricity tariffs and the legal system. 
7) An important lesson that Saudi Arabia can learn from international experiences of 
transmission pricing is that not only should the rules be predictable and transparent, but 
more importantly they should be announced in advance of the electricity market 
becoming operational. This is necessary to limit the potential sources of dispute, as 
changing the rules in the middle of the game would create objections and could even 
impede the efficiency of the market itself. 
8) The concentration of natural gas in the eastern region and the aim to link the country's 
regions with both electricity and natural gas networks highlights the importance of 
transportation costs for generators. Also, some hydrocarbon and other energy-intensive 
industries may find it advantageous to locate at the western coast of the country, which 
is nearer to their European and African markets. In addition to transportation costs, 
these industries may consider having their own power generators, in which case 
efficient decisions between these alternatives would be dependent on the availability of 
4correct' transmission prices. 
9) Having a single nationwide distribution company makes it politically unfeasible to 
have residential electricity consumers paying regionally differentiated prices. As the 
restructuring plan envisages that the industry will include regional private distribution 
companies, locational differences can feed into retail prices through transmission 
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prices. Ignoring these differences would lead consumers in regions with low (high) 
marginal transmission cost, such as the eastern (central or western) region, to face 
higher (lower) prices than necessary, resulting in too little (much) electricity 
consumption. In addition, neglecting consumers' responses to real time prices would 
create incomplete electricity market which could result in inefficient outcomes. 
10) Saudi Arabia can benefit from the GCC interconnection on two fronts: firstly, 
additional sources of cheap generation could put positive pressure on the Saudi 
electricity industry to improve its performance. Secondly, trading in an electricity spot 
market requires the use of financial instruments. Thus, the establishment of a pool for 
GCC power would open the way for traders in the Saudi electricity industry to have 
access to the more liberal financial markets, such as that of Bahrain. 
9.5 FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following is a summary of suggested topics of relevance to this research study, which 
need to be explored further. 
1) More definite conclusions can be drawn if similar studies are applied to other 
networks. Thus, the generalisation of the results can be even more reliable especially if 
larger networks are used. 
2) As the network used in this research is excessively overbuilt, the used data reflect only 
transmission losses. Thus, further research may be needed to consider the Impact of 
line congestion on transmission prices using the different pricing methods. 
3) Cost-benefit analysis of whether investment in a generator near a gas field versus 
investment in one near a consumption centre might give different outcomes using the 
different electricity transmission pricing methods. 
4) Introducing market rules to electricity has resulted in some calls for the pricing of 
ancillary services such as reactive power, which is the power supplied by generators for 
maintaining the stability of the transmission system. It would be useful to investigate 
the economics of allocating this cost using the marginal and tracing methods. 
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APPENDIX A: 
Glossary 
This thesis focuses mainly on the subject of transmission pricing which is an area of 
growing interest for both economists and electrical engineers. Due to the Interdisciplinary 
nature of this subject, it is appropriate to provide a glossary of the terms which commonly 
used in the fields of economics and electrical engineering. The following references were 
very useful in compiling this glossary: 
1) Banks, F. (1999) Energy Economics: a Modem Introduction, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Boston. 
2) Felak, R.; Poray, A.; Sheble, G. and Wong, P. (1996) Glossary of Terms and 
Definitions Concerning Electric Power Transmission System Access and Wheeling, 
The IEEE, New Jersey. 
3) Nicholson, W. (1998) NEcroeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions, The 
Dryden Press, Fort Worth. 
Allocative efficiency: the condition achieved when the prices of goods supplied to the 
market are equal to their marginal costs of supply, which means that goods and services are 
allocated to the consumers who value those goods most highly, as indicated by their 
willingness to pay for them. Thus, at these prices it is not possible to rearrange the outputs 
of an economy and make one consumer better off without making another worse off. 
Ancillary services: those services provided by generators for maintaining reliable 
operation of the transmission system, including voltage control, frequency control etc. 
Arbitrage: the act of buying an item (cheaply) in one market and selling it at a higher 
price in another market, resulting in a nsk-free profit from the price differential between 
the two markets. 
Asymmetric information: the difference in information held by the buyer and the seller 
about a potential transaction or commercial arrangement. 
Averch-Johnson effect: the condition which results when the regulator sets the allowed 
rate-of-return above the cost of capital, causing the utility to use more capital than 
if it 
were unregulated (i. e. over-capitalisation). 
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Bai al salam: an Islamic form of sale contract in which the price is paid in advance and the 
goods are delivered in the future. This deferred-delivery sale is similar to a forward 
contract where delivery of the product is in the future in exchange for payment on the spot 
market. 
BOO/BOOT: acronyms for Build-Own-Operate (BOO) and Build-Own-Operate-Transfer 
(BOOT) which are methods for encouraging private sector participation in the electricity 
industry. Under these schemes, a project company is set up to plan, finance under limited 
recourse, design, construct, and operate generation projects for a specified period of time. 
Consumer surplus: the difference between the total value consumers receive from the 
consumption of a particular product and the total amount they are willing to pay for the 
product. Consumer surplus is usually measured by the area under the compensated demand 
curve and above the market price. 
Constrained-off generator: the generator which, despite having a favourable ranking in 
the merit order schedule, is excluded from being dispatched due to congestion on 
transmission lines. 
Contestable market: a market where firms can enter or exist freely without incurring sunk 
costs. Thus, this market is subject to 'hit-and-run' entry and exit resulting in zero economic 
profit even in a natural monopoly situation. 
Co-operative game: a game in which players can negotiate binding contracts that allow 
them to plan and employ joint strategies. 
Day-ahead market: a market which involves trading of multi-hour electricity blocks for 
delivery during the following day. 
Deadweight loss: the reduction in total surplus (i. e. consumers' surplus and producers' 
surplus) due to the restriction on the output of a product at a level below the optimum 
efficient level. 
Demand-side management: the identification and implementation of initiatives that 
improve the use of existing generation capacity by modifying the characteristics of the 
demand for electricity. This usually involves a mix of pricing and conservation strategies 
that aim at increasing the incentives for a more efficient use of electricity. 
Derivative: a financial instrument, traded on or off an exchange, the price of which is 
directly derived from the value of one or more underlying securities, commodities, or any 
agreed upon pricing index or arrangement. 
Disintegration (or unbundling): the functional separation of a vertically integrated utility 
into smaller, individually owned business units. This means that the generation, 
transmission, distribution, and metering and supply become vertically separated. 
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Distribution company: the company responsible for constructing and maintaining the low 
voltage distribution lines connecting the transmission network (i. e. high voltage) to the final customer. 
Economic dispatch: the allocation of total generation requirements between different 
power plants with the minimisation of total system costs through consideration of both 
marginal generating costs and marginal transmission costs as well as the system's physical 
constraints. 
Economic profit: the difference between revenues and costs, including opportunity costs. The consideration of the opportunity costs, of the best available alternative, is very helpful in the distinguishing of economic profit from accounting profit. 
Embedded cost: the total cost based on the historical cost of the factors of production used 
to produce a given level of output. This normally does not relate to the current market 
prices for the factors used, but rather to the costs that existed when the factors were 
actually purchased. 
Ex ante/ ex post: the distinction between that which is planned (ex ante) and that which 
actually occurs (expost). 
Fixed costs: the costs that do not change as the level of output changes in the short run. 
These costs include contractual conu-nitments and investment-related costs to which the 
firm is already committed. 
Forward contract: a supply contract between a buyer and seller, whereby the buyer is 
obligated to take delivery and the seller is obligated to provide delivery of a fixed amount 
of electricity. The price can be determined in the present, or it can be related to the spot 
price at the date when the transaction is to be tenninated, or just before that time; the 
payment is due in full at the time of, or following, delivery. 
Future contract: a supply contract between a buyer and seller, whereby the buyer is 
obligated to take delivery and the seller is obligated to provide delivery of a fixed amount 
of electricity at a predetermined price at a specified location, while the payments are 
settled daily. 
Heat rate: the number of British Thermal Units (Btu) needed to obtain one kWh of 
electricity in an actual system. 
Hedging: a kind of price insurance operated through the use of options, futures, and 
swaps, which can also take place using long term contracts. 
Impedance (Z): the electrical characteristic of an electricity transmission line or 
transformer which quantifies that factor's ability to impede the flow of electrical power. 
Independent power producers: generators which deliver electricity to a system but are 
not owned by the utility or the transmission company, in a single-buyer model. 
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Installed reserve margin: the difference between the total generating capacity and the 
peak load. The objective of having sufficient installed reserve margin is to maintain the 
system's reliability by meeting unexpected circumstances such as plant outages. 
Interconnected system: individually owned and operated electricity networks which are 
connected to each other through transmission lines, known as tie-lines, for the objective of 
delivering and receiving electricity. 
Istisna: a purchasing mechanism based on Islamic financing principles. Istisna is a contract 
to purchase in the present a product (e. g. generator or transmission project) which Is going 
to be manufactured in the future against an agreed price. Payments are made to the 
contractor at each stage of completion of the project. 
Kirchhoff's (current) laws: laws stating that the algebraic sum of all currents directed 
toward (and away from) a junction point is zero. This means that, at any given node in the 
network, the power inflows should equal the outflows. 
Load (capacity) factor: the ratio of the actual amount of electricity produced to the 
maximum amount possible over the same period when applied to a single generator. A 
higher load factor means higher plant utilisation, as maximum capacity is built to meet 
peak demand, not average demand. 
Long run: a period over which complete adjustment to changes can take place. In 
microeconomics, it means the length of time over which a firm can enter or leave the 
industry and during which all its inputs are variable. 
Marginal cost: the increase in the total costs of a finn, due to the increase in its output by 
one additional unit. Marginal cost represents the opportunity cost, or the total sacrifice to 
society, for producing a given product. 
Market period: a very short period over which the quantity supplied is fixed and not 
responsive to changes in the market price. 
Marketer: an agent for generation projects who markets power on behalf of the generators 
and also arranges transmission and ancillary services as needed. The major difference 
between a marketer and a broker is that the former represents the generator while the 
latter 
acts as a middleman. 
Merit order: the rank in which generators are dispatched, based on their respective 
marginal generating costs, as the loading condition changes 
from base load to peak load 
and back. 
Monopoly: a structure of an industry in which there is only a single seller of the product, 
which has no close substitutes. 
Monopsony: a market in which there is only one buyer (as 
in the single-buyer electricity 
model) of some factor of production or the output of many producers 
(e. g. generators). 
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Natural monopoly: the situation which results when it is cheaper for one firm to produce 
a product or service, at a given level of demand, than it is for two or more firms to do so. 
Oligopsony: a form of buyer concentration, where a few large buyers confront many small 
suppliers. Thus, these powerful buyers are able to secure advantageous terms from the 
individual suppliers. 
Opportunity cost (or economic cost): the value or worth of the next best alternative (or 
opportunity) to economic good, or the cost of the sacrificed resources which are used to 
produce this good. 
Option contracts: contracts that give the owner the right but not the obligation to buy or 
sell a specified trading contract. These contracts allow the holder to buy (i. e. a call option) 
or to sell (i. e. a put option) a commodity (e. g. electricity energy) at the exercise price 
during a specified period of time in exchange for a one-off premium payment. 
Parallel flow: the electricity flow over a utility's transmission network which is caused by 
the electricity flows (transactions) over other networks. 
Pareto optimality: the situation which occurs when an economy's resources are allocated 
in such a way that no one individual can become better off without making someone else 
worse off. 
Peak load: the maximum (usually hourly integrated) demand of all customer demands 
plus system losses, which are usually expressed in MW, at a given moment in time. 
Perfect competition: the state of the world where there are assumed to be a large number 
of buyers and sellers for any product and each agent is a price taker. 
Power pool: traditionally, a co-operative arrangement whereby monopoly electricity 
utilities exchange electricity for the purpose of backup and cost saving. In a liberalised 
structure, an electricity pool is the arrangement whereby competing generators 
bid to 
establish which are to be dispatched first. 
Producer surplus: the area below the market price and above the respective supply curve. 
Productive efficiency is concerned with the lowest cost method of producing output 
demanded by consumers subject to the technical constraints of production. 
Productive 
efficiency assumes that it is not possible to re-arrange the production 
inputs and obtain 
more output of one good without reducing the output of another 
Rate-of-return regulation: the setting of a price that gives a firm or a utility, usually a 
monopoly, a competitive return on its assets. 
Reactive power: the kind of electricity which establishes and sustains 
the electric and 
magnetic fields of alternating current equipment. 
It must also supply the reactive losses on 
transmission facilities. 
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Ready reserve: the unused capacity of generation that is not on line but can be brought on line within 15 minutes. 
Real-Time Pricing: charges different retail electricity prices for different hours of the day and for different days of the year. Thus, these prices are able to capture the variations in 
supply/demand balances and, as such, reflective of wholesale prices. 
Regulation: the supervision of the economic activities of private and public enterprises by the government in the interest of economic efficiency, fairness, and safety. Regulation may be imposed by enacting laws, by setting up special regulatory agencies, or by encouraging 
self-regulation through the recognition of voluntary bodies. 
Reliability: a condition which, when applied to the electricity system, implies two 
components: adequacy and security. Adequacy is the ability of the system to meet the 
aggregate demand at all times, taking into account the unanticipated outages of system facilities. Security is the ability of the system to endure unexpected interruptions such as 
sudden loss of system facilities. 
Rent seeking: the behaviour of economic actors who use the political process to gain 
benefits which would not be attainable by accepting market outcomes. 
Resistance: is the electrical characteristic of an electricity transmission line or transformer 
which quantifies that factor's ability to oppose the flow of an electric current. 
Spinning reserves: the difference between maximum capacity and actual output of 
generating units that can be operational almost instantaneously. 
Spot market: a market where commodities (e. g. electricity) are traded for immediate 
delivery. 
Stranded investments (costs): investments that have been undertaken, but have become 
unprofitable due to the change in the regulatory system resulting in increased competition. 
For example, the cost of existing facilities are not longer needed as the utility's customers 
can chose to buy electricity from other sources. 
Strike (exercise) price: the price at which the underlying options contract is bought and 
sold in the event that the option is exercised. 
Sunk costs: the costs that have already been incurred but cannot be recovered, even in the 
long run, as they are expenses of specific factor inputs (e. g. transmission and distribution 
assets) which cannot be used for other purposes or easily resold. 
Swap market: the clearinghouse that allows contracts to be terminated with an exchange 
of physical or financial substitution. 
Third party access (TPA): the obligation of companies operating transmission (and 
distribution) networks to allow third parties (e. g. consumers and distribution companies) to 
make use of these networks. 
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Transmission losses: the amount of energy dissipated in the electrical transmission 
network when electricity travels along the transmission lines. 
Two-part tariff: the most common form of muti-part tariffs, in which purchasers of a 
product or service are charged both an access (entry) and a usage fee. 
Value added: the difference between the value of a firm's (or industry's) output and the 
cost of the inputs. So the value added of a firm is the value of what this firm adds to its 
bought-in materials and services through its own production and marketing efforts within 
the firm. 
Variable costs: the costs which tend to vary with the changes in the level of the finn's 
output. 
Welfare economics: a normative branch of economics that employ value judgements and 
concerned with the way economic activity ought to be arranged so as to maxIMIse the well- 
being of the nation by both increasing output and changing its distribution. 
Wholesale wheeling: a mechanism of trading where access by a generator to the 
purchasing utility across the transmission lines of another utility is allowed. Retail 
wheeling occurs when a non-utility generator sells power to a retail customer, such as a 
large industrial customer, over a utility's transmission network. 
X-inefficiency: the failure to achieve productive efficiency by using resources optimally 
so that the lowest possible cost for each level of service provision is attained. This type of 
inefficiency is assumed to occur when ownership and control are separated in fin-ns with 
monopolistic power. 
Yardstick competition: the situation where the regulated return for an individual 
company depends on its performance relative to the average. The horizontal disaggregation 
of the electricity distribution enables the regulator to overcome the problem of asymmetric 
information. 
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APPENDIX B 
Derivation of Tracing Formula Using Network Matrices 
This appendix is based on Bialek and Kattuman (1999). The tracing methodology will be 
derived by using the incidence and adjacency matrices of a network which is consisted of n 
nodes and m lines. For simplification, an example of a network with average flows (i. e. no 
transmission losses) is used as illustrated in Figure B. 1, below. 
Figure B. 1: A Network with Average Power Flows 
P, =304 L5 
221.5 L4 
Ll 
82.5 
13.5 
L2 59.5 
P, =394.5 394.5 
Gl (r-ýj 
P, =285.5 
172 
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112.5 
G2 rý_j 
Define P, PG, and PD as (n x I)vectors of nodal flows, nodal generations and nodal 
demands, respectively, and F as (m x 1) vector of branch flows. For this network; 
P= (394.5 172 304 285.5]T, 
PG = [394.5 112.5 0 01 
T 
PD = [0 0 304 203) 
Te 
F= [221.5 59.5 172 113.5 82.5]T, and 
the (m x n) incidence matrix B is: 
1 0 -1 0 
1 -1 00 
B= 0 1 0 -1 
1 0 0 -1 
0 0 -1 1 
(Equation B. 1) 
This matrix can be sPlit into matrix B. consisting of -I's and 
Bdconsisting of I's, as in the 
following: 
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00 
-1 o- -1000 
0 -1 00 1000 
Bu 000 Bd = 0100 
000 1000 
00 
-1 0 0001 
(Equation. B. 2) 
The adjacency matrix, D, is defined as (n X n) matrix with [D]ij =1 if there is a flow from 
node i to node j. The adjacency matrix can be calculated as D= -B 
TB 
and for the dU 
network shown in Figure B. 1 it is: 
0 
-B 
TB0001 
(Equation. B. 3) du0000 
-0010 
Let us now define (n x n) matrix Fdsuch that its (ij) element is equal to the flow in line i-j 
towards node j (i. e. downstream). Fdhas the same structure as the adjacency matrix D and 
can be calculated as 
F= -B 
T diag(F)B,, dd 
Thus, for the network shown in Figure B. 1, 
0 593 221.5 1133 
0 0 0 172 F 0 0 0 0 
-0 
0 82.5 0 
(Equation. B. 4) 
(Equation. B. 5) 
T 
where the (ij) element Of d is equal to the flow in 
line i-j towards node i (i. e. upstream). 
The Kirchhoff Current Law can be expressed as: 
p=+ Tj P=PD+Fd 1 or PG Fý (Equation-B-6) 
where 1 is (n x 1) vector of I's. 
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Equation. B. 6, above, can be expanded as: 
P =P-Fdl=P+B T diag(F)B 1 DTdu 
(Equafion. B. 7) 
= (I +Bd diag(F)B u 
diag(P -')P =AdP 
TT PG= P-Fý I= P+Budiag(F)Bd 1 
(Equation-B. 8) 
(I+B T diag(F)B diag(P-')P =AP udu 
where I is the unity matrix of rank n and 
A =I+B T diag(F)B diag(P-1) ddu (Equation. B. 9) 
A=I+BT diag(F)B diag(P-1) uud 
The diag(P-1) is a diagonal matrix with its i-th diagonal element equal to the reciprocal of i- 
th nodal flow, llPi. Note that Adhas the same structure as the adjacency matrix , D, but 
with addition of a diagonal, while the structure of A,, is the transpose of Ad. 
The elements of Adand A,, matrices can be calculated as: 
for i=j 
IPjillPj forjcai" 
for i=j 
[Ad lij 
j C=- ad -lPjillPj for i 
where; 
(Equation. B. 10) 
ad is the set of nodes supplied directly from node i (it corresponds to non-zero off- i 
diagonal columns in the i-th row of Fdor 
Ad), and 
ai" is the set of nodes supplying directly node i (it corresponds to non-zero off-diagonal 
columns in the i-th row of FT or A,, ). d 
Since [A,, ], j 
Pj = [Ad IjiPi, adding matrices A,, and 
Adgives a matrix of a structure 
identical to that of the nodal admittance matrix. 
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As A,, and Adare non-singular, equation-B. 7 and B. 8 allow calculating a nodal flow as the 
linear combination of components supplied from individual generators or to individual 
loads: 
P=AulpG and P=AdlpD (Equation B-11) 
The Proportional Sharing Rule allows the presentation of individual nodal demands as the 
sum of components supplied from individual generators or to individual nodes: 
D, Gi PDi 
LDi 
[A -ul 
lik PGk PGi = 
fGi 
[Ad, lik PDk (Equation. B. 12) Pi k=l Pi k=l 
The inclusion of losses can be done by considering gross or net network flows. For the 
gross flows, the flow vector F used to calculate A,, in equation. B. 9 must be replaced by the 
vector of flows at the sending end of each line, Fsend. For the net flows, vector F used to 
calculate Adin equation. B. 9 must be replaced by the vector of flows at the receiving end of 
each line, F, Thus, matrices A,, and Adwill be expressed as: 
Ad=I+B T diag(F,, )B,, diag(P-1) d 
A =I+B 
T diag(F 
uu send)Bddiag(P-1) 
(Equation. B. 13) 
and the rest of the method will be the same as that described in Chapter Four (Sections 
4.4.4 and 4.4.5). 
